Interpreting the self : an analysis of the first-person's perspective of beliefs in Donald Davidson's radical interpretationism by Gildenhuys, Annemie
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
INTERPRETING THE SELF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST-
PERSON'S PERSPECTIVE OF BELIEFS IN DONALD 
DAVIDSON'S RADICAL INTERPRETATIONISM 
ANNEMIE GILDENHUYS 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment for the Master of Social Science in Philosophy 
University of Cape Town 
2006 
The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation of South Africa towards 
this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at 
are those of the author, and are not to be attributed to the National Research 
Foundation. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I examine the ability of Donald Davidson's influential theory of radical 
interpretationism to accommodate the differences between a first-person's and a third-
person's perspectives of beliefs. I first describe the differences between these two 
perspectives, which collectively I call the asymmetry thesis. I then investigate in 
detail two interpretations of Davidson's strategy for accommodating the asymmetry 
thesis in his system of radical interpretationism. I call the standard interpretation the 
meaning asymmetry, and my own interpretation the sentence held-true asymmetry. I 
argue that, notwithstanding the moderate success of the meaning asymmetry in 
accounting for the asymmetry thesis in theory, it cannot be a plausible explanation of 
it since it cannot be translated into what we do in our linguistic communities with our 
shared linguistic conventions. I conclude by describing my sentence held-true 
asymmetry and arguing that it allows Davidson's radical interpretationism to 
accommodate the asymmetry thesis, both in theory and in practice. This dissertation, 
thus, opposes the popular belief that Davidson's system of radical interpretationism 
cannot accommodate the asymmetry thesis, precisely because it rejects the standard 
interpretation of Davidson's strategy for achieving this, in favour of one that utilises 
its strengths without falling victim to its weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I intend to evaluate the ability of Donald Davidson's theory of 
interpretationism to account for the way in which the first-person's stance towards her 
own beliefs differs from that of her interlocutors. The project will focus on the first-
person's perspective on beliefs specifically, and not on sensations like pain or thirst. I 
also intend the conclusion not to be generalised to all propositional attitudes, since the 
problems that the different propositional attitudes pose for the first-person perspective 
may differ. Before spelling out the problem at the heart of this project, a brief, and 
regrettably over simplistic, history will reveal the origin of the question. Since this 
project focuses on beliefs, as opposed to sensations, the historical overview will 
likewise focus on beliefs. 
Cartesian dualism owes its past popularity to the way in which it fits with our 
intuitions regarding our access to our own mental states, of which I will use beliefs as 
example. It is reasonable to suspect that this was, in fact, Descartes' original 
motivation for it. According to these intuitions, a first-person has authoritative and 
immediate access to her own beliefs. She is in a position of authority over her own 
beliefs because she is usually right about what she believes. She enjoys immediate 
access to her beliefs since she knows, without having to make use of her own 
behaviour, speech or environment as evidence, what she believes. These intuitions 
found their ideal home in dualism, according to which the first-person's authoritative 
and immediate knowledge of her beliefs was secured by the fact that they were states 
that were necessarily first-person accessible and not necessarily third-person 
accessible. This led Descartes to propose that our mental states were located in an 
inner space accessible only to the person whose space it was. The first-person could 
then access her own beliefs by scanning this private space, via a mechanism like 
introspection, for example. She possessed a collection of beliefs which she discovered 
directly through introspection and which others could discover only by drawing 
inferences from her behaviour and speech, thereby securing her immediate access. 
And, because she had direct and unmediated access through introspection, while 
others had to access her beliefs indirectly through her behaviour, she was in a better 
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position to know what her beliefs were than anyone else, thereby securing her position 
of authority. The only type of space that Descartes could think of that would not be 
necessarily third-person accessible, was an immaterial mind, somehow attached to a 
material body. Cartesian dualism, thus, became a theory that held that minds were 
immaterial entities that housed immaterial mental states that the person to whom they 
belonged could access immediately and authoritatively. 
The 20th century was a period in which Cartesian dualism was severely crippled by 
numerous objections that philosophers made to it. It was mostly criticised for making 
our minds essentially inaccessible to others, which was precisely the strategy whereby 
it secured first-person authority and immediacy. Firstly, philosophers realised, partly 
due to Sigmund Freud's theory of the unconscious, that all our mental states were 
certainly not accessible to us and that third-persons were often in a good position 
(sometimes even a better position than us) to know what mental state we were in. The 
introspective scanning of a necessarily first-person accessible inner space made it 
almost impossible for the first-person to be wrong about her own beliefs, and the fact 
that her beliefs themselves were necessarily inaccessible to observers made it almost 
impossible for a third-person to correct her regarding them. 
Secondly, many questions arose as to the plausibility of a theory that claimed that 
internal states could allow us to be in touch with the external world. Beliefs, for 
example, were meant to be about events in an external world, but if they were wholly 
private, it was difficult to see how we could ever know that they represented 
something in an external world. Cartesian dualism, since it insisted on internal states 
as the vehicles of knowledge about external things, isolated us from the world that we 
were attempting to access. It, as a result, opened up the possibility that our beliefs 
were the way they were, independent of what was going on in the world around us; an 
idea that Descartes himself conveyed through his evil demon thought experiment. 
These objections, together with numerous others, gave rise to a shift away from 
dualism towards materialist theories of mind, according to which there was certainly 
no talk of immaterial minds and mental states. Most of these materialists, however, 
still held onto one of the main commitments of Cartesian dualism, namely, the 
conception of beliefs (and mental states more generally) as internal states. The 
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difference was that they acknowledged that, even though a first-person could access 
her own beliefs directly and authoritatively, the material nature of the mental allowed 
a third-person to access them as well. Philosophers provided numerous different 
explanations for authority and immediacy, but they all essentially relied on some form 
of internal scanning mechanism to scan the person's internal physical or functional 
states. The two most prominent theories were the identity theory, according to which 
beliefs just were brain states, and functionalism, according to which beliefs were 
functional states that involved their causes, their relations to other functional states 
and their outputs. 
These theories, then, became the target of interpretationists who did not believe that 
they improved much upon Cartesian dualism. Firstly, interpretationists point out that 
beliefs (and more generally all propositional attitudes like desires, intentions, hopes, 
etc. are constitutively governed by rationality, unlike any physical, mechanical or 
computational device known to us. One of the main advantages of physicalist theories 
over Cartesian dualism is that they allow empirical, scientifically verifiable theories of 
the mental in which beliefs exhibit the same sort of law-like relationships (to the 
world, to each other and to behaviour) that are found in empirical sciences like 
geography and biology. Interpretationists, however, think that beliefs have to be 
defined, not in terms of their causal roles in producing behaviour (like functionalism 
maintains), but rather in terms of their roles in rationalizing other propositional 
attitudes and behaviour. Rationality, and the rationalisation of other propositional 
attitudes and behaviour, according to them, cannot involve the same law-like 
relationships found in empirical sciences, since it prescribes, given our beliefs and 
desires, firstly, what we ought to do, secondly, how we ought to reason and thirdly, 
which other beliefs and desires we ought to hold. It involves what we ought to do, not 
what we, as a matter of empirical fact, do. It involves prescriptions, not descriptions. 
It involves values, not facts. If we want to respect the constitutive role that rationality 
plays in beliefs together with the identity of beliefs as rationalisations of other 
propositional attitudes and of behaviour, then we cannot expect theories that involve 
them to take the same form as the empirical theories that hold over functional and 
physical brain states. 
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Secondly, one feature, specifically of beliefs, that was first pointed out by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, is the transparency that they seem to have to the world. When the first-
person decides that she has a belief, she is not just describing some physical or 
functional brain state, but she is actually committing herself to the truth of something 
in the world. If beliefs were just physical brain states, it is difficult to know why it 
would not be possible for her to describe those states without committing herself to 
the truth of something in the world. It is certainly a feature that no other bodily state 
has. Functionalism does not do much better, since it cannot explain how an 
identification and a description of a functional state can commit us to the truth of 
something in the world, while an identification and description of exactly that same 
functional state in another is no more than a mere identification or description of a 
functional state. 
These problems brought about theories, of which interpretationism was one, that 
essentially abandoned the conception of mental states as internal states. According to 
interpretationists, beliefs (and more generally all propositional attitudes) are not inner 
states. That is, claims about what a subject believes, for example, are not claims about 
her internal physical (or any other) states. The interpretationist trend is to define such 
attitudes as properties or statuses that individuals have in virtue of being interpreted as 
such by others. A belief that P, for example, is a property that we attribute to a person, 
like a length of thirty centimetres or twelve inches are properties that we attribute to a 
ruler. We obviously have physical brain states, and we may have functional states, in 
the same way as a ruler has length. But in order to call something a belief that P, it has 
to be attributable to us by a third-person's judgement of its rational ising role in our 
behaviour. As in the second objection to the identity theory and functionalism above, 
interpretationists think that beliefs just are properties that rationalise other 
propositional attitudes, behaviour and speech. There is no element of beliefs that falls 
outside a project of interpretation that rationalises our attitudes, behaviour and speech. 
For something to qualify as mental, it, thus, has to be attributable by a third-person in 
a context of this type of rationalisation or interpretation. That is, we cannot settle the 
fact of what we believe on our own or in conjunction with a neurologist that is 
examining our brains or our nervous systems. Conversely, something cannot be such 
an attitude if it is not possible for a third-person to attribute it to us. Beliefs do not 
exist independent of being attributed to us because third-person attributions fix the 
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beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. that we have. Third-person attributions are often 
wrong, as we all know, but this is because they do not use proper methods to interpret 
us, or because they know too little about us to fix our propositional attitudes 
accurately. They can be fixed accurately only by a fully informed interpreter that is 
employing the right sort of system of interpretation. What a fully informed interpreter, 
who employs a proper system of interpretation, cannot find out about the 
propositional attitudes, is, thus, not a propositional attitude at all. If a proper method 
of interpretation is used, it will yield everything that can be called propositional 
attitudes. So, if we know what a proper system of interpretation is, and we know 
everything such a system of interpretation can interpret, then we know everything 
there is to know about the propositional attitudes. More precisely, if we want to know 
what a belief is, we can study the best method on the basis of which it is attributed. 
So, if we want to know which beliefs we have, we can study the best method whereby 
they are attributed to us. 
The particulars of the interpretationist proposal have been elaborated in a variety of 
ways, but they all share the claim that the process of interpretation, whereby others 
attempt to make sense of us, fixes the propositional attitudes that we possess. By this 
they do not mean that the epistemological question of what a person, for example, 
believes can be answered by conducting a project of interpretation. They literally 
mean that a belief is constituted by, or just is, whatever the best scheme for making 
sense of us will attribute to us. No neurophysiological examination of a brain or a 
nervous system can contribute information about the mental that an appropriate 
interpretive scheme cannot. This claim has, as a result, been termed interpretationism 
and its original and leading advocate is Donald Davidson. Interpretationists would 
probably want to extend their theory to the sensations as well, but, since this is still in 
its infancy, I have not, and will not, include them in the discussion. 
The interpretationist trend has given rise to its own difficulties, of which the question 
of the first-person perspective is the most significant and persistent. If Cartesian 
dualists, identity theorists and functionalists all deliberately constructed theories with 
beliefs as inner states in order to accommodate authority and immediacy, 
interpretationists' commitment to mental states as socially ascribed properties or 
social statuses (rather than inner states), poses an immediate problem for them. If our 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ASYMMETRY THESIS 
Philosophers often suggest that there are differences between the way in which we 
know, and relate to, our own beliefs and the way in which we know, and relate to, 
those of others. They generally agree that a theory of beliefs and belief attributions is 
more desirable if it is able to leave room for the differences between these two 
perspectives. In this chapter I intend to examine what these differences are and why it 
is desirable that theories of beliefs and belief attributions are able to leave room for 
them. In section 1, I will consider various methodologies for highlighting these 
differences, with the aim of arguing that we should derive them from a pre-theoretical 
description of our everyday practices rather than from theories of self-knowledge or 
from personal reports of believing. In section 2, I will show that this pre-theoretical 
description of our everyday practices reveals three such differences between the first 
and third-person perspectives on beliefs, that individually I call the evidence, the 
transparency and the authority asymmetries, and collectively I call the asymmetry 
thesis. In section 3, I will show why it is desirable that any theory of beliefs is able to 
leave room for the asymmetries. In section 4, I will suggest four desired constraints on 
the explanations of the asymmetry thesis. 
1. METHODOLOGY 
If theories of beliefs are more desirable if they can leave room for the asymmetry 
thesis, the need to spell out the asymmetries becomes evident. The difficulty with 
doing so is that there exists no fixed collection of such asymmetries that such theories 
can be assessed on. Philosophers disagree about the exact ways in which the two 
perspectives differ, and their disagreement can often be traced to the method by which 
they arrive at the asymmetries. 
Before proceeding to a description of the asymmetries, I wish to justify my view that, 
in a project that proposes to assess a theory of beliefs, the ways in which the first- and 
third-person perspectives differ should be derived from a description of our common 
everyday epistemic practices involved in justifying beliefs and our knowledge about 
them. I propose to do this by describing three possible strategies for determining the 
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asymmetries together with an explanation of why, in this type of project, the third is 
preferred to the first two. 
The ways in which the two perspectives on beliefs differ can be established, firstly, by 
appealing to the best theories or constructing a new theory, secondly, by consulting 
our personal reports about believing and, thirdly, by describing those of our practices 
that exhibit the ways in which we routinely treat our own beliefs differently from 
those that we attribute to others. 
1.1. THE ASYMMETRIES AT A THEORETICAL LEVEL 
The nature of the asymmetries often depend, either upon the theories that attempt to 
explain them, or upon more comprehensive theories of mind. For example, most 
logical behaviourists argue that we are more likely than others to be correct about 
which beliefs we hold because we spend more time observing our own behaviour than 
others do. I Several contemporary Theories that employ concepts like rationality and 
avowal in their accounts of self-knowledge, on the other hand, claim that the greater 
likelihood of being correct about our beliefs is, in some sense, a constitutive part of 
self-knowledge.2 Further, we are all familiar with the way in which traditional 
Cartesianism brought about the first-personal notions of infallibility and omniscience; 
that is, the idea that we cannot be mistaken about what beliefs we hold and the view 
that we cannot be unaware ofa belief that we do hold, respectively.3 These are all 
versions of an authority asymmetry, but the theories within which they appear 
advance very different construals of such authority. If theorists propose different 
dissimilarities between the first- and third-person stances towards beliefs, then they 
will inevitably expect theories of beliefs to accommodate different asymmetries. The 
consequent disagreement will then concern the problem of which asymmetries need to 
be accommodated, as opposed to the question of the plausibility of such theories. A 
project that is aimed at evaluating a theory, like interpretationism, in terms of whether 
it provides a plausible explanation of the multi-perspectival character of beliefs will, 
as a result, have to be designed to persuade the proponents of such theories of three 
conclusions: firstly, that the specific asymmetries defended in the project are correct 
(which may require a lot of theorising), secondly, that any theory that fails to account 
for them is an implausible theory of beliefs and, thirdly, that interpretationism cannot 
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account for them. This threatens to be a lengthy and laborious task and, if attempted 
in one project, it runs the risk of neglecting to deal with all three these questions in 
sufficient depth. 
A second disadvantage of evaluating a theory according to whether it can 
accommodate asymmetries obtained from a specific theory, is that the conclusion of 
such a project will be oflittle importance to many. There is not much to gain from a 
project that attempts to establish whether one theory (such as interpretationism) can 
accommodate conditions spelled out in another theory (such as the rationality or 
avowal models of self-knowledge). This is true precisely because everyone does not 
hold these theories. An interpretationist is unlikely to be convinced that her theory is 
defective just because it cannot accommodate a theory that she may not even endorse. 
She is more likely to work on a reply that rejects the other theory. She may be more 
easily convinced of the need to revise her theory if she is shown that it cannot 
accommodate some of the strongest intuitions about beliefs which she most probably 
shares. 
1.2. THE ASYMMETRIES AT A PRE-THEORETICAL LEVEL 
Instead of relying on a theory to provide us with the asymmetries, we can work at a 
pre-theoretical, intuitive level to determine what the asymmetries are that theories of 
beliefs are required to account for. This resembles the procedure most commonly 
employed by moral and political philosophy according to which we construct theories 
that are consistent with our intuitions and according to which our theories are 
permitted to disregard such common intuitions only in cases where they can be 
demonstrated to be in error. In this case we expect all theories of beliefs to be able to 
allow for an explanation of the way in which we commonly think of our own beliefs 
as being different in some respects from those we attribute to others. 
Such pre-theoretical data can be derived from two sources, either from people's 
personal reports about beliefs and believing, or from some of our most common 
everyday practices. 
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1.2.1. THE ASYMMETRIES DERIVED FROM PERSONAL BELIEF REPORTS 
There are good reasons to suspect that the latter option is more feasible than the 
former. If the pre-theoretical level is preferred to the theoretical level because it 
promises more agreement over what exactly the asymmetries are, then the strategy of 
deriving the asymmetries from individual reports is a poor direction to pursue. One 
example of an asymmetry obtained from an individual's statement about beliefs is the 
following: I am sure that I am right about what my beliefs are, but I experience some 
uncertainty about the accuracy of the belief-attributions I make to someone else. 
The advantages appear to be that, firstly, this version of the authority asymmetry does 
not rely on any theory for its accuracy and, secondly, it is likely to be endorsed both 
by philosophers of different persuasions and by most laypersons. Nevertheless, even 
though this approach helps us to overcome the theory-specific nature of the 
asymmetries, it bears the disadvantage of relying on something even more person-
specific. Individual reports may give rise to very different construals of the 
asymmetries. The resulting asymmetries will depend on the amount of self-
examination that people have engaged in and judgments that they have made about 
beliefs. Such asymmetries will once again rely on the unique theories that people hold 
about beliefs. Individual reports about beliefs and believing, accordingly, are likely to 
lead to asymmetries whose characters are person-specific in a way that places it 
beyond any method of independent investigation.4 
In the context of my specific project, it is also worth observing that one of the chief 
motivating factors behind interpretationism is the avoidance of this intrinsically 
subjective, individualistic portrayal of the mental. If the asymmetries are derived from 
our subjective, individual reports of beliefs, interpretationists may be inclined to 
dismiss them for this reason alone. Obtaining the asymmetries from personal reports 
of beliefs and believing is, thus, not a good way of revealing our intuitions regarding 
the asymmetries. 
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1.2.2. THE ASYMMETRIES DERIVED FROM PRACTICE 
The most promising approach to describe the asymmetries, as a result, seems to be to 
draw attention to some of our everyday epistemic and conversational practices (such 
as the giving and asking for reasons, the justification of beliefs and belief-claims, etc.) 
that demonstrate that we do not treat first- and third-person knowledge of~ and stances 
towards, beliefs identically. This approach respects not only our need to keep the 
asymmetries theory-free, but it also keeps our intuitions independent of individual 
experiences or reports. Thus, whatever the exact nature of the theoretical asymmetries 
that philosophers derive from such practices, and whatever the nature of our 
individual reports of believing, a more feasible question is whether theories can 
explain the practices themselves. 
I alluded to the advantages of the practical approach above. Firstly, critics may deny 
the everyday practices that I posit below, much as I deny first personal reports of 
believing. But, given the fact that such practices are publicly observable and 
participated in by all, they are harder to deny than personal reports of believing are. 
Secondly, since the practices are harder to deny than information mined from the 
other two approaches, they are the least misleading sources of the asymmetries. My 
critics are not going to be able to reject the conclusion of the thesis purely because of 
rejecting a theory or a personal report from which the asymmetries are derived. The 
increased likelihood of the shared point of departure will contribute to the force of the 
conclusion. 
In the following section I, therefore, intend to describe a number of our everyday 
epistemic and conversational practices that suggest that there are three ways in which 
we, in our ordinary interactions with each other, treat our own beliefs differently from 
those that we attribute to others. 
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2. THE ASYMMETRY THESIS 
2.1. THE EVIDENCE ASYMMETRY 
The first way in which we treat the beliefs of others in a manner different from our 
own, is the role that we allow verbal and behavioural evidence to play in our 
knowledge of which beliefs are held. When asked how I know that another person 
believes something, I usually cite aspects obtained from her environment, some 
inferences from her other beliefs and her verbal and non-verbal behaviour (hereafter 
just behaviour) as evidence for my suspicion that the beliefis held. When asked how I 
know that I believe something, on the other hand, I may cite elements from my 
environment, infrequently but possibly draw inferences from some of my other 
beliefs, but it is unlikely that I will cite any information about my behaviour. In other 
words, I treat others, and they treat me, as if my observations of what they say and do 
are important when acquiring knowledge of their beliefs, while I treat myself, and 
others treat me, as if I can know what my own beliefs are without observing my own 
behaviour. 
If I am asked what reason I have for claiming that Jane believes that a man is a 
murderer, I am likely to say that she believes it because she was startled and fled 
when coming upon him in the dark alley. If I am asked what reason I have for 
thinking that I believe that the man is a murderer, I am very unlikely to say that I 
think that I believe that the man is guilty because I observed myself being startled and 
fleeing from him when coming upon him in the dark alley. 
In case 1, where I am asked to provide the evidence on the basis of which I achieve, 
or wish to acquire, my knowledge of the beliefs of someone else, a response is given 
effortlessly. It takes the form of citing or seeking the behaviour of others, together 
with some wider environmental evidence. Conversely, Case 2, where the evidence 
that gives rise to my knowledge of my own beliefs and desires is sought, I do not cite 
behaviour. not of my own or of others. In fact, in practice, such a question is very 
rarely asked, precisely because we do not expect that such behavioural evidence is 
used.s If! claim that I know that Jane believes that the man is guilty, I will be 
expected to provide at least some behavioural evidence for my claim to knowledge. It 
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is not only an appropriate question to ask, but it is, in reality, almost always asked 
when a third-person (like Jane) is discussed by two other persons. My interlocutors, 
on the contrary, are unlikely to ask me for behavioural evidence for my claim that I 
know that I believe that the man is guilty. Not only is it an inappropriate question for 
which there does not seem to be an adequate response, but it is, in reality, hardly ever 
asked. 
Further, our interlocutors usually notice the switch from typically first-personal to 
behaviour-based self-attributions and typically treat them as less confident. 
Let us imagine that the murderer in question is a speaker (S)'s husband. Now, the 
question about S's belief regarding a man's guilt is a question about whether she 
believes her husband to be guilty of murder. She declares that she does not think that 
her husband is capable of killing anyone because he is such a sensitive person. But her 
friends and family point out to her that she acts as if she believes that he is guilty. She 
still thinks that he couldn't possibly be a murderer, but she can understand that there 
is good evidence that she, as a matter of fact, does believe that he is guilty. This 
perplexing situation may compel her to assert that she knows that she believes that he 
is guilty, because she tinds herself acting fearfully in his company. 
This is a familiar case of emotional conflict which we are able to accommodate in our 
relations with others. Those with whom she interacts will understand her conflict and 
will be able to make sense of her evidence-based self-attribution. But they will notice 
that she is not relating to herself in the same way that people usually do, evidenced by 
the fact that they will ask why she is treating it as something that she would have 
attributed to anyone who exhibited some specific behaviour, instead of attributing it 
directly to herself in a specific circumstance. They will also assume that she is 
uncertain about what she believes. She says that she believes X, because behaviour Y 
(when engaged in both by herself and by others) would make sense only in the 
presence of a belief in X. She seems confused about what she believes, so she 
attempts to draw inferences from the same sort of evidence that she would have used 
when attributing beliefs to someone else. And instead of giving herself and others 
more confidence that she is sure of what she believes, the inference from her 
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behaviour to a likely belief will be taken to indicate uncertainty, rather than 
confidence, in the self-attribution. 
Evidence-based self-attributions are also treated as inappropriate, or as if there is 
something wrong with the way the speaker relates to herself. The case above 
illustrates this clearly. It is improbable that a speaker will say that she concludes that 
she believes that a man is guilty because she observed herself acting fearfully in his 
company. And ifshe were to do so (such as in the case above), her interlocutors will 
immediately know that there is some sort of psychological conflict or unusually low 
level of self-awareness involved. They are likely to start questioning why she seems 
unwilling to attribute the belief to herself via some other method that does not involve 
behavioural evidence. And if they judge that she is incapable of reaching a conclusion 
about what she believes without consulting such evidence, her interlocutors will treat 
her as someone who has, for some reason, temporarily lost touch with herself. 
Lastly, these differences in the way we treat first- and third-person beliefs is even 
more obvious when we move from the treatment of one individual evidence-based 
self-attribution to the handling of general self-attributions of this sort. As seen above, 
individual cases of evidence-based self-attributions occur infrequently and they are 
treated as being fairly peculiar. And if this is true for individual cases of evidence-
based self-attribution, we should not be surprised that, in practice, we do not have a 
way of dealing with someone that generally self-attributes beliefs based on 
behavioural and verbal evidence. 
2.1.1. THE EVIDENCE ASYMMETRY AND ORDINARY CASES OF 
BELIEVING 
Some critics may argue that I chose the above case specifically because it leads to the 
conclusion I am attempting to defend. Such thinkers may try to construct more 
ordinary cases of evidence-based self-attribution to attempt to prove that we do not 
usually treat such self-attributions as uncertain or peculiar. What about a case where, 
for example, a friend asks me which chocolate bar I believe I like the best. I am sure 
that I do not believe that anyone chocolate bar is tastier than the others, which is what 
I tell him I believe. He then suggests that I must believe that Tex bars are tastier than 
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other chocolate bars, since the last fifteen chocolate bars I bought included ten Tex 
bars. I then agree with him that I do believe it, since my behaviour suggests it. 
But this is where the example collapses. In most cases the interlocutor will be 
surprised if! self-attribute the belief based on behavioural evidence only. My friend 
will probably continue to question whether his observation of my behaviour genuinely 
indicates that I believe what he thinks I do. He will expect me to think about it some 
more, arriving at a conclusion about my chocolate bar-related beliefs by some method 
other than observing my own past and present behaviour. Others can point out some 
of our behavioural patterns together with their interpretations of them, but whether we 
agree that the suggestions are accurate is expected to be settled in some other, first-
personal, way. 
2.1.2. THE EVIDENCE ASYMMETRY AND PAST BELIEFS 
Some critics may try to argue that the ditTerence between our treatments of the two 
perspectives is not significant in the case of the attribution of past beliefs. 
But even most past beliefs are dealt with in this way. If a friend asked me what reason 
I have for thinking that Jane believed that the man was a murderer, I will still say that 
Jane must have believed it since she was startled and fled when coming upon him in 
the dark alley. Ifhe asks me what reason I have for thinking that I believed that the 
man was a murderer, I am likely to respond in one of two ways. I will either tell him 
that I remember that I believed it and that I did not use my behavioural and verbal 
evidence to self-attribute it, or I might tell him that I cannot remember what I 
believed, but that I must have believed that the man was a murderer since I remember 
being startled and running off when coming upon him in a dark alley. 
As the last response indicates, we do occasionally cite our behaviour as sources of 
evidence for what we believed in the past. But then the only difference between self-
attribution of present and past beliefs is that occasional evidence-based self-
attributions of past beliefs are likely to be treated more favourably than such self-
attributions of present beliefs. They are not viewed as indicative of some 
psychological conflict or an unusually low level of self-awareness. If it is done on a 
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propositional attitudes are fixed by attributions from a third-person stance, it casts 
doubt on our ability to take up a first-person stance towards such attitudes. That is, it 
seems to imply that our knowledge of our own propositional attitudes will have to be 
obtained by adopting the position of a third person towards ourselves; that our self-
attribution and revision of such attitudes will have to be achieved in the same way that 
we, as someone else's third-persons, achieve the attribution and revision of their 
attitudes; that we will have to relate to our propositional attitudes in the same way as 
we, as third persons, relate to those held by others. We do, however, by now know 
that the knowledge that we have, and the relation that we adopt, towards our own 
propositional attitudes is different from our knowledge of, and our relation towards, 
those of others. 
The objective of this research project is to explore the relation between Donald 
Davidson's version of interpretationism and the first-person's perspectives of beliefs. 
Once again, since different propositional attitudes may pose slightly different 
problems, I will focus on beliefs specifically. The type of questions that will be 
addressed are the following: In chapter 2, I will investigate the nature of the 
differences between our knowledge of, and relation to, our own beliefs and our 
knowledge of, and relation to, those possessed by others. I will argue that three such 
differences can be derived from our common everyday epistemic and conversational 
practices, which I collectively call the asymmetry thesis. In chapter 3, I will describe 
Donald Davidson's influential verSlOn of interpretationism, called radical 
interpretation, and sketch his strategy for accommodating the asymmetry thesis in it. 
The common view is that Davidson's radical interpretationism cannot account for the 
asymmetry thesis, but I want to argue that this view is motivated by a 
misunderstanding of Davidson's strategy to accommodate it. I will, consequently, 
claim that his reconciliation strategy can be interpreted in two different ways: the 
standard interpretation of it, which I will call the meaning asymmetry, and my own 
interpretation, which I will call the sentence held-true asymmetry. In chapters 4 and 5, 
I will argue that, notwithstanding some moderate success in accounting for the 
asymmetry thesis, the meaning asymmetry interpretation cannot give a satisfactory 
account of it. In chapter 6, I want to offer my sentence held-true asymmetry 
interpretation, with the aim of arguing that it allows Davidson's radical 
interpretationism to accommodate the asymmetry thesis. 
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regular basis, though, observers are likely to treat them as being just as unusual and 
peculiar as regular present-tense ones. We can accommodate people who occasionally 
self-attribute past beliefs based on behavioural evidence, but we just do not easily 
accommodate a person who generally self-attributes past beliefs based on such 
evidence. 
2.2. THE TRANSPARENCY ASYMMETRY 
I treat my own beliefs as consistent with what in the world I hold true, while I treat 
the beliefs of others as rationalisations of their behaviour. Likewise, they treat my 
beliefs as states that make sense of my behaviour, while they treat their own as states 
that express their view of what is true in the world. That is why, from the third-person 
perspective, beliefs can be divorced from the question of their truth, whereas first-
person attributions cannot come apart from an assessment of their truth. 6 1fT related to 
my own beliefs primarily as causes of my behaviour, their truth would not matter to 
7 
me. 
When self-attributing a belief~ or when revising a belief attribution to myself, I 
invariably attribute something that is consistent with my view of some states of affairs 
in the world. If I claim that I believe that leopards are dangerous pets, I am thereby 
claiming that, from my point of view, leopards are dangerous pets. I do not attribute a 
belief to myself without taking a stand on the truth of something external to me. I 
simply will not claim that I have the belief about leopards without concerning myself 
with questions about what they eat, whether they behave aggressively, whether they 
can be taught to be submissive, etc.; that is, with the question of whether they are, in 
fact, dangerous. I, moreover, certainly will not attribute the belief that they are 
dangerous pets to myself while deciding that I think that they are quite harmless. My 
interlocutors will not ask me both what I believe and how I see the world since they 
know that my responses to the two questions will be the same. 
When I attribute a belief, or revise a belief attribution to someone else, I do not 
concern myself with the truth of any proposition or state of affairs. If I claim that 
James believes that leopards are dangerous pets, I attribute this belief to him on the 
basis of his verbal reports of what he says he believes and his non-verbal behaviour 
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when visiting someone that keeps such pets, both interpreted in the context of what 
else I know that he believes. In such cases, I am not concerning myself with leopards 
at all. If I want to know what to attribute to him, I concern myself with questions like: 
"Does he have the tendency to be afraid of animals that bite and scratch?" "Does he 
own a leopard?" "Does he act responsibly around it?" etc. It is, accordingly, common 
for my interlocutors to ask me both the questions about what someone else believes 
and what I hold true, since my responses to the two questions may differ. 
Lastly, if I change my view of an aspect of the world, I do not have to take on a 
separate task of revising my self-attribution. The self-attribution is revised 
involuntarily when I change my view of something in the world. If my interlocutors 
want me to change the belief that I attribute to myself, they simply try to change my 
view of the state of affairs that my belief is about. 
2.3. THE AUTHORITY ASYMMETRY 
While communicating with others, everyone assumes that we are usually more likely 
to be correct about our own beliefs than those with whom we interact.8 In special 
cases, it may be possible for others to override our first person claim about what we 
believe, but, in general, it is accepted that our judgement of what we believe is a 
better indication of what we really believe than a judgement offered by an observer. 
Many of our practices can serve as evidence for this. 
We expect to be treated as if we are usually correct about our own beliefs. We expect 
others to treat us in a way that acknowledges that they rely on us for information of 
what we genuinely believe, even in cases where they happen to know us well. This is 
demonstrated clearly by the fact that we become angry or argumentative when others 
do not respect our claim about what we believe. Imagine a situation in which I claim 
that golf is a boring game, while a friend uses the fact that I play golf every Saturday 
as evidence that I in fact believe that it is exciting. I argue that I do not play because I 
enjoy golf, but because I hope to meet new business partners. My friend may then cite 
my enthusiasm on the golf course as a reason to think that I do in fact believe that golf 
is exciting. I will respond that I fake the enthusiasm in order to interest enthusiastic 
businessmen. Let us assume that my friend concludes his side of the discussion by 
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claiming that, no matter what I think I believe, I actually do believe that playing golf 
is exciting. 
In this situation, I am likely to become annoyed and either terminate the discussion 
and ignore the interlocutor, or become angry and argue that I am more likely to be 
right about what I believe than my interlocutor is since they are my own beliefs, based 
on my reasons to believe that I know better than anyone else. 9 If, however, my 
interlocutor does turn out to be right, everyone is likely to be surprised that I managed 
to misidentify my own belief, which provides another practice in support of the 
authority asymmetry. 
Such debates occur infrequently, but when they do occur, the third-person usually 
takes a questioning, rather than a positive, stance. Exchanges are fairly common in 
which an interlocutor doubts that a speaker has identified her belief correctly and asks 
her for more information about her belief and her behaviour. The interlocutor's final 
confident claim that he is right, while the speaker is wrong, is highly improbable, 
though. And, if an interlocutor were to take this confident attitude that his conclusion 
about the speaker's beliefs is right, then he would be treated as if what he is doing is 
peculiar. 
2.3.1. CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY 
Some critics may want to argue that it is not that uncommon for those with whom we 
have close long-term relationships to attempt to correct our understanding of what we 
believe. But the truth is that even then we are treated as authoritative because of the 
way in which they suggest beliefs that they think we hold, indicate their reasons for 
thinking that we hold them, request our own reasons for thinking that we do not hold 
them, ask for our reasons for behaving in ways that suggest that we hold them, seek 
our approval of their interpretations of our beliefs and other attitudes, attempt to 
change our view of our own circumstances and attitudes with the aim of bringing 
about a recognition or avowal of the beliefs they suggest to us as the ones we 
genuinely hold. I may not have been aware of my belief that Tex Bars taste better than 
other chocolate bars, but my interlocutor will not simply decide that this is definitely 
what I believe just because my behaviour indicates it. He will ask me to verify it. Or, 
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if I appear unable to verify it, such as in cases where I honestly do not know what I 
believe, then he is still likely to enter into a discussion with me during which he seeks 
my approval of what he is suggesting. He thinks that he is right about what I believe, 
but he continues to treat me as if I am the only person who can determine whether he 
is, in fact, right. 
2.3.2. THE AUTHORITY ASYMMETRY AND PAST BELIEFS 
My critics may try to object that the authority asymmetry does not apply to past 
beliefs, but all these practices are present in discussions about past beliefs just as 
much as presently held ones. A past-tense version of the golf-related discussion would 
have been very similar to the present-tense one. Once again, I would have become 
annoyed with my friend, he would not have taken such an aggressive stance and we 
would both have been surprised if he had been found to be right. If there is a 
difference between the discussions of past and presently held beliefs, it is the fact that 
the issue of a past belief might not be very passionately debated. But this does not 
show that the first- and third-person are treated as if they are equally likely to be right 
about a person's past beliefs. If it is indeed the case that the question would have 
roused less emotion, it could be ascribed to the fact that we care more about our 
presently held beliefs than about our past ones. There seems little point in convincing 
someone that he is wrong or right about a belief that has been abandoned or is no 
longer of great concern. 
2.4. IMPORTANT THEORETICAL ISSUES 
The evidence asymmetry is one that is clearly reflected in our practices, but it 
problematically rests upon some assumptions about the mind that the majority of 
people unquestioningly accept. When deriving the asymmetries from the ways in 
which people treat one another, this type of problem is unavoidable. Our practices are 
inevitably closely linked with the most common, intuitively pleasing, assumptions of 
the majority of us. And, as we have discovered often enough, our intuitions are 
sometimes mistaken. I said earlier that there clearly is an evidence asymmetry when 
we are asked how we know that we believe something, or when we are asked how we 
know that a third-person believes something. And this is, in deed, the way in which 
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the question is usually asked. But questions of this form assume that a belief already 
exists and they request information on the basis of which it can be discovered. The 
first-person is treated as if she does not rely on any evidence to know what her already 
established beliefs are, while the third-person is treated as if he cannot know what 
those already established beliefs are without making use of such evidence. 
This asymmetry can, however, be interpreted as implying that the first-person is 
treated as if she retrieves her own beliefs directly from her own mind, while the third-
person is treated as having to rely on behavioural and verbal information in order to 
guess at what might be in that first-person's mind. And this is, unfortunately, the way 
in which the majority of people interpret the concept of a belief. But this is precisely 
the Cartesian picture of the mind to which everyone has objected so convincingly 
throughout the past four centuries. I possess a collection of beliefs which I discover 
directly through introspection, while others have to use my behaviour and try to infer 
what those beliefs are. This picture of beliefs is not only rejected by interpretationists, 
but by many other contemporary philosophers. 
Many theories towards the end of the twentieth century defended a view of self-
knowledge whereby I come to know what my beliefs are through looking outward to 
my environment, as opposed to inward to my mind. lo I come to know that I believe 
that it is summer by looking at the sun, feeling the heat, and so forth. Such theories 
are criticised for neglecting to distinguish between the question of how I obtain 
knowledge of what I already believe and the question of how I form a new belief. And 
that is precisely the point about which they disagree. Theories that rely on 
introspection for knowledge of our beliefs hold that beliefs are fixed, already 
established entities, while those who subscribe to the outward-looking claim argue 
that beliefs are states that are re-examined and re-established every time I become 
aware of them. II SO, for the latter, the process of coming to know what I believe is the 
same question of establishing exactly what I believe, or of subjecting a belief to 
rational scrutiny, at the very least. 
Interpretationists also reject the idea that there are beliefs already in place which it is 
up to everyone to discover. They also think that Beliefs are not fixed, introspectable 
states that exist inside the individuals to whom they belong. And, according to them, 
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the process whereby third-persons discover beliefs is not like a treasure hunt in which 
the participants attempt to find hidden articles by means of a series of clues provided 
by a game leader. Beliefs are, instead, no more than statuses that are attributed to us in 
a social context. There are no elements of the content of beliefs that cannot be fixed 
during communication. And, if this is the case, then the question of how one knows 
that one believes something, and the question of how one knows that others believe 
something, once again make little sense. After all, if something is called a belief only 
when it is attributed, then there exist no fixed set of beliefs that one can obtain 
knowledge about. Beliefs simply do not exist independent of one's attribution of 
them. Thus, for an interpretationist, the question of how one knows that one holds a 
belief is a question of how one attributes beliefs to oneself. And the question of how 
one knows that someone else believes something just becomes a question of how one 
attributes beliefs to others. 
So, how can we square the evidence asymmetry (which is clearly present in our 
practices) with this interpretationist conception of beliefs? Most philosophers will ask 
why we should evaluate theories of beliefs according to whether they can 
accommodate the Cartesian picture if it is widely believed to be wrong. But most 
laypersons will ask why we should evaluate such theories according to whether they 
can accommodate this deeply theory-laden conception of beliefs. After all, if the main 
advantage of describing the asymmetries on a practical level is to avoid relying on 
theories that are not shared by everyone, then it seems important to hold on to our 
practices as a guide to concepts that almost everyone intuitively accepts. 
I will, as a result, retain the evidence asymmetry as something that is present in the 
way in which we treat one another. We expect that all theories of beliefs are able to 
accommodate the idea that we treat third-person beliefs as knowable only through 
behavioural and verbal evidence while we treat first-person beliefs as knowable 
independent of verbal and behavioural evidence. But, it is important to keep in mind 
that, for an interpretationist, the evidence asymmetry pertains to how we attribute, as 
opposed to discover, beliefs, with the result that this asymmetry is not a response to 
an epistemological question of how we discover existing articles, but how we decide 
on, and attribute, them. (More about this in section 3.) 
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This relationship can be further qualified by the transparency asymmetry which deals 
with the question of how we form or attribute beliefs which, as explained above, 
interpretationists will see as the same question as how they are known. Where the 
evidence asymmetry holds that we know what our beliefs are without making use of 
behavioural evidence, the transparency asymmetry suggests that we fonn or acquire 
our beliefs by fonning opinions about states of affairs in the world. If one is 
comfortable with a picture of beliefs as fixed states that await discovery through, for 
example, introspection, one will think that the first question differs from the second. 
The question of how I know what I do believe is different from the question of how I 
fonn a belief. If one does not subscribe to this picture of beliefs and one thinks that 
beliefs are, for example, states that I fix by an investigation of my environment, then 
there is no room for an epistemological question. So, the fonn of the evidence 
asymmetry that an interpretationist will want to account for simply holds that we do 
employ behavioural evidence when attributing beliefs to others, while we do not 
employ behavioural evidence when attributing beliefs to ourselves. And, in addition 
to this, they will have to be able to explain the transparency asymmetry, according to 
which we attribute beliefs to others in the service of an explanation of their behaviour, 
while we attribute beliefs to ourselves only if they are consistent with our view of the 
world. 
2.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ASYMMETRIES 
One way of thinking about the relationship between the three asymmetries is that we 
treat a first-person as if she usually knows what she believes (the authority 
asymmetry) because she self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with her view ofthe 
world (the transparency asymmetry) and does not have to draw conclusions from her 
own behaviour (the evidence asymmetry). 
This relationship is clearer in situations in which we realise that the asymmetries are 
not present. A case in which we assume that the authority asymmetry is absent is 
usually a case where the speaker is unsure about what she believes, or where there is 
some evidence that suggests that she may be wrong about what she thinks she 
believes. Then we refrain from assuming that she is, by default, right about what she 
believes since there are reasons to believe that she is not. Many such cases are also 
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examples of instances where we assume that the evidence asymmetry is absent. The 
speaker has somehow lost her position of authority over her beliefs and we now treat 
her as if it is appropriate to engage in a discussion about what she believes by 
referring her to her behaviour. If the speaker turns out to be wrong about what she 
believes, and we convince her that she actually believes whatever we think her 
behaviour suggests, then we also have a situation where we assume that the 
transparency asymmetry is absent. She is wrong about what she believes, she accepts 
our behaviour-based suggestion of what she believes and we accordingly realise that 
she is self-attributing a belief in the service of an explanation of her behaviour, as 
opposed to one that is consistent with what she deems true about the world. The 
absence of the authority asymmetry in a specific case does, of course, not entail the 
absence of the other two, since a speaker can still reject our behaviour-based 
suggestions of what she believes in favour of whatever she thinks she believes 
without employing her behaviour as evidence. The three often do coincide, though. 
For the reasons above, the link between the evidence and transparency asymmetry is 
even stronger. A case where a speaker has to employ her behaviour to know what she 
believes will almost certainly be a case in which she ends up self-attributing a belief 
in the service of an explanation of her behaviour. It might coincide with what she 
holds true, of course, but in such cases the truth of the belief that she ends up self-
attributing is incidental since she is self-attributing it specifically in order to make 
sense of her behaviour. 
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ASYMMETRY THESIS 
The position endorsed in this project is that theories of beliefs that can accommodate 
these practices are more attractive than those that cannot do so. This stance does 
require some justification, especially in the light of a scepticism regarding intuitions 
and intuition-reflecting practices that has been gaining popularity in recent years. I am 
sympathetic to the scepticism of the role of intuitions and intuition-reflecting practices 
(hereafter just intuitions) in Philosophy, but I still contend that they do have a role in 
this project. 
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There are at least three positions on the role of intuitions in Philosophy. First, any 
philosophising is constrained by intuitions. Second, it is desirable for Philosophy to 
cohere as much as possible with intuitions, unless there are good reasons for 
suspecting that they are mistaken, in which case it is acceptable for our theories to 
depart from them. Third, intuitions are irrelevant to Philosophy and our theorising 
does not have to take them into account. 
I want to reject the first claim. Our theorising cannot be constrained by intuitions 
since they are difficult to interpret. We often appear to have conflicting intuitions and 
they are largely dependent on the specific circumstances that are sketched to draw 
them out. Intuitions are the products of socio-historic circumstances and they often 
change. It is not uncommon for two persons' intuitions to differ, or for one person's 
intuitions to differ from one time to another. They are, moreover, probably not 
entirely theory-independent themselves since their development is not isolated from 
the development of an individual or a group's theories about the world. Intuitions 
should, thus, not be treated as the ultimate given in Philosophy. 
I also want to reject the third claim. All theorising has to start somewhere, with the 
result that this approach's pretence not to take intuitions into account is a fiction. 
Moreover, if it had been possible not to take them into account, the theories resulting 
from such theorising will be wildly unbelievable and largely irrelevant to our lives 
and how we understand them. 
I, thus, want to embrace the second claim, in accordance with which we are neither 
reifying (1), nor ignoring (3), our intuitions, but using them as a useful starting point 
for our theorising. We should treat them as potentially fallible, and if a specific 
intuition leads us to theories that we think are implausible, we should show why it is 
mistaken and why it should be discarded. 
This approach is preferable to any other, since it is likely to be accepted by 
proponents of schools of thought as different as Philosophy as a substantive discipline 
and philosophical quietism. According to proponents of Philosophy as a substantive 
discipline, the aim of Philosophy is to arrive at theories that resolve things that we 
find pUzzling. Intuitions provide us with a starting point for our theorising, but our 
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conclusions are not constrained by them. Many theory theorists, for example, think 
that our common, everyday folk psychology is a good place from which to launch our 
theorising about beliefs (and other propositional attitudes), even if our resulting 
philosophical theories will modify such folk theories in the light of scientific evidence 
and further theorising. (See below). According to proponents of philosophical 
quietism, the purpose of Philosophy is not to theorise, but to describe. It should 
provide an explanatory narrative of how we, as a matter of contingent fact, came to be 
in a position where we found something puzzling. Our theorising is responsible for 
causing us to be in situations where we find things puzzling, and such explanatory 
narratives will serve as a therapy to return us to a situation where we did not find it 
puzzling. Philosophy should, in other words, describe both the practices and intuitions 
that allowed us to live without finding things puzzling, and describe the theorising 
that confused us. Proponents of both these conflicting schools of thought are likely to 
endorse my view on intuitions defended above, which is a good reason to accept it. 
Theories of beliefs that can accommodate the practices in section 2 are, thus, more 
attractive than theories that cannot do so, unless they can show why our intuitions are 
mistaken. I am, accordingly, amenable to the possibility that a theory of beliefs does 
not have to leave room for all the asymmetries. As I explained above, I find it 
acceptable to allow interpretationism, for example, to modify the evidence asymmetry 
to apply to the attribution, as opposed to the discovery, of beliefs, since I find the 
arguments against beliefs as internal states persuasive. The evidence asymmetry, as it 
occurs in practice, relies on some intuitions that there are many good reasons for 
rejecting. And this is a strategy that I stand by in the case of all theories of beliefs. If 
they can justify an alternative description of one or more of the asymmetries by, for 
instance, persuading us that the people who participate in the practices are wrong to 
do what they do, or to think what they think, then I will be more than accepting of the 
resulting re-formulated asymmetry thesis, or even of a rejection of it. 
4. FURTHER CONSTRAINTS 
Not just any explanation of the asymmetry thesis is satisfactory, however. In this 
section I want to point out some characteristics of the asymmetry thesis that are likely 
to be overlooked but that are, nevertheless, worth accounting for, and argue that there 
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should be certain constraints on such explanations. Once again, I will adopt the 
approach above according to which theories that can account for, or that are 
constrained by, these characteristics, are preferable to those that cannot do so. 
Firstly, it is desirable for theories to be able to allow for the idea that we treat others 
as if they usually do not employ their own behaviour and speech as evidence to know 
what they believe, as if they usually self-attribute beliefs that are consistent with how 
they see the world and as if they are usually right about what they believe. These three 
general assumptions hold during all interactions. But a theory that is genuinely 
capable of allowing for the asymmetries should also be able to accommodate 
situations in which, even though these general assumptions hold, we still realise that 
someone is using her own behaviour to know what she believes, self-attributing a 
belief in the service of an explanation of her behaviour or possibly wrong about what 
she believes. 
Secondly, it is desirable for theories to be able to account for the asymmetries in 
practice, as opposed to only in theory. Theories that propose that something can be 
explained once we place ourselves in a possible world or in a fabricated set of 
conditions are useful to extract our intuitions regarding that thing, but they are less 
useful when we want a theory that explains what we, as a matter of fact, do in 
practice. Davidson's system of radical interpretation, as will become evident in 
chapter 3, is such a theory. A theory that is able to explain what we do in practice is 
preferable to one that can only set out a list of conceptual requirements and 
constraints that can never obtain. 
Thirdly, a theory that can allow for a unified explanation of the asymmetries is 
preferable to one that accommodates only a haphazard or clumsy explanation of them. 
We prefer explanations that are intelligently designed to explanations that are forced 
into spaces where they just do not quite fit, even if they are able to clumsily explain 
whatever needs to be explained. 
Lastly, explanations of the asymmetries that are constrained by univocality are 
preferable to those that are not. We want there to be only one concept of belief, with 
two different perspectives from which we can relate to it. Theories that deny 
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univocality are theories that suggest that there are two different concepts of belief, one 
that gets its meaning from the way in which a first-person relates to it, and another 
that gets its meaning from the way in which a third-person relates to it. Thus, when I 
refer to my own belief that reality television is tedious, I am talking about something 
different from my reference to someone else's belief that contains the same 
proposition. However, such theorists are going to have to explain our strong intuition 
that, in such cases, we are talking about the same sort of state that constitutes a 
commitment to the same sort of thing. Furthermore, the first-person and third-person 
often reach agreement and ascribe the same belief to one individual. But if univocality 
is denied, then we can never be said to ascribe the same thing, not even after 
discussion and apparent agreement between two people. Most theorists would want to 
avoid these types of problems. 12 Hence, my suggestion that explanations of the 
asymmetries that are constrained by the univocality of beliefs are preferable to those 
that are not. 
I want to briefly illustrate these desired requirements and constraints by questioning 
two popular theories' ability to account for them. My aim is not to refute these 
theories, to claim that they cannot account for these points or even to give a detailed 
account of how their proponents have attempted to account for them. My aim is to 
suggest that the surface appearance of these theories make it appropriate to express 
some doubts regarding their ability to satisfy these points. 
Cartesian dualism, according to which beliefs are non-physical states housed in a non-
physical mind, maintains that the asymmetries are a product of the mind's ability to 
monitor and be aware of its own states. The fact that the mind is not a physical entity 
means that it is not accessible to a third-person, with the result that the first-person's 
judgements alone constitute her beliefs. That is, something is a belief if the first-
person understands herself as having it. We treat a first-person as if she usually knows 
what she believes because, being her own beliefs in her own first-person accessible 
only mind with its monitoring mechanism, whatever she thinks she believes is, as a 
matter of fact, what she does believe. We treat her as if she does not have to use her 
own behaviour as evidence to know what she believes because the mind's monitoring 
mechanism gives her immediate access to her beliefs. The monitoring mechanism 
allows for a unified explanation of these two asymmetries since it allows the theory to 
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use the same mechanism to explain both. It, lastly, can explain the asymmetries in 
practice, since it takes the fact that we treat each other as such as a result of the fact 
that we are always right about what we believe, which is explained by the fact that the 
monitoring mechanism allows for immediate, infallible and omniscient access to our 
beliefs. 
Cartesian dualism does, however, seem to be defeated by the other points. It, firstly, 
does not seem able to explain the transparency asymmetry, since it seems to commit 
itself to the view that my identification of my belief is an identification of a state that 
is present in my mind. The transparency asymmetry, however, requires that my self-
attribution of a belief commits me to the truth of something outside myself. So 
Cartesian dualism is challenged to explain how an identification and description of an 
internal state through a self-monitoring mechanism can commit me as such. Even 
more problematically, if this mechanism is geared towards identifying internal states, 
then why does it not make it possible for a speaker to describe one of her beliefs 
without taking a stance on the truth of something outside herself? The monitoring 
mechanism just does not seem to fit with the transparency asymmetry and no 
Cartesian dualist, to my knowledge, has produced a reason for rejecting such 
practices. 
Secondly, many philosophers have criticised Cartesian dualism for its inability to 
accommodate cases where speakers are shown to be wrong about what they believe. If 
a speaker's judgement of what she believes just is what a belief is, then whatever she 
judges herself to believe must be what she genuinely believes. I do not intend to 
labour this point any further here, except to add that if it has a problem 
accommodating such cases, it is likely to have a problem to accommodate cases in 
which speakers have to use their own behaviour as evidence to know what they 
believe. Even if they can produce an explanation for occasional failures of the 
monitoring mechanism, her mind, since it is not physical, is not accessible via any 
other means. If a third-person's observations of the speaker's behaviour can only be 
accurate if she confirms them to be correct, then it does not seem as if she can know 
whether she is making accurate judgements of what she believes when employing her 
own behaviour. 
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Thirdly, Cartesian dualism is not constrained by univocality, due to its commitment to 
the mind as a non-physical entity. Since this renders a speaker's mind inaccessible to 
her interlocutors, each person will have to fix the meaning of the concept of belief for 
herself 
Thus, Cartesian dualism, on the surface, seems to rank low on our scale of desirability 
since it, firstly, fails to explain some of what I want theories to be able to explain and, 
secondly, fails to give reasons for thinking that those things do not have to be 
accounted for. 
The second theory that I want to put through the superficial test of desirability is the 
theory theory, held together with the background assumptions of functionalism and 
the representational theory of mind. 
According to the theory theory, our ability to attribute "mental states" is an ability to 
draw inferences from a Theory of Mind. If our Theory of Mind, for example, includes 
the datum, "ceteris paribus, those who believe that leopards eat humans will run when 
they encounter a leopard", I will attribute the belief that leopards eat humans to a 
person that I spot running away from one. I know that this is what she believes 
because that information is contained in my Theory of Mind. 
Many theory theorists, in addition, believe that our folk Theory of Mind is reasonably 
accurate, if incomplete, and that a scientific investigation of the mind will build upon 
this folk Theory of Mind to show where it is scientifically correct and incorrect. Most 
such theorists think that such scientific investigations should proceed via an 
examination of the functional roles of mental states. They, in other words, defend 
functionalism, according to which something is a belief in virtue of its functional role 
in the system of which it is a part. This functional role is determined by what they are 
caused by, their patterns of relations with other mental states and their typical 
outcomes. The belief that leopards eat humans, for example, is typically caused by 
relations with certain environmental events, by certain types of conversations with 
others, and so forth. It typically relates to other mental states by, for example, making 
the speaker more likely to have certain desires, fears, hopes, and so forth. Together 
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with such relations with other mental states, it typically has certain behavioural 
consequences like the running away from leopards. 
Many theory theory-functionalists, lastly, defend a representational theory of mind 
according to which beliefs are functional states that relate a speaker to the symbolic 
representations of the content of those states. "Leopards eat humans" is the semantic 
content of a symbolic mental representation. If a speaker has the belief that leopards 
eat humans, he is in the functional relation (that is typical of a belief) to a symbolic 
mental representation with the semantic content "leopards eat humans". He can have 
another symbolic mental representation with that same semantic content (leopards eat 
humans), but with the functional role of, say, fear. In the popular literature these 
functional roles are usually referred to as one's belief box, one's fear box, etc., not to 
indicate a physical location in the brain, but to identify the functional role of 
everything in that box. 
To impose order on this theory stew, theorists who defend all three these theories 
(Jerry Fodor, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, etc.), usually believe that a scientific 
psychology will show that most of our commonsensical folk theory of mind is correct, 
that it will show that something is a belief in virtue of the specific functional role that 
it has and that it will show that the content of such functional role states is symbolic 
mental representations. Now, if a belief just is a specific type of functional role (a 
belief box) with a symbolic mental representation as its semantic content, and if the 
only way of non-scientifically accessing it is via our Theory of Mind, then, whether it 
belongs to ourselves or to others, it must be so accessed. We know what we believe in 
the same way as we know what others believe, namely, by drawing theory-mediated 
inferences from our behaviour (which includes our speech). 1314 
We treat a first-person as if she is usually correct about what she believes since she 
has observed more of her behaviour than anyone else has, and can thus draw more 
accurate conclusions about her beliefs via her Theory of Mind. We treat her as if she 
can know what she believes without having to use her behaviour as evidence because 
the information on the basis of which she knows what she believes includes her 
memory of past behaviour. She, thus, can often know what she believes without 
employing her behaviour as evidence since she employs memories of her behaviour 
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instead. The theory theory can explain situations where we judge that the asymmetries 
are absent, because the theory-mediated inferences that we often have to rely on are 
far from infallible. Moreover, since our folk theory of mind may not always cohere 
with scientific evidence, the correct answer of what we believe will sometimes not be 
available to us. The theory theory can explain the asymmetries in practice, since it 
treats our practices as a result of the fact that the first-person will always be more 
closely acquainted with herself than anyone else can ever be. It gives a unified 
explanation of the asymmetries since it relies on our Theory of Mind to explain both 
asymmetries, and it respects univocality since both first- and third-person beliefs are 
defined by their role in a theory. 
It, however, cannot improve much upon Cartesian dualism's attempt to explain the 
transparency asymmetry since it is committed to the view that our Theory of Mind 
correctly picks out functional states with symbolic representations as semantic 
content. The same questions as in the Cartesian case arise. The transparency 
asymmetry requires that my self-attribution of a belief commits me to the truth of 
something outside myself. But how can theory theorists explain that an identification 
and description of a functional state through a Theory of Mind can commit me as 
such? Once again, if this Theory of Mind is geared towards identifying functional 
states, then why does it not make it possible for a speaker to describe one of her 
beliefs without taking a stance on the truth of something outside herself? Since the 
functional role of a belief is partly defined in terms of what causes it, it has a slight 
advantage over Cartesian dualism. A functional state is not as wholly internal as a 
Cartesian non-physical mental state. But it is still not clear how describing a 
functional role commits me to the truth of something, as opposed to simply being a 
description of, amongst other things, the thing that caused it. The identification of a 
functional state with a symbolic mental representation as content just does not seem to 
fit with the transparency asymmetry and no theory theorist, to my knowledge, has 
produced a reason for rejecting such practices. 
It is also important to point out that the explanation of the evidence asymmetry is 
inadequate since it, firstly, subscribes to the questionable claim that our memories 
contain sufficient information of past behaviour to derive our beliefs from and, 
secondly, will as a result have to admit that we quite frequently do rely on our 
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behaviour to know what we believe. Theory theorists have not produced a reason for 
rejecting the evidence asymmetry, and my modification of it cannot help since they 
insist on beliefs as functional states with mental representations as content. 
Therefore, the popular combination of theories described above, on the surface, seems 
not to rank much higher than Cartesian dualism on my scale of desirability unless it is 
supplemented, either with a persuasive rejection of our practices or with an 
explanation that can be constrained by the above points. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In section 1, I provided reasons for deriving the asymmetries from our practices. In 
section 2, I described such practices and derived from them an evidence, a 
transparency and an authority asymmetry. In section 3 and 4, I proposed some desired 
requirements for, and constraints on, explanations of the asymmetries and provided 
reasons for preferring theories that can account for them over theories that cannot. In 
the remainder of this project I will consider which of these conditions Donald 
Davidson's system of radical interpretation can satisfy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DAVIDSON'S SYSTEM OF RADICAL INTERPRETATION 
In this chapter I intend to set out the problem at the heart of the rest of this project. I 
shall do this by, firstly, providing a sympathetic exegesis of Davidson's arguments for 
the social constitution of meaning and belief content, secondly, describing his system 
of radical interpretation, thirdly, outlining the prima facie incompatibility between 
radical interpretation and the asymmetry thesis and, fourthly, explaining the aspect of 
an interpretationist system that, according to him, makes it compatible with the three 
attitude asymmetries. 
1. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF BELIEF 
CONTENT 
Donald Davidson's theory of interpretationism is one of the most complete and 
influential interpretationist accounts. His project was motivated by his conviction that 
semantic concepts like meaning and belief could never be made sense of outside a 
context of interpersonal interaction. That is, something can qualify as the meaning of 
a person's utterance and it can be correctly termed a belief only if it is established as 
such during the process of one person's interpretation or understanding of another. 
Before proceeding to his arguments for this claim, I want to clarify a few definitions. 
The heading of this section is termed "the social constitution of belief content". By 
"social", Davidson has in mind that belief content needs to be established during some 
interaction between two people. He wants to deny that such content can be established 
by one person in isolation. By "constitution", Davidson literally means that the 
content is developed, or takes shape, during such social interactions. In the paragraph 
above, I somewhat misleadingly used the word "establish", which can be understood 
in a constitutive or in an epistemic sense. As explained in chapter 2, the epistemic 
sense, which is the more common way of thinking of beliefs, relates to how we know 
what someone believes while the constitutive sense relates to what exactly beliefs are. 
Davidson rejects the epistemic sense, since he does not think that beliefs already exist 
that are up to an interpreter to discover. He firmly supports the constitutive sense, in 
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which belief content literally is something that takes shape during social interactions. 
In the remainder of this project, terms like "establish", "determine", "settle", and the 
like, should, accordingly, be understood in a constitutive way. Lastly, the reader 
should note that we are here talking about the constitution of belief content and 
thereby about the constitution of beliefs themselves. Some philosophers draw a 
distinction between the two and may think that Davidson's interpretationism is aimed 
merely at establishing or individuating belief content. Davidson, however, ties content 
individuation fundamentally to beliefs themselves, with the result that the social 
constitution of belief content is also an argument about the social constitution of 
beliefs themselves. 
He offered two arguments in support of the social constitution of belief, one that 
stems from considering our folk psychological explanations of behaviour as a 
metaphysical account of mind and one that goes via the publicity of meaning and its 
intricate connection with belief content. 
1.1. THE ARGUMENT FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
Davidson's more straightforward argument for the idea that belief contents need to be 
established socially is an argument from folk psychological explanation. His point of 
departure was the observation that the way in which we usually make sense of the 
behaviour of others is through a process of interpretation whereby we attribute 
propositional attitudes that rationalise their behaviour. The Cartesian account of mind 
can allow for the view that beliefs rationalise behaviour, but according to this 
traditional picture, the issues of whether a belief is held, what belief is held and what 
belief can render which behaviour rational, are settled from the first-person's point of 
view. A belief has the content that it has because the first-person understands herself 
as having it. 
Wilfred Sellars is commonly understood as being one of the first philosophers to 
question the identity of a belief as something established by the first-person's 
introspective knowledge of her own mind. 15 He calls the idea that beliefs are directly 
given to us through introspection the myth of the given, and proposes an alternative 
story that can account equally well for the mental and our intuitions regarding first-
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person access to the mental. 16 He asks us to imagine a situation in which our 
ancestors, who initially understood behaviour in purely behaviouristic terms, acquire a 
new theory of behaviour that posits inner episodes as the causes of overt behaviour. 
At first they apply this new theory only to make sense of the behaviour of others, but 
then they discover that the theory can be extended to make sense of themselves as 
well by attributing beliefs to themselves upon observing their own behaviour. Their 
achievement is complete when they realised that their application of the theory is 
becoming so skilled that they often manage to self-attribute beliefs without being 
aware of applying a theory at all, even when they are unaware of applying a theory 
when attributing (or self-attributing) beliefs, such beliefs remain the postulates of a 
theory of mind. This Sellarsian myth gave rise to what is now popularly known as the 
theory theory of folk psychology. Beliefs, on this account, acquire their identity from 
their role in the rationalisation of behaviour. 
Davidson does not accept the whole of what has come to be known as the theory 
theory. He denies that folk psychology is the same sort of theory as physics and 
biology, for instance, because he thinks that no theory that involves psychological 
terms like desires and beliefs can contain the type of law-like relationships found in 
other theories. 17 But this does not prevent him from accepting one of the main 
themes in the Sellarsian myth: the conception of a belief as a construct defined by its 
place in a commonsense framework for explaining (and even predicting) behaviour. 
He rejects the intuitive notion that, while others interpret our behaviour and attribute 
beliefs and desires to us to rationalise it, our genuine attitudes can be established in 
some other way such as through introspection or a neurophysiological study of the 
brain. Consequently, if the concept of a belief is exhausted by its role in making sense 
of people's behaviour, then there can be no element ofa belief that is not available to 
a third-person interpreter that is observing and rationalising their behaviour. That is, if 
beliefs are no more than the sort of things that are attributed in order to make actions 
intelligible, then an investigation of the best method of attributing them will reveal all 
there is to know about them. IS In Davidson's words, "talk apparently of thoughts and 
sayings ... belongs to a familiar mode of explanation of human behaviour and must be 
considered an organized department of common sense which may as well be called a 
theory. One way of examining [the nature of thought and language] is by inspecting 
the theory implicit in this sort of explanation." 19 
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l.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NECESSARY PUBLICITY OF MEANING 
Davidson's second argument for the social constitution of belief content is an 
argument from the publicity of meaning. According to Davidson, "meaning, and by 
its connection with meaning, belief also, are open to public determination.,,2o He 
probably decided on this approach because it is often easier to convince people of the 
public determination (or more precisely the social constitution) of meaning than of 
belief. 
l.2.l. THE NECESSARY PUBLICITY OF MEANING 
According to Davidson, meaning is necessarily public because the only way in which 
language can have semantic content is for that content to be determined during 
interaction with other language speakers with whom one can agree or disagree about 
the existence and nature of the environment that speakers claim to talk about. So, 
without communication between at least two people who are talking about their 
mutual environment, language cannot have semantic content at all because it would 
have no way of establishing the objectivity of the things it talks about. Consequently, 
if there are objects that are meant to give phrases their semantic content (or elements 
of the meaning of a phrase), that cannot be understood by an adequately equipped and 
informed person with whom we interact, then such objects (or elements) cannot play 
any role in the meaning of that phrase.21 ,22,23 Thus, if! use a phrase to talk about 
something in my environment, it will always be possible for someone in favourable 
circumstances who is equipped with sut1icient information to settle the matter of what 
I mean by that phrase. 
More precisely, Davidson employs the notion of a Tarskian truth theory, rather than 
that of reference, in his theory of meaning. He believes that the notion of reference 
cannot be used in a theory of meaning, since an explanation of it would have to be 
given in non-linguistic terms, which is impossible. In his own words ... "If the name 
'Kilimanjaro' refers to Kilimanjaro, then no doubt there is some relation between 
English (or Swahili) speakers, the word, and the mountain. But it is inconceivable that 
one should be able to explain this relation without first explaining the role of the 
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words in the sentences; and if this is so, there is no chance of explaining reference 
directly in non-linguistic terms.,,24 His dismissal of reference as the source of meaning 
makes him reject any theory of meaning that gives the meaning of a word or phrase 
by relating it to an object to which it is meant to refer. Instead, he proposes that a 
theory of meaning should consist of theorems that relate a speaker's sentences to the 
sentences her interpreter uses to specify the conditions under which her sentences are 
true. 
This means that the meanings of a speaker's phrases have to be specified by sentences 
in her interpreter's idiolect that describe the truth conditions of her sentences as he 
sees it. Take, for example, a situation in which an English-speaking teacher is 
communicating with a Xhosa-speaking student. The teacher says, "It is sunny" while 
pointing up to the sun. The student tries to discover what the teacher means by this 
phrase by judging which environmental conditions will make the sentence true and 
translating those environmental conditions into his own idiolect. The student says, "It 
is sunny if and only if it is cloudy" while pointing skyward on a cloudy day. The 
teacher will indicate that the student has misunderstood what he means by the phrase, 
and will continue to do so until the student, according to the teacher, applies the 
phrase in the presence of the same type of environmental event that the teacher 
applies it in. When the student, for example, says, "it is sunny if and only if it is 
sunny" while pointing up at the sun, the teacher will judge that the student 
understands his sentence correctly and has translated it correctly into Xhosa. What the 
teacher means by this phrase is, thus, determined by the environmental conditions 
under which the teacher's sentence has been judged to be true by his interpreters. 
What the teacher means when uttering the phrase is conveyed to the student by the 
environmental conditions under which the student judges his sentence to be true. This 
picture applies even when the student misunderstands what the teacher means when 
uttering this phrase. Then what thc student means when uttering this same phrase is 
determined by the environmental conditions (such as a cloudy sky) under which the 
teacher judges his sentence to be true. 
This approach serves, not only as a way to avoid the concept of reference, but also to 
respect the holistic nature of meaning. Davidson does not think that the meanings of 
sentences can be attributed one by one on the occasion of their use. He holds firmly 
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onto the idea that meaning is holistic; that is, some sentences depend for their 
meaning on their connections with other meaningful sentences that, in turn, depend 
for their meaning on other meaningful sentences, and so forth, until a whole language 
with its interconnected meanings have been attributed. Clearly, the only way of 
attributing a whole language with interconnected meanings is to map a language onto 
another language with its own interconnected meanings. That is why the only way of 
getting to the meanings of a speaker's sentences is for an interpreter to map it onto his 
language so that their meanings can be holistically established by relating them to 
sentences, and the relationships between those sentences, in his language. (Much 
more about this in chapters 4 and 6.) 
If what someone means when uttering a word is determined in any way other than by 
sentences in an interpreter's idiolect that specify the environmental conditions under 
which he judges the speaker's sentence to be true, it will lead to the same type of 
problems encountered by the traditional Cartesian theories. Davidson worried, in 
particular, about scepticism of both the existence, and the nature, of an external world. 
I f a part of what the teacher means by his phrase is determined by, for instance, a 
picture in his subjective, first-person accessible-only mind, a physiological design in 
his brain or a pattern of stimulation in his sensory receptors or in his nervous system, 
then questions like the following are always appropriate: is he talking about real 
objects/events in an external environment? Or, is he talking about the correct 
objects/events in his environment?25.26 
If we claim that the question of what a person means by a phrase can be settled by 
asking him which essentially first-person accessible mental picture he entertains when 
he utters the phrase, then we run into the question of how it can ever be established 
that such an insulated, private and subjective mental picture is about something in the 
world at all. If it is before the mind in the sense that it is immediately graspable by it, 
then there is no way of knowing, firstly, whether that picture relates the person to 
conditions in the world at all and, secondly, whether the words of others are uttered in 
approximately the same conditions as our own. We speak as if our words are applied 
to something objective, but if what we mean by a word is derived from a mental 
object, then its subjectivity prevents us from taking the first step in determining 
whether it corresponds to what it purports to represent. The problem with deriving 
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what a person means by her words from a mental picture does not end here, though. 
Davidson also points out that the very notion of such mental objects/pictures is 
implausible. If they are meant to be inner objects that are private and immediately 
accessible to the person to whom they belong, then they cannot also claim to be 
objective in the sense of representing objects in a shared environment. In his own 
words, "The only object that would satisfy the twin requirement of being 'before the 
mind' and also such that it determines the content of a thought must, like Hume's ideas 
and impressions, 'be what it seems and seem what it is'. There are no such objects, 
public or private, abstract or concrete."n Thus, theories that allow that what we mean 
by our words is determined by asking the first-person which mental object she is 
entertaining, give a highly implausible account of the source of the semantic content 
of language. 
It: on the other hand, we claim that the question of what someone means by a word 
can be settled by examining the pattern of stimulation of their sensory receptors or 
nervous systems, then we run into the problem that it simply wouldn't be possible to 
determine who is right or wrong about the world?8 To illustrate, let us imagine a 
situation in which one person, when a horse canters by, has the same pattern of 
stimulation that another person has when a cow is in view. In the presence of a horse, 
person 1 will say "there's a cow", which person 2, since their patterns of stimulation 
are identical, will interpret as meaning "there's a cow", even though she is sure that 
she is seeing a horse and almost always responds "there's a horse" when under those 
environmental conditions. Both people will think that they are right, especially when 
all their other perceptions and responses confirm this. Introducing a third person into 
the scenario to determine who is right cannot help for, if person 3, in the presence of 
horses and cows, has the same patterns of stimulation as person 2, the best we can 
then do is to say that person 1 has unusual or abnormal patterns of stimulation. We 
cannot say that her patterns of stimulation are wrong or inappropriate under those 
environmental conditions, because then we are implicitly appealing to the nature of 
something in the environment (as agreed upon by persons 2 and 3) to verify that their 
patterns of stimulation are more appropriate to that thing than person 1 . s. Thus, 
theories that allow that what we mean by our words is determined by investigating 
patterns of stimulation in our sensory organs or nervous systems cannot give a 
plausible account of how language acquires its semantic content, because they can 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
provide us, firstly, with no hint of the nature of the conditions that are meant to give 
language such semantic content and, secondly, with no acceptable notion of truth and 
falsity. 
Instances of astigmatism, colour blindness, deafness and other sensory abnormalities 
together with, of course, evil demons and brains in vats controlled by mad scientists 
all ground the argument for the necessary publicity of language. The moment we try 
to derive semantic content from something other than the conditions in a common 
environment that people derive the truth conditions of each other's sentences from, 
we are, in effect, inserting additional information between the world and the semantic 
content; information that is meant to serve as evidence for what our sentences derive 
their semantic content from. And, if we do this, then we cannot extricate ourselves 
from the type of sceptical questions above. We would not be able to say whether the 
extra information is evidence for what it purports to be evidence for, namely, events 
in an external world. Thus, in Davidson's own words, "Without other people with 
whom to share responses to a mutual environment, there is no answer to the question 
what it is in the world to which we are responding.,,29 And if we cannot even establish 
the existence and the nature of the objects to which we are meant to be responding, 
then our language simply cannot have semantic content. 
1.2.2. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MEANING AND BELIEF CONTENT 
The next stage of Davidson's second argument for the social constitution of belief 
content is his claim that belief is inextricably linked with meaning. Ifwe accept the 
above argument for the publicity of meaning, and we accept the argument that follows 
for the link between meaning and belief, then we should also acknowledge that belief 
contents are socially established. Belief content is inextricably linked with meaning. 
According to Davidson, a belief just is a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. Alternatively, a belief is a state of mind that is attributed by making use of a 
sentence that the speaker holds true. And, from the above argument, we know that the 
sentence that the speaker holds true will have to rely on the conditions in the 
environment that a third-person interprets the sentence as being about for its meaning. 
Now, if a belief is a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds true, or a belief is the 
sort of state that is attributed by giving a sentence that the speaker holds true, and the 
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meaning of the sentence that the speaker holds true is given by the conditions in the 
environment that they are interpreted as being about, then the meaningful content of 
the speaker's belief is given by the same correspondence between her application of 
her words, her interpreter's application of his words, and their reactions to each 
others' applications. If the semantic content of our sentences is derived from the 
conditions in our environment under which our interpreters judge our sentences to be 
true, and our beliefs have the same semantic content as our sentences, then the 
semantic content of our beliefs has to be derived from the same conditions in the 
environment under which our interpreters judge our sentences to be true. And if the 
semantic content of our beliefs is derived from the conditions under which others 
interpret our sentences as being true, then it means that our belief contents are 
publicly determined. 
In the argument for the publicity of meaning, we want to say that different people talk 
about the same objects, namely, objects in the environment. If the objects are not in 
the environment, or somehow constituted socially, then we violate the requirement 
that language has to be public without which, as seen above, language can have no 
semantic content. And the only way of confirming that we are talking about 
something in the environment, as opposed to something in our bodies or minds, is to 
know that we are talking about the same things that others are talking about. This 
same argument applies to belief. We want to say that different people hold beliefs 
about the same things, namely, things in the environment. If they were not in the 
environment, or somehow constituted socially, then we violate a requirement that the 
objects that we hold beliefs about have to be public. For exactly the same reasons as 
in the case of the semantic content oflanguage, without the public determination of 
the objects that we hold beliefs about, beliefs can have no semantic content. And the 
only way of knowing that our beliefs are actually about something in the environment, 
as opposed to something in our bodies or minds, is to know that we hold beliefs about 
the same things that others have beliefs about. As Davidson wrote, "The answer to 
what object a person is applying a word to, or having a belief about, cannot be given 
outside a context where a second person is responding to the first. ,,30 
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2. RADICAL INTERPRETATION 
2.1. PRELIMINARIES 
The above two arguments support Davidson's conclusion that contentful beliefs are 
the sort of things that can only be socially established. If there are no more to the 
concept of belief than what others can attribute to us based on what we say and do, 
then it will not be possible to have a belief that someone with the right sort of 
information who follows the right sort of method of attribution cannot attribute to us. 
Hence, an investigation of the appropriate method by which they are attributed can 
tell us all there is to know about them. The problem is that, in ordinary circumstances, 
we share at least some language with the people that we are trying to understand. So, 
if it is true that our beliefs involve the same objects in the environment as our 
language, then our interpretive practices that involve a shared language will give us 
the sort of semantic knowledge which serves as a short-cut to people's beliefs. But 
Davidson's system of attribution (or interpretation as he termed it) is supposed to tell 
us how such semantic knowledge is obtained. This means that we cannot use our 
everyday interpretive practices as a description of an appropriate method of 
interpretation, because such everyday practices already assume knowledge of beliefs 
and meaning. 
This is why Davidson wants us to imagine the predicament of an imaginary character, 
called a radical interpreter, who wants to make sense of the behaviour (verbal and 
non-verbal) of someone with whom she shares no language. Without ascribing 
meaning and beliefs through a process of interpretation, she cannot know what any of 
his behaviour means, with the result that everything he does will be completely 
mysterious to her. She, hence, needs to employ a method of interpretation that will 
give a satisfactory explanation of his behaviour and, because belief and meaning are 
the sort of things that rationalise behaviour, a method of interpretation that explains 
behaviour adequately will give a satisfactory account of what the foreigner means and 
believes. Thus, nothing other than third-person attributions can fix the beliefs that we 
hold, but this method of belief constitution can be accurate only if the process of 
interpretation whereby they are attributed is appropriate. 
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Let us, thus, examine Davidson's suggestions for an appropriate method of 
interpretation in order to clarify the constraints placed upon our attributions; that is, 
the rules that we have to apply in order for our third-person attributions to qualify as 
fixing someone's propositional attitudes accurately. 
When I interpret, say Jane, I observe her utterances, her actions and her surroundings, 
and employ this information to assign meaning to her utterances and attribute 
propositional attitudes to her that render her behaviour intelligible. My evidence, 
hence, consists of her utterances, her behaviour and her environment, which I 
probably share. Davidson believes that I can use this evidence to know what sentences 
she holds true. I hear an utterance (or string of meaningless sounds), observe her 
behaviour and assign to her the attitude of holding true towards that sentence. Then I 
still do not know what the sentence means, but I know which sentence she holds true. 
To know what the sentence means, I, once again, observe her behaviour and 
environment. If I, for example, see Jane, a Xhosa speaker, run from what appears to 
me to be a big dog that is barking while chasing her, and I hear her yell "lumkela inja" 
or "ndicla uncedo" I can assign meaning to her utterances by employing my own 
perceptual experience to offer a hypothesis as to what in our environment is 
prompting her to hold them true. So, I will imagine that she yelled "lumkela inja" or 
"ndicla uncedo" because of the aggressive-looking dog. And, knowing this, I assign 
that truth condition to that specific utterance. Jane's utterance "lumkela inja" is true if 
and only if, from my own perspective, there is an aggressive dog. Meaning just is the 
truth condition of a sentence. And, as seen above, the only way in which the truth 
condition of Jane's sentence can be specified, is by making use of myself, as her 
third-person, who understands her utterance as prompted by something in our shared 
environment. Thus, at this point, as the interpreter, I will know what sentence Jane 
holds true, and will know what that sentence means. And, according to Davidson, a 
belief is no more than a sentence that a speaker holds true. So, once I know what 
sentence Jane holds true, and I know what it means, then I know what she believes. 
Thus, interpretation proceeds as follows: I, firstly, have to assume that almost all 
Jane's utterances indicate the attitude of holding true towards the sentence she is 
uttering, secondly, observe the objects in our environment and offer hypotheses as to 
what her sentence means by referring to the objects that prompt her to speak the 
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sentence that she holds true and, finally, derive her belief from my knowledge of the 
meaning of the sentence that she holds true. 31 
2.2. CHARITY: BEYOND A ROUGH SKETCH 
As mentioned above, Davidson proposed two constraints that need to be adhered to 
when interpreting someone else. He derived these constraints, not from anything 
theoretical, but rather from the way in which a radical interpreter will have to go 
about making sense of someone with whom she shares no language. Both constraints 
are aspects of what Davidson calls the principle of charity. 
2.2.1. CORRESPONDENCE 
The first constraint, which I already employed above, is one without which 
interpretation cannot get off the ground at all. In my interpretation of lane above, I 
assumed that she was responding to the same aggressive-looking dog that I perceived. 
And this is what allowed me to judge that her utterance meant "aggressive dog" and 
her belief was about an aggressive dog. I, in other words, assumed that her perceptual 
experiences were similar to mine and that, therefore, she held beliefs that were true 
from my perspective, true. Without making these assumptions, I would not have been 
able to assign meaning to lane's utterances at all and, consequently, I would not have 
been able to attribute a belief. This is Davidson's principle of correspondence, and it 
encourages the interpreter to take the speaker to be responding to the same features of 
the world that he (the interpreter) would be responding to under similar 
circumstances. It, hence, allows the interpreter to charitably credit the speaker with a 
degree of what the interpreter takes to be true belief about the world.32 
2.2.2. COHERENCE 
An assumption of correspondence, however, is a crude method of fixing someone's 
attitudes, unless we add Davidson's second constraint. When interpreting someone, I 
have to assume that she is rational, on my understanding of rationality, and attribute to 
her a collection of logically consistent beliefs. 33 I should not simply ascribe those 
beliefs that I judge to correspond with mine under one or two specific conditions. 
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Instead, I should discover as much as possible about the speaker before I attribute 
attitudes that are all consistent with one another.34 If, for example, I am aware of the 
fact that Jane enjoys running, loves dogs and believes that the pursuing dog belongs to 
her, I cannot attribute a belief that the pursuing dog is dangerous, just because I am 
afraid of dogs and would have held that belief while being chased by it. I will have to 
attribute to her attitudes that are all consistent with each other and that are based on 
my entire body of Jane-related knowledge. For instance, a belief that the dog is 
harmless, a belief that she is playing a game, a desire to entertain both herself and the 
dog, and so forth. This is Davidson's principle of coherence, and it encourages the 
interpreter to detect a degree oflogical consistency in the attitudes of the speaker. It, 
in other words, allows the interpreter to charitably credit the speaker with a degree of 
what the interpreter takes to be rationality. 
2.2.3. THE PLACE OF CHARITY 
The usefulness of the two aspects of the principle of charity is, thus, that I can use my 
own attitudes, utterances and perceptions as a guide to the attitudes, utterances and 
perceptions of others, unless there is a good reason not to do so. This is why theorists 
often say that, on Davidson's system of radical interpretation, my role, as interpreter, 
is to map a speaker's sentences onto my own by employing my own perceptions of 
our environment, together with my response to that environment, as a guide to what 
she is saying and, thereby, believing. 
We should always obey these two aspects of charity when assigning meaning and 
attributing beliefs. This still does not guarantee an accurate interpretation, however, 
because it is possible for an interpreter to apply correspondence and coherence to an 
insufficient amount of evidence about the speaker. A genuinely accurate interpretive 
project is one in which an entire set of consistent attitudes are attributed based on 
everything one can know about her. In the situation above, if I possessed all the 
information that there was to be had about Jane, my interpretation and attributions 
would have fixed her entire range of meanings and attitudes accurately, because then I 
would have been what has often been called a fully informed (or omniscient) 
interpreter. This is Davidson's reason for claiming firstly, that correct attitude 
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determination requires such an omniscient interpreter and, secondly, that what such an 
omniscient interpreter cannot discover is simply not mental. 
Critics may want to argue that we can never possess sufficient knowledge of any 
person to allow our interpretations to comply fully with, especially the coherence 
constraint, and that, as a result, our attributions can never be appropriate to fix a 
person's beliefs accurately. Still, the fact that such an omniscient interpreter does not 
actually exist, does not defeat Davidson's primary claim that beliefs, generally 
speaking, are states that are attributed to us by others during a process of 
interpretation that satisfies certain important constraints. If I interpret someone 
without being able to obey those constraints fully, such as when I lack sufficient 
information about her, I am still fixing her beliefs, but whether I am correct can only 
be established by making use of a complete method of interpretation that does include 
all information and, as a result, obey the constraints completely. Just so long as there 
is no talk of a belief that can be discovered independent of interpretation, or of 
something other than interpretation fixing beliefs, Davidson's theory remains in tact. 
Now that all the main features of Davidson's theory of interpretation ism have been 
presented, it should be clear enough that Davidson himself never intended his system 
to describe what we usually do when we communicate. (More about that in chapter 5.) 
For now it is important to appreciate that Davidson was trying to create a conceptual 
picture of the mental. He never suggested that situations of radical interpretation were 
common, or that individuals like omniscient radical interpreters existed (or even ever 
could exist). His aim was to use some of our intuitions, such as the procedures we 
would have to follow when trying to make sense of someone with whom we shared 
no language, to paint a picture of what would have to be in place if we wanted the 
whole of someone's mental life explained. Accordingly, in the remainder of this 
project, when I refer to "a situation of radical interpretation", I am talking, not about a 
situation that actually occurs, but about a conceptual process whereby meaning and 
beliefs have to be constituted with the necessary constraints in place. Similarly, when 
I refer to an omniscient interpreter, I am not talking about an actual person that can or 
does exist, but about an imaginary character that illustrates what would have to be 
known for a person's mental life to be explained completely and accurately. 
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3. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF RADICAL INTERPRETATION AND THE 
ASYMMETRY THESIS 
The following is just a loose and first take on exploring the incompatibility between 
radical interpretation and the asymmetry thesis and will be developed in more detail 
as the project proceeds. 
3.1. RADICAL INTERPRETATION AND THE EVIDENCE ASYMMETRY 
An objection that many philosophers have raised to Davidson's radical 
interpretationism is related to the first asymmetry identified in Chapter 2. If the very 
identity of belief is provided by the role it plays in third-person attributions and third-
person attributions are almost never made without behavioural evidence, it implies 
that most beliefs are attributed based on behavioural evidence. And if belief is mostly 
attributed based on behaviour then, whether they belong to us or to others, they are so 
attributed. But, as argued in chapter 2, I do not usually treat myself, and others do not 
usually treat me, as if I learn of my own beliefs by observing or interpreting my own 
behaviour. It does not appear, however, that Davidson's radical interpretationist 
model can accommodate this view for, ifhe admits that we can learn of our own 
beliefs in a way that is independent of our behaviour, he is contradicting one of the 
most fundamental interpretationist tenets, namely, that there is no way of identifying 
beliefs outside a project of interpretation. 
3.2. RADICAL INTERPRETATION AND THE TRANSPARENCY ASYMMETRY 
The system of radical interpretation also seems to encounter problems when trying to 
account for the second asymmetry, which holds that my self-attributions of beliefs are 
usually consistent with my view of the world, whereas my attributions of beliefs to 
others are made in the service of an explanation of their behaviour. If the very identity 
of belief is provided by the role it plays in third-person attributions and third-person 
attributions are made in order to rationalise behaviour, it implies that beliefs can only 
be attributed on the basis of rationalising behaviour. And if belief can only be 
attributed in the service of an explanation of behaviour then, whether they belong to 
us or to others, they must be so attributed. The problem for radical interpretationism 
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stems from Davidson's claim that, for something to be a belief, an interpreter needs to 
attribute its content during a process of interpretation. From the third-person 
perspective, which is then how all beliefs are attributed, the acquisition and revision 
of beliefs essentially involve explanatory power whereas the way anyone person 
views the world is of secondary importance. But, as argued in Chapter 2, from a first-
person perspective one's view of the world plays a fundamental role in the acquisition 
and revision of beliefs while their explanatory power is purely incidental. 
3.3. RADICAL INTERPRETATIONISM AND THE AUTHORITY ASYMMETRY 
The asymmetry related to the authority that we assign first-person belief-claims poses 
a problem for Davidson's radical interpretationism because, if a third-person fixes 
one's beliefs by attributing their content, it seems to imply that such a third-person is 
actually in a more authoritative position regarding the identity of such beliefs. Once 
Davidson removes the first-person's privilege to establish the identity of her own 
beliefs by leaving it up to the third-person's attributions, he seems to deny the tlrst-
person's claim to be generally correct about what she believes. The one who fixes the 
identity of a belief is more likely to be correct about it than the one that is not in a 
position to do so. 
4. DAVIDSON'S RECONCILIATION OF RADICAL INTERPRET ATIONISM 
AND THE ASYMMETRY THESIS 
4.1. DAVIDSON'S ASYMMETRIES 
Davidson recognised the evidence and authority asymmetries discussed in chapter 2 
and never denied the transparency asymmetry. In his writings on self-knowledge, he 
focused primarily on addressing the authority asymmetry, and his explanation of the 
evidence asymmetry is directly involved in this. I will, hence, set out his solution to 
the authority asymmetry and offer an explanation of the evidence and transparency 
asymmetries that is consistent with his theory of self-knowledge. I, however, need to 
address two important qualifications before moving on to his explanation of the 
asymmetries. 
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Firstly, Davidson defends a version of the evidence asymmetry that differs from the 
one endorsed in this project in two closely connected ways. Take the evidence 
asymmetry In Davidson's words, "Because we usually know what we believe (and 
desire and doubt and intend) without needing or using evidence (even when it is 
available), our sincere avowals concerning our present states of mind are not subject 
to the failings of conclusions based on evidence.,,35 In this quote, it is clear that he 
actually claims that the first-person knows what she believes without making use of 
evidence of any kind, while I wish to remain neutral on the nature of such first-
personal evidence, if any, and merely claim that we do not treat the first-person as if 
she knows what she believes by employing the same sort of evidence employed by a 
third-person. I, in fact, think that environmental evidence plays a large role in 
knowing what we believe, precisely because I view beliefs as states that are attributed 
via their transparency to how a person sees the world, as opposed to already 
established states that are waiting to be discovered. My disagreement with Davidson 
regarding the existence of first-person evidence, consequently, seems to be a result of 
another difference between our evidence asymmetries, namely, the Cartesian 
language that Davidson's evidence asymmetry is couched in. As I argued in Chapter 
2, our intuitive notion of the evidence asymmetry, which is exactly what Davidson 
adopts, is probably mistaken and needs to be replaced by the transparency asymmetry 
(that is a much more plausible way of thinking about the traditional notion of 
immediacy). It is, in fact, surprising that Davidson holds onto the traditional version 
of the evidence asymmetry, considering his commitment to the idea that beliefs, qua 
contentful states, are not already established internal states about to be discovered by 
us. 
Still, even if the evidence asymmetry is re-phrased with this in mind as, say, the role 
that behavioural evidence plays in our attribution (as opposed to our knowledge) of 
first-person beliefs, Davidson's evidence asymmetry nonetheless differs from mine 
since I only claim that behavioural evidence plays a much smaller role in first-person 
belief-attributions, while he eliminates all evidence from the first-person case. 
Secondly, Davidson's version of the authority asymmetry also differs from mine. He 
argues that I still speak with authority about a belief-claim that someone else has 
legitimately overturned. In his words, "even when a self-attribution is in doubt, or a 
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challenge is proper, the person with the attitude speaks about it with special weight.,,36 
This claim seems to be stronger than my idea that we are treated as if we are usually 
right about what we believe, which implies that, once someone else has proved me to 
be wrong about what I believe, I am not treated as if I am right about that specific 
belief anymore. 
Notwithstanding these differences in detail, his asymmetries are indisputably versions 
of my evidence and authority asymmetries. So, it is worth examining his reasons for 
thinking that they can be included in his system of radical interpretation. Considering 
that his versions of the asymmetries are "stronger" than mine, if his incorporation of 
his asymmetries into a system of radical interpretation works, then it is likely to work 
as an incorporation of mine. 
4.2. DAVIDSON'S RECONCILIA nON STRATEGY 
In his paper, First-Person Authority, Davidson explains that the first two asymmetries 
can be accounted for once we understand that, within an interpretationist system, a 
speaker generally knows, while an interpreter may not know, what a speaker's words 
mean.
37 Recall that, for a belief to be attributed, an interpreter has to know both which 
sentence a speaker holds true and what she means by that sentence. Consequently, 
even when both the interpreter and the speaker know what sentence the speaker holds 
true, only the speaker knows what she believes because only she knows the meaning 
of her words. The interpreter can, of course, assign meaning to her words via 
interpretation, but the fact that he has to interpret her words, while she does not have 
to interpret her own words, makes it possible for him, but not for her, to be generally 
or largely mistaken about what her words mean. After all, the meaning of the words 
of a speaker involves numerous elements like ... "her actions and other words, her 
education, birthplace, wit and profession, her relation to objects near and far, and so 
forth".38 There, as a result, can be no general guarantee that an interpreter is 
interpreting a speaker correctly whereas the general guarantee that the speaker is 
getting the meaning of her words right is that whatever she consistently applies her 
words to is what gives them the meaning they have.39 The asymmetries between first-
and third-person perspectives of beliefs, therefore, rest on the presumption that 
speakers usually know the meaning of their words without interpretation (or the use of 
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behavioural evidence), while it is possible that their interpreters, even after 
interpretation (or evidence), are still mistaken about what the speaker's words mean. 
There are, thus, two aspects to the reconciliation. Firstly, the speaker knows, while her 
interpreter may not know, what she means, and, secondly, the speaker knows what 
she means without using her own behaviour as evidence, while her interpreter cannot 
know what she means without using such evidence. 
What is critically important in this project, is that Davidson admits that there may be 
an asymmetry between the speaker's knowledge of which sentence she holds true and 
her interpreter's knowledge of which sentence she holds true, but he does not think 
that this can help explain the attitude asymmetries. To say that a speaker 
authoritatively and immediately knows which sentence she holds true is no less 
mysterious than to claim that the speaker knows authoritatively and immediately what 
she believes. There does not seem to be any way other than the identification of some 
essentially first-person accessible thing to ground the speaker's knowledge of what 
she believes and of which sentence she holds true. But, since we already know that a 
belief and a sentence that is held true have to be socially constituted in order to have 
content at all, a speaker's authoritative and immediate knowledge of what she 
believes and of which sentence she holds true cannot proceed via the identification of 
something that is not accessible to her observer. Meaning, as will be shown below, is 
the only step in the interpretive process that can ground whichever asymmetries exist, 
so a meaning asymmetry is what we should focus on.40 
Before proceeding to the details of Davidson's argument for this reconciliation, we 
can become familiar with the general form of his account of self-knowledge by 
spelling out how he accommodates the asymmetries. I will start with the authority 
asymmetry, because that is essentially the only one that he explicitly accounts for, and 
is the one that he thinks is more basic and interesting than the others are. 
4.2.1. THE AUTHORITY ASYMMETRY 
1. If both the interpreter and the speaker know which sentence the speaker holds 
true, then 
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2. There is a presumption that a speaker generally knows the meaning of her 
sentence because the consistent use of her sentences fixes their meaning, and 
3. There is no presumption that an interpreter generally knows the meaning of 
her sentence because he has to conduct the complex task of interpretation in 
order to assign meaning to her utterances. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. 
5. There is a presumption that, if both the interpreter and the speaker know which 
sentence the speaker holds true, the speaker generally knows what she believes 
while there is no such presumption in the case of her interpreter. 
4.2.2. THE EVIDENCE ASYMMETRY 
1. If both the interpreter and the speaker know which sentence the speaker holds true, 
then 
2. There is a presumption that the speaker does not generally rely on behavioural 
evidence when assigning meaning to her own utterance because the consistent use 
of her sentences alone fixes their meaning, and 
3. There is a presumption that an interpreter relies on behavioural evidence when 
assigning meaning to her utterance. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds true. 
5. There is a presumption that, ifboth the interpreter and the speaker know which 
sentence the speaker holds true, then, generally, the only behavioural evidence 
employed in attributing beliefs to a speaker is employed by the interpreter in the 
process of assigning meaning to her sentence, and, thus, 
6. There is a presumption that a third-person has to rely on behavioural evidence to 
acquire knowledge of the beliefs of another while a first-person's knowledge of 
her own beliefs does not usually involve such evidence. 
4.2.3. THE TRANSPARENCY ASYMMETRY 
l. If both the interpreter and the speaker know which sentence the speaker holds 
true, then 
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2. There is a presumption that the speaker generally knows the meaning of her 
sentence because the consistent use of her sentences fixes its meaning, and 
3. There is no presumption that an interpreter generally knows the meaning of her 
sentence because he has to conduct the complex task of interpretation. 
4. There is a presumption that, if both the interpreter and the interpretee know which 
sentence the interpretee holds true, then, generally, only the interpretee really 
knows what she holds true because she generally knows, while her interpreter may 
not, the meaning of the sentence that she holds true. 
S. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds true. 
6. There is a presumption that self-ascriptions of beliefs are generally consistent with 
what a person holds true about the world while third-person attributions are made 
in the service of an explanation. 
4.3. DAVIDSON'S THREEFOLD ARGUMENT FOR HIS RECONCILIA nON 
STRATEGY 
Davidson offered an argument for his reconciliation strategy that consists of three 
parts. I will call the first component his transcendental argument from interpretability, 
the second his argument from disquotation and the third his argument from the 
speaker's status as an interpreter. In chapter 4, I intend to argue, against the common 
misconception that Davidson did not in fact offer three separate arguments for his 
reconciliation strategy. 
4.3.1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FROM INTERPRETABILITY 
In the first stage of his argument for his reconciliation strategy, Davidson asks us to 
imagine a situation in which two people attempt to communicate, even though they do 
not share a language and, thus, can make no sense of each other without engaging in a 
project of radical interpretation. If the speaker wishes to communicate with the 
interpreter, she will have to try to be interpretable. In other words, as Davidson puts it, 
"the best she can do is to use a finite supply of distinguishable sounds applied 
consistently to objects and situations she believes are apparent to her hearer". 41 The 
interpreter has only the speaker's utterances and non-verbal behaviour as evidence to 
interpret as well as, of course, his own perceptions of the environment that they share. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Davidson argues that, in this situation, it makes no sense to think that the speaker is 
generally getting her language wrong. This is because the consistent use of her 
sentences gives them their meaning. If she uses her sentences inconsistently, she will 
not be interpretable. In other words, if she fails to employ the same sentence in the 
same environmental conditions every time (or at least most of the time), her 
interpreter will not be able to make sense of what she is saying. On the other hand, if 
she uses her sentences consistently, she will be interpretable and, because the 
consistent use of her sentences will render her interpretable, we can say that she is 
getting her language right. No sense can be made of the notion of someone who 
generally gets her language wrong for, if she was getting her language wrong, then 
she wouldn't be interpretable as applying her words consistently and would then, by 
definition, not be speaking a language at all. 
Davidson has often warned against a conception of the consistency of the use of 
sentences as simply a collection of noises that an interpreter can find meaningful. We 
should understand the consistency of use as stemming from an intention of the 
speaker to use her sentences consistently, not from whatever the interpreter can find 
meaningful.42 Therefore, if a speaker is interpretable, she is necessarily getting her 
language right. And if she is getting her language right, we can assume that she is 
applying her sentences consistently with the intention of providing clues about their 
meaning to her interpreter.43 And if she uses her sentences consistently with the 
intention of providing clues about their meaning, then one can say that she knows the 
meaning of her sentences. 
Davidson then generalises this argument to all language speakers to show that his 
reconciliation strategy, and thereby the asymmetries between first- and third-person 
perspectives of beliefs, apply to all language speakers. All language speakers are 
interpretable because, for something to qualify as a language, one needs to apply the 
same sentences consistently in the same environmental conditions. Therefore, all 
language speakers are mostly getting their language right. And the fact that all 
language speakers mostly get their language right implies that they are necessarily 
applying their sentences consistently with the intention of providing clues about their 
meaning to their interpreters. And the fact that they use their sentences consistently 
with the intention of providing clues about their meaning implies that they know the 
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meaning of their sentences. And the fact that all speakers, unlike their interpreters, 
generally know the meaning of their own sentences implies that all speakers, unlike 
their interpreters, generally know what they believe (the authority asymmetry) 
without making use of behavioural evidence (the evidence asymmetry) and ensures 
that their beliefs are consistent with what they hold true (the transparency 
asymmetry). 
4.3.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM DISQUOTATION 
The point of the transcendental argument from interpretability is to show that, if one 
is interpretable, then one is using one's language consistently with the intention of 
providing clues to one's interpreters about the meaning of one's sentences. 
Disquotation is a way in which Davidson proves that, if someone is interpretable and 
applying her sentences consistently, she can actually state their meaning. This is 
Davidson's account of what we would want to call first-person perspective. 
He explains this stage of the argument for his reconciliation as follows: "The speaker, 
after bending whatever knowledge and craft he can to the task of saying what his 
words mean, cannot improve on the following sort of statement: 'My utterance of 
"Wagner died happy' is true if and only if Wagner died happy'. An interpreter has no 
reason to assume this will be his best way of stating the truth conditions of the 
speaker's utterance.,,44The sentence on the right-hand side of the biconditional is 
understood to be the truth conditions of the sentence on the left. The argument is, 
accordingly, that a speaker can always correctly state the truth conditions of her 
sentences by using the same phrase on the right hand side of the biconditional that she 
uses on the left, because, assuming that she is applying her words consistently, the 
environmental conditions specified by the phrase on the right-hand-side of the 
biconditional will be identical to the environmental conditions specified by the phrase 
on the left. An interpreter, of course, can state the same biconditional. The only 
problem is, however, that he will be stating it in the speaker's idiolect whose 
meanings he does not yet know. So, when stating the biconditional in the same way as 
the speaker, he has no guarantee that disquotation in the speaker's idiolect will yield 
an accurate account of the truth conditions of the utterance. 
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If, on the other hand, the interpreter tries to state the biconditional in his own idiolect, 
which will involve interpreting the meaning of the sentences on both sides of the 
biconditional, he still does not know whether the biconditional in his own idiolect 
correctly states the truth conditions of the sentence because he does not know whether 
he correctly interpreted the meaning of the speaker's sentence. He will have to start 
by stating the phrase on the left-hand-side of the biconditional (which is the speaker's 
utterance that he is trying to interpret), then employ all the speaker's behavioural 
evidence in addition to his own perception of the environment to interpret the phrase 
on the right, and only then will he be able to say that, in his own idiolect, the meaning 
of the phrase on the right is identical with that on the left, since, according to him, the 
environmental conditions specified by the phrase on the right are the same as those 
specified by the speaker's original phrase on the left.45 Therefore, a speaker is always 
in a position to state the truth conditions of her sentences correctly while there is no 
guarantee that her interpreter can. 
Disquotation, however, can only work if the speaker is applying her sentences 
consistently under the same environmental conditions. If she fails to do this, it is 
conceivable that, when she states a biconditional like the one above, the phrase on the 
right-hand-side of the biconditional does not specify the same environmental 
conditions as the phrase on the left. The transcendental argument from interpretability 
is supposed to ensure that, if the speaker is interpretable, she is applying her sentences 
consistently and, thereby, that she is getting her language right. And the argument for 
disquotational knowledge is supposed to provide a way in which the first-person, if 
applying her sentences consistently, can state their truth conditions. 
We should not understand the transcendental argument from interpretability 
independently of the argument for disquotational knowledge because interpretability 
alone does not explicitly allow us a way to state the truth conditions (and thereby the 
meaning) of our own utterances. And we should not interpret the argument for 
disquotational knowledge independently of the transcendental argument from 
interpretability because disquotation alone does not guarantee the consistent 
application of our sentences, which is required to get the truth conditions of our 
sentences right. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
a
e T
ow
n
4.3.3. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SPEAKER'S STATUS AS AN 
INTERPRETER 
This third argument for the reconciliation is not one that Davidson himself ever 
offered in support of it, probably because it only dawned on him in the latter stages of 
his career that his system of radical interpretation implied it.46 It does, however, 
strengthen the case for a reconciliation between radical interpretation and the attitude 
asymmetries considerably and it confirms that my interpretation of Davidson's 
reconciliation strategy is more accurate than the standard interpretation offered by 
other philosophers. 
If the speaker is interpretable, it implies that she is speaking a language. If she is 
speaking a language, then she is capable of being an interpreter of others, since she 
has a language onto which she can map their idiolects. In order to assign meaning to 
their utterances, she needs to observe which environmental conditions they are 
uttering the sentences that they hold true in the presence of~ figure out which sentence 
she would have held true under the same environmental conditions and, thus, via her 
own perception of their environment and her knowledge of her own language, 
translate their sentences into her language to interpret their meaning. The only way in 
which she will be able to know what they mean by the sentence that they hold true, in 
other words, is by knowing which sentence she would have held true in the same 
environmental conditions. And, if she knows which sentences she holds true when 
encountering the environmental conditions in which she holds them true, then she 
clearly knows the meaning of her sentences. Speakers, thus, know what they mean 
since their status as interpreters of others requires their knowledge of their own 
language, while their interpreters still have to work out what they mean. (Much more 
about this in chapter 6). 
The argument from the speaker's status as an interpreter cannot work independently 
of the transcendental argument from interpretability and the argument from 
disquotation. A speaker can be an interpreter of others only if she speaks a language, 
and we can only say that she speaks a language if she is interpretable. It also requires 
the argument from disquotation because, to be an interpreter of another, our speaker 
needs to be able to state the truth conditions of her own sentences. If she cannot state 
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the truth conditions of her own sentences accurately (which will be the case if she is 
not interpretable), then she cannot state the truth conditions of someone else's 
sentences accurately since getting right the truth conditions of someone else's 
sentences is parasitic upon getting right the truth conditions of one's own. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Once again, the reader should bear in mind that Davidson was trying to create a 
conceptual picture of the mental, as opposed to proposing that all the above is what 
we in fact do in practice. Situations of radical interpretation are not common, and 
individuals like omniscient radical interpreters do not (and probably cannot) exist. 
The aim of this chapter was to give a sympathetic exegesis of Davidson's system of 
radical interpretation, which describes some methods and constraints that he proposes 
have to be in place for beliefs to be attributed accurately. Beliefs have to be 
constituted socially (section 1). They have to be attributed by an interpreter that is 
observing and making sense of a speaker's speech and behaviour by attempting to 
charitably map her language and behaviour onto his own language and his own 
behaviour (section 2). Radical interpretation demonstrates that first-person speakers 
know what they mean and that they do not have to use their own behaviour as 
evidence to know what they mean. This shows why we treat first-person speakers as if 
they know what they believe, as if they do not have to use their own behaviour as 
evidence to know what they believe and as if they self-attribute beliefs in the service 
of an explanation of their behaviour (section 4). 
In the remainder of this project I will oppose the popular view that Davidson's 
reconciliation strategy cannot give a satisfactory account of the three attitude 
asymmetries. Theorists are typically drawn to this conclusion by their 
misunderstanding of what Davidson was saying. I want to suggest that the standard 
interpretation of Davidson's reconciliation (called the meaning asymmetry) cannot 
explain the asymmetries, but that an improved interpretation of this reconciliation 
(called the sentence held-true asymmetry) can. 
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Before proceeding to chapter 4, it is important to outline my approach to the problem 
so that readers can understand the road I want them to travel in the remainder of this 
project. 
The first claim (l) is that interpretation in the radical case necessarily involves a 
general meaning asymmetry between a speaker and her interpreter since interpretation 
implies that the former, but not the latter, generally knows the meaning of her words. 
(Note the word generally.) We, firstly, assume that a first-person usually knows what 
she means because the consistent use of her words, as interpreted by her interpreter, 
fix their meaning. We, secondly, assume that a first-person does not usually use her 
own behaviour to know what she means since the consistent use of her language (as 
opposed to her speech and behaviour) gives her her knowledge of what she means. 
According to Davidson, radical interpretation necessarily leads to the general form of 
the meaning asymmetry since, if a speaker is interpretable, she is necessarily applying 
her words consistently and can thereby qualify as speaking a language. Language use, 
hence, brings about the general form of the meaning asymmetry, since the consistent 
use of our words and the consequent success of our disquotational statements explain 
the first-personal aspects of meaning. 
The second claim (2) is that the general form of the meaning asymmetry leads to the 
general form of the attitude asymmetries. If radical interpretation can show why the 
speaker usually knows what she means, and why she usually knows this without using 
her own behaviour as evidence, then it can show why we are treated as if we usually 
know what we believe, why we are treated as if we usually know this without using 
our own behaviour as evidence and why we are treated as if we usually self-attribute 
beliefs that are consistent with what we hold true. This step from meaning to belief is 
acceptable, firstly, because a belief just is a sentence that is held true and, secondly, 
because the content of our beliefs is the same as the content of our language. If the 
fact of speaking a language cannot explain our asymmetrical treatment of first- and 
third-person meaning, then it clearly cannot explain our asymmetrical treatment of 
first- and third-person beliefs, and if it can account for the asymmetrical treatment of 
meaning, then it can also account for our asymmetrical treatment of belief. 
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The third claim (3) is that, even though the general form of the attitude asymmetries 
are always present, there are situations in which we realise that the attitude 
asymmetries are absent and a speaker is wrong about what she believes, has to use her 
own behaviour as evidence to know what she believes or has to self-attribute a belief 
in the service of an explanation of her behaviour. 
The fourth claim (4) is that, during communication in our linguistic communities with 
their shared conventions, claims 1, 2 and 3 have to persist. 
Davidson himself does not lead us far through the challenge of the asymmetry thesis. 
He explicitly argues that defending claim 1, and arguing that claim 2 follows from 
claim 1, is what he needs to do to defend his system of radical interpretation from the 
challenge of the asymmetry thesis. I, on the other hand, propose that he also needs to 
be able to explain how claim 3 follows from claims 1 and 2, and how claim 4 follows 
from claims 1,2 and 3. Davidson's tendency to overlook the last two claims made 
him formulate his reconciliation strategy very roughly to give a clear account of only 
claims 1 and 2. This rough formulation has since become the standard interpretation 
of Davidson's reconciliation strategy and is taken directly from how he formulated it. 
It is what I term the meaning asymmetry and what I intend to argue gives an 
unsatisfactory account of the attitude asymmetries. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this project will proceed as follows: In chapter 3, I 
explained why claim 2 follows from claim 1. In chapter 4 section 2, I intend to argue 
that the meaning asymmetry interpretation can explain claim 1 and concede, for the 
reasons given in chapter 3, that claim 2 follows from claim 1. In chapter 4 section 3, I 
will argue that the meaning asymmetry interpretation cannot show how claim 3 
follows from claims 1 and 2. In chapter 5, I will argue that the meaning asymmetry 
interpretation cannot show how claim 4 follows from claims 1, 2, and 3. In chapter 6, 
I will give an alternative interpretation of Davidson's reconciliation strategy, termed 
the sentence held-true asymmetry, that is based on claims 1 and 2, but that can, in 
addition, account for claims 3 and 4. Since my sentence held-true asymmetry builds 
on the successes of the meaning asymmetry interpretation, my agreements with it in 
chapter 4 should accordingly be read as defences of my sentence held-true asymmetry 
interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MEANING ASYMMETRY AND A SITUATION OF 
RADICAL INTERPRETATION 
In this chapter I intend to consider the standard interpretation of Davidson's 
reconciliation of radical interpretation and the asymmetry thesis. It is directly based 
upon the description in the previous chapter and is termed the meaning asymmetry. I, 
firstly, intend to argue that the meaning asymmetry can show why the attitude 
asymmetries, when understood as general assumptions about beliefs, are always 
present in a situation of radical interpretation. I, secondly, will argue that the meaning 
asymmetry leads to peculiar consequences in situations where the attitude 
asymmetries are absent. My first argument is, thus, that the meaning asymmetry is 
more plausible than is often supposed, while my second argument is that, 
notwithstanding a degree of plausibility, there is a feature of the attitude asymmetries 
that it cannot explain. It should be noted that this chapter is concerned with the 
meaning asymmetry's ability to explain the attitude asymmetries only in a situation of 
radical interpretation, and not in everyday interactions in linguistic communities. 
Since a situation of radical interpretation does not arise frequently, and since a fully 
informed radical interpreter is an imaginary character that illustrates a point about the 
mental, rather than a person that can ever exist, the question in chapter 4 should be 
understood as a question about the ability of the meaning asymmetry to provide a 
conceptual account of the attitude asymmetries. 
1. THE MEANING ASYMMETRY INTERPRETATION 
The meaning asymmetry interpretation is taken directly from Davidson's explanation 
of his reconciliation strategy, with little awareness of its origin or implications. A 
speaker can only be said to speak meaningfully if she is interpretable to an omniscient 
radical interpreter. Since the consistent use of her sentences is what renders her 
interpretable, the fact that she is interpretable means that the consistent use of her 
sentences fixes their meaning. If the consistent use of her sentences fixes their 
meaning, and she is applying them consistently, then she is getting the meaning of her 
sentences right. A speaker, thus, knows, without evidence, what she means. Her 
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interpreter has to conduct the complex task of the interpretation of her speech in the 
context of their environment and her history to know what she means. Accordingly, 
the speaker knows, while her interpreter may not know, what she means, and the 
speaker knows without evidence, while her interpreter cannot know without evidence, 
what she means. (The arguments were set out in detail above and will not be repeated 
here.) 
This is the form that the meaning asymmetry takes as an explanation of the attitude 
asymmetries. 
The Authority Asymmetry as explained by the meaning asymmetry 
1. Both the interpreter and the speaker generally know which sentence the 
speaker holds true. 
2. There is a presumption that the speaker generally knows the meaning of her 
sentences because their consistent use fixes their meaning. 
3. There is no presumption that an interpreter generally knows the meaning of 
the sentences of the speaker because he has to conduct the complex task of 
interpretation in order to assign meaning to her utterances. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. 
5. There is a presumption that the speaker generally knows what she believes 
while there is no such presumption in the case of her interpreter. 
The Evidence Asymmetry as explained by the meaning asymmetry 
1. Both the interpreter and the speaker generally know which sentence the 
speaker holds true. 
2. There is a presumption that the speaker does not generally rely on behavioural 
and verbal evidence when assigning meaning to her own utterances because 
the consistent use of her sentences alone fixes their meaning. 
3. There is a presumption that an interpreter relies on behavioural evidence 
when assigning meaning to her utterances. 
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4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. 
5. There is a presumption that, generally, the only behavioural evidence 
employed in attributing beliefs to a speaker is employed by the interpreter in 
the process of assigning meaning to her sentences. 
6. There is a presumption that a third-person has to rely on behavioural evidence 
to acquire knowledge of the beliefs of another while a first-person's 
knowledge of her own beliefs does not usually involve such evidence. 
The Transparency Asymmetry as explained by the meaning asymmetry 
1. Both the interpreter and the speaker generally know which sentence the 
speaker holds true. 
2. There is a presumption that the speaker generally knows the meaning of her 
sentences because their consistent use fixes their meaning. 
3. There is no presumption that an interpreter generally knows the meaning of 
the words of the speaker because he has to conduct the complex task of 
interpretation. 
4. There is a presumption that, generally, only the speaker really knows what she 
holds true because she generally knows, while her interpreter may not, the 
meaning of the sentence that she holds true. 
5. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. 
6. There is a presumption that self-ascriptions of beliefs are generally consistent 
with what a person holds true about the world while third-person attributions 
are made in the service of an explanation. 
The meaning asymmetry interpretation, whose advocates I will from now on label 
traditional interpretationists, maintains that Davidson attempts to explain the attitude 
asymmetries via a meaning asymmetry only, and that he denies, either the existence 
of a sentence held-true asymmetry, or the role of a sentence held-true asymmetry in 
an explanation of the attitude asymmetries. (Note how the first statements above 
differ from those in chapter 3.) Davidson does not explicitly use a sentence held-true 
asymmetry, but he leaves open the possibility of its existence and even its explanatory 
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role. (More about this in chapter 6). Traditional interpretationism takes Davidson as 
denying that a sentence held-true asymmetry has any explanatory role, which is why it 
starts from the assumption that the speaker and her interpreter generally know which 
sentence she holds true. Davidson, on the other hand, treated the meaning asymmetry 
as primary and argued that, whichever other asymmetries exist, and whatever 
explanatory role they have, need to be derived from the meaning asymmetry. 
The meaning asymmetry interpretation is present in the writings of numerous 
philosophers. Bernhard Thele made it clear that he thought that Davidson should have 
explained the attitude asymmetries via both a meaning and a sentence held-true 
asymmetry, but that he explained them with reference to a meaning asymmetry only, 
without leaving room for a sentence held-true asymmetry. In his own words (with my 
terminology and emphasis): 
"In order to give a complete explanation of the attitude asymmetries, it seems, we 
have to explain the sentence held-true asymmetry as well as the meaning asymmetry. 
But Davidson argues that we do not need the sentence held-true asymmetry to explain 
the attitude asymmetries.,,47 
Kirk Ludwig also interprets Davidson as arguing for a pure meaning asymmetry as an 
explanation for the attitude asymmetries. In his own words: 
"Although a speaker might know with better warrant what her words meant, she 
might not know with as great a warrant as her interlocutor what sentences she held 
true. And, without an asymmetry between one's own knowledge of which sentences 
one holds true and that of an interpreter, we are not guaranteed an asymmetry between 
one's knowledge of one's own and of others' attitudes:,48 
Or David Beisecker: "Since Davidson is reluctant to trace any asymmetry of 
knowledge between speakers and interpreters to a sentence held-true asymmetry, 
presumably the speaker knows which sentence she holds true in the same way as her 
. ld 49 mterpreters wou . 
These philosophers, together with some others, then go on to argue that the concept of 
the meaning asymmetry is heavily flawed and, if Davidson cannot explain our 
asymmetrical treatment of meaning, then he cannot explain our asymmetrical 
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treatment of belief. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to discuss the ability of the 
meaning asymmetry to explain the speaker's immediate and authoritative knowledge 
of what she means in a situation of radical interpretation. 50 If it can explain her 
immediate and authoritative knowledge of what she means in a situation of radical 
interpretation, then the connection between meaning and belief guarantees that it can 
explain the three attitude asymmetries. I will offer two arguments. In section 2, I want 
to defend the meaning asymmetry from some common misunderstandings and show 
that it is, in fact, able to explain our asymmetrical treatment of meaning (and thereby 
of belief). In section 3, I want to begin my argument against the meaning asymmetry 
interpretation by showing that the meaning asymmetry alone cannot explain situations 
in which the attitude asymmetries are judged to be absent. (See the schematic outline 
at the end of chapter 3). 
2. THE MEANING ASYMMETRY AS AN EXPLANATION OF THE 
GENERAL FORM OF THE ATTITUDE ASYMMETRIES 
2.1. OBJECTIONS TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FROM 
INTERPRET ABILITY 
The first challenge is based on many Davidsonian claims and can be spelled out as 
follows: Davidson takes the fact that utterances are interpretable to mean that they are 
meaningtul, the fact that they are meaningful to imply that the speaker means 
something by those utterances and the fact that the speaker means something by her 
utterances to imply her actually knowing what she means by them. Bernhard Thele 
once accused Davidson of sliding from: 
(a) A speaker's utterances are (in general) interpretable to 
(b) A speaker's utterances are (in general) meaningful to 
(c) A speaker (in general) means something by his utterances to 
(d) A speaker knows (in general) what he means by his utterances. 51 
In a similar vein, Barry Smith objects that Davidson's transcendental argument from 
interpretability substitutes "meaning what I say" for "knowing what I mean".52 Thele 
and Smith essentially have the same problem with this det1ationary strategy towards 
knowing the meaning of one's utterances. 53 
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It is easy to see why "meaning something by my utterances" should normally coincide 
with "knowing what I mean by those utterances", and that "meaning something by my 
utterances" usually depends on those utterances being meaningful. But Davidson does 
not think that "my utterances are usually meaningful" involves my "meaning 
something by my utterances" or that "meaning something by my utterances" usually 
involves "knowing what those utterances mean". He proposes that "my utterances are 
meaningful" implies that "I mean something by my utterances" and/or that "I know 
what I mean by my utterances". But remember that, according to Davidson, for my 
words to be meaningful (and thereby to mean something by my words) is no more 
than for others to interpret me as meaning it more often than not. Whether I can truly 
be said to use my sentences consistently depends upon whether I am interpretable; 
that is, upon whether others can attribute consistency of use to me. So, whether my 
sentences are meaningful, and whether I mean something by my sentences seems to 
be up to my interpreters. And if knowing the meaning of my sentences is the same as 
my sentences being meaningful and, thereby, as meaning something by my sentences, 
then Davidson is in effect arguing that, if others understand my speech to be 
meaningful (or interpretable), then I know the meaning of my sentences. And this is 
the point to which many Philosophers object since they think that it misses some 
aspect that is central to the first-person perspective; something akin to first-person 
involvement. 
Barry Smith, for example, once remarked that, "we are missing something crucial to 
the first-person perspective of the language-user if we do not recognize a sense of 
comprehension beyond that of the speaker producing words the interpreter can find 
. fi I" ':;4 meanmg u .... 
But what exactly does Smith's objection mean? It intuitively endorses the idea that we 
enjoy some first-person comprehension of our language while we speak. But this is 
not an intuition that an interpretationist will deny. Smith then goes on to claim that 
interpretationism cannot accommodate this intuition, without attempting to discover 
whether interpretationism can, in fact, accommodate it. In what follows, I intend to 
show that interpretationism can accommodate a sense of first-person comprehension, 
but that such first-person comprehension is tied to third-person interpretation. 
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If critics try to reject interpretationism for its inability to make room for a sense of 
first-person comprehension of meaning independent of third-person interpretation, 
then they are unquestionably assuming the very aspect of mind that interpretationism 
denies, which dooms any further discussion to failure. 
Bernhard Thele has a worry that is similar to Smith's, and that he manages to express 
without employing objectionably first-personal terms. Thele thinks that being 
interpretable does not imply (or cannot be substituted for) knowing what we mean. In 
his own words: 
Davidson goes so far as to identify 'knowing what she means' with getting 
her language right. This identification is certainly unacceptable: we 
certainly would not say that a speaker knows the meaning of two of her 
utterances if she were agnostic about whether or not they mean the same. 
But I see no reason why a speaker who is agnostic about sameness of 
meaning should be uninterpretable. 55 
Thele's problem is that it is possible for a speaker to be both interpretable and lacking 
knowledge of what she means, since it is possible for a speaker to be both 
interpretable and agnostic about whether two of her sentences mean the same. 
In a case where a speaker is uninterpretable, a meaning asymmetry interpretation 
seems right. If she, for example, is agnostic about whether the meaning of the 
sentences "I deny this" and "I refute this" are identical or different, she will probably 
refrain from using them at all, especially because she knows that she is meant to make 
herself interpretable. Still, if she does use the sentences with deny and refute 
interchangeably, while admitting that she has no opinion on whether they mean the 
same, she will remain generally interpretable, but with regard to these two sentences, 
she will fail to apply them consistently in the same environmental conditions. She will 
apply both to describe a situation where she declares something untrue or refuses to 
believe that something is true. She will also apply both to describe a situation where 
she proves a theory to be false or where she overthrows a theory by argument or 
proof. As a result, I will not be able to map her language onto my own, or I will not be 
able to understand which environmental conditions her sentences are being applied in. 
In my own experience there are two events for which my language has two different 
sentences, while it seems to me that she understands the same two events, but that her 
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language has two sentences that are randomly applied to both. This will render her use 
of those two sentences uninterpretable to me even though I find the remainder of her 
language generally interpretable. It is beyond doubt that the speaker does not know 
what she means by those sentences, and that is why we can say that her use of them is 
uninterpretable, even though she is otherwise generally interpretable. 
Thele did not provide us with an example of a situation in which a person is both 
interpretable and agnostic about sameness of meaning which weakens his objection 
considerably. If a speaker, for example, employs the sentences "This is a good result" 
and "This is a good outcome" to refer to the same type of event, and she does so 
consistently, then her use of these two words will obviously be interpretable. In my 
experience there is one type of event in a specific type of context for which my 
language has two different sentences, and it seems to me that her experience and her 
language resemble my own in this way. A strong case can be made, however, that, if 
she really does not know whether the two words mean the same or not, then 
something in her speech will reveal this fact. 
Say she asks someone whether there is a difference between the sentences containing 
outcome and result, or whether there are different conditions that they can be applied 
in, or whether they are always applied in the same conditions, or whether there are 
other contexts in which they cannot be used interchangeably, etc. That would give her 
agnosticism about meaning away because, instead of applying them consistently, she 
will be asking questions about their application to ascertain what would make her use 
of these words interpretable to others. If Davidson's claim is accepted that almost all 
our assertions are of sentences held true, her questions will be interpreted as follows: 
she holds the sentence "I am unsure about whether these sentences containing 
outcome and result mean the same" true. Her disquotational statements will become 
questions that look something like this: "This is a good outcome if and only if what?" 
and "This is a good result if and only if what?" This is a situation in which the speaker 
is agnostic about meaning, and understood to be agnostic about meaning. Her 
interpreters will find her past use of those two sentences interpretable, because of her 
consistent application, but past interpretability alone does not imply true 
interpretability. Her interpreters will know that her consistent application does not 
imply that she is getting her language right, exactly because they understand her to be 
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unsure about whether they mean the same, and may at any time become 
uninterpretable. The evidence on which we judge whether someone is interpretable or 
not includes not only past assertions, but also future ones. 56 
My critics may object that it is conceivable that the speaker may be agnostic about the 
meaning of two of her sentences without ever asking another person whether they 
mean the same or not. But an interpretationist like Davidson does not claim that the 
agnosticism has to be revealed in the person's actual speech. All he claims is that the 
agnosticism about meaning has to be interpretable. The evidence from which an 
interpreter interprets includes not only the speaker's actual statements, but also her 
dispositional ones. If the speaker is ever asked whether she thinks that those sentences 
containing result and outcome mean the same, then she will admit that she does not 
know. Her speech will reveal her agnosticism and her application of the two sentences 
will be understood in that light. Davidson's claim thus stands since the agnosticism 
will be interpretable to an omniscient interpreter under favourable circumstances. 
My critics may object that it is unlikely that someone will ever ask the speaker 
whether she knows whether those sentences containing outcome and result mean the 
same if she applies them consistently in the same conditions. But this objection 
commits the same mistake as the one above. Whether an interpreter, in fact, will or 
will not ask such a question is not important. All that Davidson needs to defend his 
claim is that, in principle, it will be possible for an interpreter to ask such a question 
and that, in principle, the speaker's agnosticism about meaning will be so revealed. If 
the interpreter never asks, then he is not interpreting her under favourable 
circumstances since he is not prompting her in a way that will reveal the potentially 
accessible information. If he does ask, then the circumstances are ideal for 
interpretation since he is prompting her in a way that will bring such information to 
light. (More about this in 2.2 below). 
One of the mistakes philosophers make is to assume that the only information that is 
relevant to being interpretable is a speaker's actual application of her language. But, 
as seen above, the speaker's application of her sentences has to be interpreted in the 
light of everything else we know about her, which will include her potentially 
manifestable agnosticism. So, her interpreters, because they will have all this 
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information in mind, will know that she is not applying her sentences consistently 
precisely because she is asking questions about how to apply them, and thereby they 
will know that her use of them is not interpretable and that she is, as a result, not 
getting her language right. A convincing example of a situation in which a person is 
agnostic about the meaning of two phrases and still remains fully interpretable with 
-7 
respect to her use of them has not, to my knowledge, been produced.) 
I presume that the worry behind both Thele's and Smith's objections is that it is 
possible for someone to be interpretable but yet not be able to explain what she means 
by one of her phrases. 58 But they aim this objection specifically at the transcendental 
argument from interpretability. And, as explained in chapter 3, the transcendental 
argument from interpretability should not be understood as an argument that operates 
independently of the argument from disquotation. Once the argument from 
disquotation is added, this objection no longer holds because then the speaker does 
have a way of stating what her phrases mean. 
2.2. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FROM DISQUOT A TION 
This objection holds that disquotation cannot give us the knowledge of the truth 
conditions of our sentences. Those who advance this objection argue that there is a 
difference between knowing that a biconditional is stating the truth conditions of a 
sentence and knowing what truth conditions the biconditional states. 59 Disquotation 
can show why a speaker knows that she is stating the truth conditions of a sentence, 
but knowing that truth conditions are being stated is not the same as knowing those 
truth conditions. And surely merely knowing that one is stating the truth conditions of 
a sentence cannot be sufficient for actually knowing those truth conditions. If 
Davidson and I assume that the knowledge that truth conditions are being stated is 
sufficient for actually knowing what those truth conditions are, then our theory 
involves a peculiar notion of knowledge. A type of knowledge of truth conditions that 
may not be expressible or communicable to others, a type of knowledge of meaning 
where the individual in question may not be able to tell the difference between the 
meaning of two of her sentences in different terms from those contained in the 
sentence, knowledge of meaning where the individual may not be able to tell when 
two of her sentences mean the same, knowledge that she might not necessarily be able 
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to relate to whatever else she believes or to conditions in her environment. And if the 
knowledge that one is stating truth conditions cannot be sut1icient for actually 
knowing those truth conditions, then the speaker cannot qualify as knowing the truth 
conditions of her sentences. And if she cannot be said to know the truth conditions of 
her sentences, then it cannot be claimed that she knows their meanings. 
Here is why critics may think that stating truth conditions is not sufficient for 
knowing what those truth conditions are. When we assign meaning to the utterances 
of another speaker, we use behavioural and environmental evidence to judge what that 
speaker applies her words to. And then we state a biconditional, just in our own 
idiolect. "Jane's utterance that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white." And 
this qualifies as knowledge of what she means, precisely because we have identified 
the environmental conditions that give the truth conditions of her utterance and, as a 
result, the phrase on the right-hand-side of the biconditional that we use to explain 
what she means picks out the environmental conditions that give the truth conditions 
of the phrase on the left. This cannot apply to the first-person case where she states 
the biconditional that holds the truth conditions of her utterance as well, since such 
cases do not involve an interpretation of what she is uttering her sentence in the 
presence of. The third-person case, thus, involves a judgment of what the speaker is 
applying her words to, and a judgment of how her application relates to the 
interpreter's own language. Critics may argue that the first-person case involves no 
more than the mere application of phrases, the stating of the same phrase on both 
sides of a biconditional and the good fortune of appearing to others to be applying her 
phrases consistently. It might be this difference between the biconditionals that allows 
an interpreter to succeed in having knowledge of what the speaker means while the 
speaker's own biconditional can accomplish no more than conveying to the speaker 
that, if an interpreter manages to find her interpretable, then truth conditions are being 
stated. 
The first mistake that this objection makes is to interpret Davidson as saying that 
disquotation is meant to give the speaker the knowledge of the truth conditions 
contained in the disquotational biconditional or, as claimed above, that stating the 
truth conditions is sut1icient for knowing what those truth conditions are. This is, 
however, not the case since it neglects to take into account the role of the 
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transcendental argument from interpretability. She knows the truth conditions of her 
sentences, as evidenced by the fact that she is applying her language consistently. 
Given that she is applying her language consistently and that she accordingly knows 
what she means, disquotation gives her an accurate way of stating the truth conditions 
of her sentences. My critics, in other words, should not state the objection in terms of 
what knowledge the disquotational biconditional can give the speaker, but rather as 
what knowledge it allows the speaker to state. And if the objection holds that 
disquotation can allow the speaker to state truth conditions without the speaker's 
knowing which truth conditions she is stating, then there is a persuasive line of 
reasoning to show such critics to be mistaken. 
My response appeals to interpretability to show that the speaker must know which 
truth conditions her disquotational biconditionals state. If the speaker is judged to 
apply a phrase consistently across many different contexts, she is judged to respond 
consistently to questions about the environmental events that her biconditional 
involves and she is judged to respond consistently to questions about the truth 
conditions as stated in her biconditional, it is difficult to see what can justify denying 
that her behaviour exhibits knowledge of the truth conditions contained in the 
biconditional. Like in the case of interpretability in 2.1 above, if she knows only that 
her biconditional is stating truth conditions, without knowing what those truth 
conditions are, her behaviour or speech will, if prompted appropriately, reveal her 
uncertainty about what such truth conditions are. 
Moreover, interpretation proceeds holistically or via a judgment of coherence. As 
explained in chapter 3, meaning is holistic in nature since sentences in a language 
depend for their meaning on other sentences in that language. Her behaviour will, as 
above, reveal her uncertainty of what truth conditions her disquotational biconditional 
states And this point holds not only when the speaker is asked about that one specific 
biconditional, but also in other contexts across the whole of her language. If she lacks 
knowledge of the truth conditions stated in, for example, the biconditional "snow is 
white if and only if snow is white", such ignorance will be revealed when she talks 
about (or when she is specifically asked about), for example, sentences like "Snow is 
cold", "Milk is white", "Grass is not white", etc. We, thus, do not have to worry about 
the possibility that disquotation allows us to state the truth conditions of our sentences 
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without our knowing what those truth conditions are. If this had been the case, then 
we would have gotten large parts of our language wrong, evidenced by frequent 
inconsistent applications of our words and admissions of our ignorance of the truth 
conditions of our sentences. 
The mistake that Philosophers tend to make is to assume that the only evidence for 
knowledge of meaning through disquotation is a statement of a biconditional like the 
one above.6o But what sort of evidence for knowledge can that really be, considering 
that it is, as critics enjoy pointing out, merely a statement of the same phrase on both 
sides of a biconditional? The evidence for that knowledge (or lack of knowledge) is 
present throughout the whole of the speaker's speech. 
In order to dispute this response, as well as the one in Section 2.1, a critic will have to 
construct an example of a case in which the following holds: First, the speaker lacks 
knowledge of something. Second, the speaker consistently behaves as if she has this 
knowledge. Third, even if interpreted in favourable circumstances, (by, say, 
prompting an honest, intelligent speaker who understands what is asked, who wants to 
provide the answers and who is not prevented from doing otherwise), her ignorance 
remains hidden. In other words, an example that involves a speaker that is willing to 
admit her ignorance, but who cannot do so since such ignorance is the kind of thing 
that can remain inexpressible in language and behaviour. Such an example cannot be 
produced. 
Firstly, it may require a type of necessarily first-person only accessible space 
unreachable even to those with the right kind of information obtained in the right kind 
of circumstances. More importantly, it will have to deal with all the implications of 
such a view regarding the nature of such a space. This is exactly the type of picture 
that everyone has condemned Cartesian immaterialism for for centuries, without 
realising that their own way of thinking about the mind either conforms to it or entails 
the same consequences as it does. 
At this point my critics may accuse me of assuming that the objection implies that 
knowledge of what the truth conditions are is necessarily inaccessible to observers; 
hence, my anti-Cartesian words of warning above. My opponents might claim that the 
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example above is consistent with materialist theories of mind (such as J.J.c. Smart's 
type identity theory, D.M. Armstrong's central state materialism, Hilary Putnam's 
machine-state functionalism or Jerry Fodor's psychofunctionalism) that do not imply 
that such knowledge is inaccessible to observers like Cartesian immaterialism does. 
Since they are materialist theories, they inevitably allow third-person access to mental 
states, but not necessarily the type of access that interpretationists demand. Now my 
opponents might claim that my response above is persuasive only if such materialist 
theories are disregarded. It is possible to construct an example of a situation with the 
three features I specified above if one bears in mind that the speaker's lack of 
knowledge of what truth conditions her biconditional states can be accessible without 
being evident from her behaviour, past, present and future, actual and dispositional. 
Interpretationism restricts the information on the basis of which beliefs can be 
attributed to what any ordinary layperson has access to, namely, a speaker's speech 
and behaviour together with information about her environment. An examination of 
the physical structure or processes of a brain, which is the kind of information that the 
materialist theories listed above allow, goes way beyond what any layperson 
interpreter can iind out and is, according to an interpretationist, irrelevant to the 
mental. Interpretationism holds that, if we discover that the attributions that an 
omniscient interpreter under favourable circumstances make are reflected in our 
physical brain processes, then we can still use a speaker's speech, behaviour and 
environment to attribute beliefs. It further maintains that, if we discover that there are 
brain activities that we cannot link with the beliefs attributed by an omniscient 
interpreter in favourable circumstances, then such activities do not give us any 
information about anything mental. No questions about the mental can be answered at 
any level other than a layperson's interpretations based upon information about a 
speaker's speech, behaviour and environment. If this, my critics may claim, allows for 
a situation where everything that is mental is potentially manifestable in speech and 
behaviour, and a picture where everything mental is potentially manifestable in 
speech and behaviour allows for a situation where disquotation (together with a third-
person judgment of interpretability) can give a speaker knowledge of what she means, 
then one of the materialist approaches above is preferable. 
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Such strategies cannot give a plausible account of the speaker's ignorance with regard 
to the truth conditions that her biconditional states, however. What is required is a 
picture that can make sense of a situation where a speaker consistently gives the right 
truth conditions of a phrase by applying the relevant parts of her language 
consistently, where she is asked specifically whether she knows the truth conditions 
of a phrase, where she is willing to admit that she does not but where she is unable to 
since everything she says or is disposed to say indicates that she does know the truth 
conditions, etc. In such cases, the materialist theories above will have to hold that a 
scientist who is studying physical or functional brain processes will be able to detect 
that, even though everything we do know, and can know, about her indicates that she 
does know what those truth conditions are, she actually does not. This seems like 
something that few contemporary philosophers will endorse. It completely removes 
something that is meant to be mental from the realm of rationality. The "scientifically 
accessible only" ignorance fails to cohere with anything that the speaker does or can 
possibly say or do. It, further, fails to cohere with anything else that she knows or 
believes and even conflicts with some of what she knows and believes. (Knows and 
believes as judged both by her and by others, of course). 
The most desperate of my critics can try to argue that it does cohere with some of her 
other knowledge and beliefs, and that the knowledge and beliefs that I think it 
conflicts with is not really knowledge and beliefs that she has, since they are things 
that her interpreters are mistakenly attributing to her. But such critics will overlook 
the enormity of the mistakes that her interpreter will then have to make. Say that such 
critics argue that she is ignorant of the truth conditions of her sentence "Snow is 
white", even though she is applying that specific sentence, together with sentences 
about snow and white consistently across all contexts. To deny that she knows the 
truth conditions of "Snow is white", they will have to argue that the scientist (who is 
detecting the physical or functional state of the ignorance of those truth conditions) is 
right, while her interpreters are wrong, about what she knows. But ifher interpreters 
are wrong when attributing to her the knowledge of those truth conditions, then their 
attributions to her of the knowledge of the truth conditions of many other sentences 
will fall into doubt. One does not even have to subscribe to the holistic nature of 
meaning to see this. Straightforward compositionality is sufficient to show that, if the 
speaker knows the meaning of "snow", "is" and "white", and she can apply it 
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consistently across all contexts, then she knows the meaning of the sentence "snow is 
white". There simply is no justification to withhold knowledge of the truth conditions 
from her if everything she does and can say indicates that she knows them. 
The idea that a speaker lacks knowledge of what truth condition her biconditional 
states can be plausible only if such ignorance is accessible either to herself or to her 
interpreters. And if it is accessible, then the interpretationist claim stands that what is 
not discoverable by an omniscient interpreter under favourable circumstances just is 
not mental. Then there is nothing that prevents us from accepting the claim that a 
disquotational biconditional (together with a third-person judgment of consistent word 
application), allows the speaker to accurately state the truth conditions that she knows 
her sentences to have. 
Most of the arguments in this chapter are based on the claim that interpretability does 
not imply that the speaker genuinely knows what she means. It only implies that, 
since we need to make her interpretable, and since knowledge of what she means will 
make her interpretable to us, we have to attribute the knowledge of what she means to 
her. Davidson brought about this objection by misleadingly asserting: "There is a 
presumption - an unavoidable presumption built into the nature of interpretation - that 
the speaker usually knows what he means.,,61 This encouraged philosophers to treat 
the speaker's knowledge of what she means as an instrumental tool that we use to 
make her interpretable, as opposed to as something that she genuinely has. In Sarah 
Sawyer's words: 
According to Davidson, if we do not assume a subject knows her 
thoughts, then we cannot begin the process of radical interpretation. This 
explains why the presumption is needed, but it is not clear that this in 
itself provides ajustitication for it.62 
This objection, however, conceives of interpretationism as instrumentalism whereby 
we use whatever is useful to make sense of what others do. The metaphysical 
commitment of interpretationism is that, whatever an omniscient radical interpreter 
attributes in order to render a speaker interpretable, picks out what is already there, 
just from the perspective of that interpreter's interpretive scheme, just like the lengths 
of thirty centimetres or twelve inches are properties that a ruler already has, described 
by either the measurement scheme of centimetres or inches. (More about this in 
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section 2.3). The response to this objection is, thus, that the speaker knows what she 
means, and that this is why she applies her language consistently and is interpretable 
to her interpreters. Her interpreters, thus, attribute the knowledge of her language to 
her, not only because it is useful to render her interpretable, but because that is what is 
supported by the largest amount of evidence. We, in other words, treat others as if 
they know what they mean because radical interpretation demands that we pick out 
and attribute to them whatever all available evidence proves they have. (I will return 
to this point in chapter 7 to assess whether interpretationism can, accordingly, 
accommodate a stronger version of the asymmetry thesis than that described in 
chapter 2). 
2.3. OBJECTIONS TO THE MEANING ASYMMETRY VIA DUAL 
INTERPRETIVE SCHEMES 
According to this objection, radical interpretation cannot involve the meaning 
asymmetry, since such a meaning asymmetry will have to be compatible with dual 
interpretive schemes. It cannot be made to be compatible with dual interpretive 
schemes without peculiar consequences. Thus, the meaning asymmetry that radical 
interpretation implies is implausible and cannot explain the attitude asymmetries. 
Davidson argues that, where there are two omniscient interpreters that are both 
employing a method of interpretation that satisfy the necessary constraints, there is no 
independent check on which interpreter's understanding is correct. His system of 
radical interpretation in fact entails this. As argued in the previous chapter, what an 
omniscient interpreter who employs an appropriate interpretive project cannot find out 
about a speaker simply is not mental at all. There is nothing other than interpretation 
that can settle the question of what a person means and believes. This opens up the 
possibility that two such fully informed appropriate systems of interpretation can 
yield different results, without the option of settling the matter in some other way. If 
interpreter I interprets a speaker as meaning 1*, and interpreter N interprets a speaker 
as meaning N*, and they both possess all he information that there is to be had about 
her, and they both employ a system of interpretation that obeys the constraints of 
correspondence and coherence, then there is no further way of judging whether she 
means 1* or N*; That is, there is no way of adjudicating between the two systems to 
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ascertain which one is giving the more accurate interpretation. And, since 
interpretationism holds that meaning is constituted by these interpretations, there is 
then essentially no one thing that the speaker actually means. In other words, if there 
is no more to meaning than what an omniscient interpreter who is employing an 
appropriate system of interpretation can attribute, then there is no more to what a 
speaker means than what two such interpreters will attribute. If they happen to 
attribute different meanings, then there is no further matter of fact as to what the 
speaker genuinely means. 
One common objection to Davidson's meaning asymmetry as an explanation for the 
attitude asymmetries is, accordingly, that if two such omniscient interpreters 
understand a speaker as meaning different things by her words, then it will have to 
imply that she means both those things by her words and that she, as a result of 
Davidson's deflationary strategy to meaning, knows that she means both those things 
by her words. 63 But the idea that she can mean two different things by her words and, 
therefore, know that she means two different things by her words once again requires 
a fairly peculiar concept of knowing: a kind of knowledge that she will not be able to 
express or that she will not be able to relate to whatever else she knows. She again 
will not be able to tell the difference and similarities between the meanings of two of 
her sentences because the two different things that she supposedly means by them 
(and knows what she means by them) are attributed to her by two third-persons. 
Attempting to solve the problem by using '"intending to mean something by her 
words" instead of "meaning something by her words" cannot work either. In the 
original argument, Davidson phrases consistency of use in terms of an intention to use 
our words consistently.64 But, an intention is just another propositional attitude, so it 
is going to have to be attributed to her by an interpreter to qualify as an intention. And 
then the problem is the same as in the paragraph above. The speaker's intention to use 
her words consistently will be attributed from the third-person stance. So, intending to 
mean something by her words, and thereby knowing that she means something by her 
words, will be attributed by a third-person via a project of interpretation. Then we will 
still have to accept the possibility that two omniscient interpreters can understand us 
as intending to mean different things by our words, which implies that we do know 
that we intend to mean those different things by our words. Thus, if knowledge of 
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what we mean has to be attributed from the third-person stance, our concept of 
knowledge will have to change considerably. 
Davidson, however, also argues that interpretations are relative to specific interpretive 
schemes. Even if two omniscient interpreters interpret me as meaning two different 
things by my words, I do not mean, and know that I mean, two different things by my 
words. There are simply two equally accurate systems of interpretation that can make 
sense of what I say. A correct understanding of the way in which the objects of speech 
determine what we mean (and consequently the identity of our beliefs) can illustrate 
why indeterminacy does not imply that I know that I mean two different things by my 
words. 
I will borrow Davidson's measurement analogy to show how this objection can be 
overcome.
65 The situation of indeterminacy explained above is found in the 
measurement of length, weight and distance just as much as in the attribution of 
meaning and belief content. One measurement system employs centimetres to assign 
numbers to a ruler that indicate its length, another system employs inches to assign 
different numbers to that same ruler to indicate its length. One omniscient interpreter 
(I) that obeys the right interpretive constraints assigns meaning and belief content to a 
speaker that make sense of what she says and does, another such interpreter (N) may 
assign different meanings and belief contents to her that make sense of her. Even 
though they assign different numbers, we cannot say that the system that uses 
centimetres is more right than the one that uses inches, since they make equally good 
sense of the length of the ruler. Similarly, even though they assign different meaning 
and belief contents, we cannot say that interpreter I is more right than interpreter N, 
since their systems make equally good sense of the speaker. Let us assume that a 
speaker is applying her words consistently. Interpreter I says that she means 1* and 
interpreter N says that she means N*. Her language can thus be mapped onto two 
other people's languages (or her language can be measured by two measurement 
models). 
Returning to the objection above, what exactly does she mean and know that she 
means? The objection assumes that she means, and that she knows that she means, 
everything that is attributed to her. This, however, once again neglects the role of 
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disquotation. She means, and knows what she means, whatever truth conditions her 
disquotational biconditional states. If it is slightly different from the truth conditions 
that her interpreter's translation of her biconditional states, it is simply because his 
language (or measurement model) is a slightly different model that is capable of 
making sense of what she says. And if there are two omniscient interpreters who are 
obeying the necessary constraints of interpretation that attribute different meanings to 
her, then she still knows that she means whatever truth conditions her biconditional 
states. And what truth conditions exactly her biconditional states is a question for 
which there cannot be only one answer, precisely because it is a matter that can be 
measured by different measurement models that are employed from different 
perspectives. 
She knows what truth conditions her biconditional states because she applies her 
words consistently (even across different contexts). As seen above, if she is asked 
what she knows she means, and she is willing to say what she knows she means, and 
she does say what she knows she means, and there is nothing that she can say or do 
that suggests that she does not know what she means, then she does know what she 
means. Interpreter I and N know what truth condition her biconditional states because 
they have found measurement models that make complete sense of her by finding 
coherent relationships between all her statements (past and future, actual and 
dispositional). There may be more than one measurement system that can make 
equally accurate sense of her. But this does not mean that she means different things 
by her words or that she knows that she means different things by her words in the 
same way as we do not usually say that a ruler is both thirty centimetres and twelve 
inches. If it is measured in centimetres, then it gets assigned the number thirty. If it is 
measured in inches, then it gets assigned the number twelve. The numbers thirty and 
twelve are given relative to the systems that assign them. If a speaker is interpreted by 
omniscient interpreter I, she gets assigned a collection of truth conditions; if she is 
interpreted by omniscient interpreter N, she may be assigned a different collection of 
truth conditions. The truth conditions, and thereby meanings and belief contents, are 
assigned relative to specific interpretive schemes. So there is no room to say that she 
means, and knows that she means, two different things by her words. Since there are 
two omniscient interpreters that are finding her word application to be consistent, we 
can say that she is speaking a language. And the fact that she is speaking a language 
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allows her disquotational biconditionals to be accurate statements of what she means, 
and of what she knows she means. This constitutes her interpretive scheme for 
herself, so what she means, and what she knows she means, is given relative to her 
own interpretive scheme of herself. 
Objecting to the measurement analogy by suggesting that different measurement 
models can be directly translated into each other and that there is consequently some 
kind of matter of fact as to the ruler's length, as Philosophers tend to do, is of no help 
in this context. Proponents of this view will say that, analogously, there must be a 
matter of fact as to what the speaker means (and what she knows she means), 
evidenced by the fact that she can say what she means and what she knows she 
means. Theorists may then object that a theory that allows for interpretive schemes 
that cannot be translated into each other cannot capture this matter of fact of what the 
speaker means. 
Even if it is true that different measurement models can be directly translated into 
each other in a way that interpretive schemes cannot, it does not help the objection 
above. It is true that different models of interpretation (that is, interpreters' languages 
and systems of rationality), cannot be directly translated into each other since a 
translator will have to use another such system to relate the systems he is trying to 
compare, which simply leads to questions about the third system. But this observation 
does not change the key point that all measurement models are equally accurate. We 
don't have to compare centimetres and inches to verify that they make equally good 
sense of measuring the length of a ruler. All we have to do is to investigate each 
system to establish whether it can attribute coherent relations between different 
measurements. For example, we want four centimetres to be twice the length of two 
centimetres and we want one-hundred inches to be twenty times the length of five 
inches. We don't need inches to verify that centimetres can attribute such coherent 
relations and vice versa. The same holds for attributions of meaning and belief 
content. We don't need to be able to translate systems of interpretation into each other 
to be able to verify that a system makes accurate sense of what a speaker does. Ifit 
can make sense of everything the speaker does, and it can attribute coherent relations 
between what the speaker does, and it carries the additional benefit that many of the 
speaker's observations of her environment seem to coincide with what the interpreter 
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observes, then it is an accurate system of measurement for that speaker. Whether 
centimetres and inches can be directly compared, and whether this implies that there 
is a matter of fact as to the length of the ruler are matters to be settled elsewhere. The 
point here is that, since the interpretive systems cannot be directly compared, and 
since there is nothing over and above interpretation that can settle the question of 
what a speaker means, there cannot be a matter of fact as to what she means. Her 
language and its disquotational biconditionals, which serve as an interpretive system 
of herself, is one such system that gives her knowledge of what she means and 
believes. Her interpreters have other equally accurate systems that help them make 
sense of her. Whether disquotation does, or does not, assign the same truth conditions 
(and thereby meaning and belief contents) to her as her interpreters do, is not 
important, firstly, since we have already established that she knows that she means 
only one thing and, secondly, since the impossibility of translating systems into each 
other without employing further such systems will make it a question without a 
solution anyway. And why would we want such an answer if the speaker knows what 
she means, and if her interpreters can make an accurate judgment of what she means. 
Whatever the speaker is doing is right, and whatever her interpreters are doing is 
right. They can communicate successfully. There is simply no problem to be solved, 
no further questions to be asked. 
3. THE MEANING ASYMMETRY AND THE ABSENCE OF THE ATTITUDE 
ASYMMETRIES 
The meaning asymmetry can, accordingly, explain the presence of the attitude 
asymmetries as assumptions about how people usually relate to their own beliefs as 
well as to the beliefs of others, but a lot more is required of an acceptable theory of 
self-knowledge. Explaining our general assumptions about beliefs is important, but 
we also need an explanation of specific cases in which we treat a speaker as if she is 
wrong about what she believes, as if she is using her own behaviour and speech as 
evidence to know what she believes and as if she is self-attributing a belief in the 
service of an explanation of her speech and behaviour. And this is where the meaning 
asymmetry alone fails. 
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I will use the authority asymmetry to illustrate, since all three of the attitude 
asymmetries pose the same problem. Let us return to an example in chapter 2. 
Suppose that a speaker says that she believes that her husband is not a murderer, while 
someone with whom she communicates maintains that she actually believes that her 
husband is a murderer since a lot of her behaviour indicates that she fears him. 
The meaning asymmetry interpretation will have to explain it as follows: 
1. Both the speaker and her interpreter know that she holds true the sentence 
"My husband is not a murderer" since that is what she is saying. 
2. Since her usual meaning of such a sentence is incompatible with the majority 
of evidence in this case, she seems to be applying her words inconsistently, 
which removes her position oftirst-person authority. 
3. Both the speaker and her interpreter have to use everything they know about 
her as evidence to know what she means by the sentence "My husband is not a 
murderer". 
4. Since the majority of evidence indicates it, they both know that, in this 
specific situation, by the sentence "My husband is not a murderer", she means 
what she usually means by the sentence "My husband is a murderer".66 
5. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that the speaker holds 
true. 
6. They both know that she believes that her husband is a murderer. 
While discussing her belief with her interpreter, she will use both the sentences "My 
husband is not a murderer" and "My husband is a murderer". She uses the former 
when saying what she thinks she believes and the latter when talking about what she 
thinks her interpreter is attributing to her, which she argues is exactly the opposite of 
what she does believe. According to the meaning asymmetry interpretation, by her 
sentence "My husband is not a murderer", in this specific situation, she actually 
means that her husband is a murderer. But in this description of the discussion 
between the speaker and her interpreter she is using the sentence "My husband is a 
murderer" to talk about her husband being a murderer, which is exactly what she 
argues she does not believe. 
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In this situation she understands herself as meaning two different things by the two 
sentences since she is applying her words inconsistently and is consequently wrong 
about what she means. But she, in fact, does not mean two different things by the two 
sentences as confirmed by the majority of evidence. From her interpreter's point of 
view, she means the same thing by the two sentences, even though she fails to realise 
it. He will understand that she understands herself as meaning two different things by 
the two sentences, and he will be able to work out what those two things are. Hence, 
from his perspective it is a discussion because he knows that she thinks that she 
means two different things by her two sentences, and from her perspective, it is a 
discussion because she thinks that she means two different things by her two 
sentences. 
The problem with this explanation is that the meaning asymmetry interpretation then 
suggests that the discussion the speaker and her interpreter will be having is a 
discussion about what she means by her sentence "My husband is not a murderer", 
while it will actually be a discussion about what she holds true. The interpreter will 
not try to convince the speaker that she actually means the opposite of what she 
usually means by that sentence. He will try to convince her that she is wrong about 
what she holds true. Further, when she corrects herself, she will not admit that she has 
the meaning of her sentences wrong. She will say that she is wrong about what she 
holds true. It will be a discussion about what in the environment she holds true, and 
not about what she means. 
Take Davidson's original argument for his system of radical interpretation. In a 
situation where two people share no language, the best a speaker can do is to apply 
her words consistently to things in her environment that she thinks are apparent to 
both herself and her interpreter.67 Davidson derives the two constraints of the 
principle of charity from what our intuitions inform us such an interpreter will have to 
do to succeed in making sense of her. Ifwe continue to describe this process, we will 
eventually reach a stage where the interpreter and the speaker are both familiar with 
her language; where they both know her typical responses to specific environmental 
situations. Once we reach this stage, there is nothing in interpretationism that rules out 
the possibility of judging that a speaker has misidentified environmental conditions. 
The interpreter will know that, even in this one situation, by the sentence "My 
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husband is not a murderer" the speaker means that her husband is not a murderer. He 
will also know that, by the sentence "My husband is a murderer" she means that her 
husband is a murderer. Her language will be held constant. But he will judge that she 
has misidentified which state of affairs she holds true. 
This can be best illustrated by the type of discussion they will have. An interpreter is 
not typically going to say, "in this situation you mean 'your husband is a murderer' by 
the sentence 'My husband is not a murderer' and I will convince you that that is what 
you mean". He is most probably going to say, "Since you are having a discussion with 
me, and since I understand your point in the discussion and since you understand 
mine, you clearly understand what you mean by both these sentences. But there is 
behaviour that indicates that you have misidentified what you hold true". He is not 
going to say, "There is behaviour that indicates that you are applying your words 
inconsistently and you therefore think that you mean one thing but you actually mean 
the other". Our intuitions, in the form of a discussion between the speaker and her 
interpreter, indicate that a discussion about what someone believes will be a 
discussion about what environmental conditions the speaker takes to be true, as 
opposed to about what the speaker means by what she says. 
Philosophers who believe that the meaning asymmetry alone can explain the attitude 
asymmetries (my traditional interpretationists), may respond that our intuitive 
understanding of the situation is right. It is true that, in a case where we do not know 
what we believe, it is because we do not know what we hold true. And in a case where 
we are wrong about what we believe, it is because we are wrong about what we hold 
true. Recall that the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions; that is, the 
environmental conditions under which an interpreter judges the speaker to hold it true. 
If a speaker uses the sentence "My husband is not a murderer" in the presence of her 
husband being a murderer, she is getting the meaning of her sentence wrong precisely 
because she has misidentified the environmental conditions under which she is 
currently applying it. Getting the truth conditions of a sentence wrong is the same as 
getting its meaning wrong. Both the speaker and her interpreter know which 
environmental conditions she usually utters it in, but he realises, while she does not, 
that the current environmental conditions are not the ones that usually prompt her to 
utter that specific sentence. 
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This response is similar to the strategy that I defend in chapter 6. The speaker is 
wrong, while her interpreter is right, about the environmental conditions in which she 
is uttering her sentence. They both attribute to her the same sentence that she holds 
true. "My husband is not a murderer". But he is right, while she is wrong, about what 
she means by it since he is right, while she is wrong, that the current environmental 
conditions are not the same conditions that she usually holds it true in. The moment 
her interpreter convinces her of the nature of their shared environmental conditions, 
and that she usually holds a different sentence true in them, then she will change the 
sentence that she holds true. 
The problem with this response in this context is that it appeals to the connection 
between meaning and truth to obtain a sentence held-true asymmetry which it then 
utilises to explain situations in which the attitude asymmetries are absent. And even 
though I agree that this is how Davidson should be interpreted, it is not consistent 
with the meaning asymmetry interpretation according to which Davidson allegedly 
argues that, firstly, a sentence held-true asymmetry either does not exist or plays no 
explanatory role in the attitude asymmetries and, secondly, the meaning asymmetry, 
in the absence of all other asymmetries, can explain the attitude asymmetries. 
The meaning asymmetry alone, as a result, cannot explain our intuitive conceptions 
(that are backed up by the requirements and constraints of a situation of radical 
interpretation), of situations in which the three attitude asymmetries are absent. 
We want an explanation of the authority asymmetry that can respect the following: 
When the speaker is unsure about what she believes, she consults the states of affairs 
in the world that she is trying to form a belief about. She can use two sentences, one 
to say what she thinks she believes and one to talk about the opposite of what she 
thinks she believes. She knows what both sentences mean. She can use them in the 
current situation and in other contexts, she has always used both sentences 
consistently as interpreted by others and she can relate both to the rest of her 
language. She can thus accurately state the truth conditions of both through 
disquotation. She just does not know which of the two sentences she holds true. 
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We want an explanation of the evidence asymmetry that can respect the following: 
When the speaker is unsure about, or does not know, what she believes, she knows the 
meaning of both of the sentences that she suspects she might hold true. She can use 
them in the current situation and in other contexts, she has always used both sentences 
consistently as interpreted by others and she can relate both to the rest of her 
language. She can thus accurately state the truth conditions of both through 
disquotation. She just does not know which sentence she holds true since there is 
evidence that suggests both. She now has to try to figure out which case is supported 
by the largest amount of evidence. But then she is not using her own behaviour and 
speech to figure out what she means, she is using it to know which sentence she holds 
true. 
We want an explanation ofthe transparency asymmetry that can respect the 
following: When the speaker self-attributes a belief in the service of an explanation of 
her behaviour and speech, it is because she does not know what she holds true. She 
knows the meaning of both of the sentences that she suspects she might hold true. She 
can use them in the current situation and in other contexts, she has always used both 
sentences consistently as interpreted by others and she can relate both to the rest of 
her language. She can thus accurately state the truth conditions of both through 
disquotation. She just does not know which sentence she holds true since there is 
evidence that suggests both. She now has to try to figure out which case is supported 
by the largest amount of evidence and accordingly self-attribute a belief in the service 
of an explanation of her speech and behaviour. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In section 1, I described the meaning asymmetry interpretation of Davidson's 
reconciliation between radical interpretation and the asymmetry thesis. In section 2, I 
argued that radical interpretation really does involve a meaning asymmetry between a 
speaker and her radical interpreters and, if we accept the connection between meaning 
and belief (which both Davidson and I do), then the meaning asymmetry can explain 
the general form of the attitude asymmetries. In section 3, I argued that the meaning 
asymmetry alone fails to provide a plausible account of situations in which the 
attitude asymmetries are absent, since such situations have a lot to do with which 
sentences we hold true. In chapter 6, I will show how a sentence held-true asymmetry 
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relies on, and benefits from, the strengths of the meaning asymmetry pointed out in 
section 2 and how it can resolve the difficulties described in section 3. Before 
proceeding to chapter 6, however, I want to use chapter 5 to show that the problems of 
the meaning asymmetry interpretation are more substantial than this chapter suggests. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE MEANING ASYMMETRY AND LINGUISTIC 
CONVENTIONS 
In this chapter, I will make it clear why a meaning asymmetry alone cannot give a 
satisfactory account of the attitude asymmetries. I intend to do this by showing that 
one cannot extend the same sort of meaning asymmetry that is present in the radical 
case to everyday cases of language use, and that the version of the meaning 
asymmetry that is present in practice is not appropriate to explain the attitude 
asymmetries between speakers and the interlocutors with whom they share linguistic 
conventions. Section 1 will describe the Davidsonian claims that give rise to the 
suspicion that there is no meaning asymmetry between a speaker and her 
interlocutors. Section 2 will examine four possible strategies for accommodating the 
meaning asymmetry in practice, together with my reasons for thinking that they all 
fail to explain the attitude asymmetries.68 
1. BACKGROUND 
The problem that this chapter deals with stems from a perceived tension between four 
Davidsonian claims. Firstly, the meaning asymmetry explains the attitude 
asymmetries, secondly, a meaning asymmetry between a speaker and her interpreter 
relies on the fact that he has to interpret her, thirdly, many everyday cases of 
communication between speakers in a linguistic community do not, as a matter of 
fact, require anyone person's interpretation of another and, fourthly, the attitude 
asymmetries are present in everyday cases of communication between speakers in a 
linguistic community.69 The apparent tension that the third claim introduces is that, if 
the first three claims are true, it suggests the fourth claim is not true. The first and 
second claims were justified in chapters 3 and 4, the fourth in chapter 2. Sections 1.2 
and 1.3 below will explicate the third, while section 1.1 will further examine the 
relation between interpretation and the meaning asymmetry, thereby clarifying exactly 
what the tension is between the four claims. 
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1.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND THE MEANING 
ASYMMETRY 
Radical interpretation (with its necessary constraints) can explain a meaning 
asymmetry between a speaker and her radical interpreter, since, firstly, the fact that 
she applies her words consistentl/o implies that she immediately and authoritatively 
knows what she means and, secondly, her radical interpreter has to interpret her 
behaviour to know what she means. 71 Since this is the traditional interpretationists' 
explanation for the meaning asymmetry, they will have to use it to explain the attitude 
asymmetries between speakers and their interlocutors in their linguistic communities. 
In other words, they will have to say, firstly, that the requirements and constraints of 
radical interpretation can be operative in practice, even if there is no one that is 
actually interpreting anyone else, secondly, that the fact that it is still operative 
justifies a meaning asymmetry between the speaker and her interlocutors and, thirdly, 
that this meaning asymmetry between the speaker and her interlocutors then explains 
the attitude asymmetries between the speaker and her interlocutors. 
This is problematic, though. In practice our interlocutors often do not, and do not have 
to, interpret our behaviour to know what we mean, a claim that Davidson himself 
subscribes to and that I will explain below. Now, if an explanation of the meaning 
asymmetry between speakers and their radical interpreters relies on the fact that such 
radical interpreters have to interpret their behaviour to know what they mean, and in 
practice our interlocutors often do not have to interpret our behaviour to know what 
we mean, then it is not clear how radical interpretation and its constraints can secure a 
meaning, and thereby the attitude, asymmetries between a speaker and her 
interlocutors. The fact that the constraints of radical interpretation are operative in the 
practical case can prove that the speaker is applying her words consistently, and it can 
show why there would be a meaning asymmetry between the speaker and anyone who 
would have to interpret her behaviour to know what she means. But it cannot, without 
sufficient argumentation, be claimed that such a meaning asymmetry (and thereby the 
attitude asymmetries) can be extended to hold between the speaker and those who do 
not have to interpret her. In other words, if the meaning asymmetry between a speaker 
and her radical interpreter holds in virtue of his need to interpret her, and our 
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interlocutors often do not have to interpret us, then what can account for the meaning 
asymmetry (and thereby the attitude asymmetries) in practice? 
1.2. INTERPRETATION IN THE CONTEXT OF LINGUISTIC CONVENTIONS 
Before proceeding to Davidson's view ofthe relation between interpretation and 
conventions, I want to provide some reasons for thinking that we do not, as a matter 
of fact, interpret a speaker's behaviour to know what she means. That is, everyday 
situations where language communities share conventions of how to use and interpret 
statements do not involve, or require, the use of interpretation. When I speak, my 
interlocutors do not interpret to check whether they have the meaning of my phrases 
right, or that they have their meaning at all. They wouldn't be able to do this since 
they almost always lack the type of information required to do so. For example, they 
understand my speech easily when they first meet me, without having had access to 
any information about my behaviour and speech in the context of the specific 
environmental events we discuss, and a lot of interactions with my interlocutors occur 
far from the environmental conditions under discussion. They will present specific 
objects and events to me and prompt me to respond only when we are not 
communicating successfully. If they thought that I did not use the same conventions 
as them, they would have asked me for verbal and behavioural evidence aimed at 
environmental objects/events much more often than they actually do. Even in cases 
where we are not communicating successfully, they are more likely to relate the 
phrase that they are trying to understand to more basic phrases that they assume I 
share. The environmental objects and events that people talk about are often not easily 
reached when we talk about them, so they do rely on the conventional use of other 
phrases to make sense of the new expressions I produce. 
We can treat each other as above precisely because we recognise that other English 
speakers speak roughly in the same way we do since they speak the same language as 
us with the same rules we observe. 
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1.3. DAVIDSON'S VIEW OF LINGUISTIC CONVENTIONS 
Davidson has often been accused of denying that we use linguistic conventions when 
we communicate. A more detailed discussion of his view of conventions will help to 
show that this is actually not what he says. 
One of Davidson's remarks, which has since become one of his most frequently 
quoted and misunderstood claims, is the following: "there is no such thing as a 
language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists 
have supposed". 72, 73 Davidson identifies the "standard view" of language as a system 
of convention-governed meanings shared by a linguistic community. On this view, we 
acquire an enormous collection of words and phrases together with rules for their 
application to objects and events and rules for relating them to each other. These rules 
are shared by everyone in our linguistic community. They are applied whenever 
situations arise in which they dictate how we should speak in order to be 
understood. 74 According to this "standard view" such linguistic conventions are 
necessary for successful communication and, if there are such things as individual 
idiolects, they are deviations from the norms of our linguistic community. 
Davidson observed two phenomena that led him to believe that conventions could not 
be necessary for successful communication. The first, and most frequently cited, is the 
occurrence of strange speech acts that we manage to understand, even though they 
cannot be included in the rules for our language. One example is malapropisms, or the 
confused use of words in which an appropriate word is replaced by one that resembles 
it in sound or spelling, but has an absurdly inappropriate meaning. "Lead the way and 
we'll precede", "The plane will be landing momentarily" or "The Hood damage was 
so bad they had to evaporate the city". Ifthe standard view was correct that linguistic 
conventions were necessary for successful communication, then we would not have 
been able to interpret any such sentences correctly. Neither would we have been able 
to make sense of mixed metaphors such as "I'll bum that bridge when I come to it", 
"Deaf as a doornail" and "Don't rume the boat", (don't rock the boat/rume his 
feathers). And communication involving spoonerisms (named after the Reverend 
William Archibald Spooner), in which corresponding consonants or vowels are 
transposed, would have had minimal success. Two of Spooner's well known slips 
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were to tell a student "You have tasted two worms" (wasted two terms) and to claim 
in a sermon that "The Lord is a shoving leopard" (loving shepherd).75 These 
phenomena are not the type of things that can be built into linguistic conventions 
since all the possible slips that people can make cannot be anticipated and coded into 
rules for language use. 76 Accordingly, Davidson argues that, if we agree that such 
slips cannot be included in linguistic conventions, and we further appreciate that our 
hearers can make sense of such confused sentences when they are uttered, then we 
have to admit that some of our successful communication takes place in the absence 
of conventions. And if the absence of conventions in such cases does not prevent us 
from communicating successfully, then linguistic conventions cannot be a necessary 
condition for communicative success. 
Davidson's second observation, made in anticipation of being criticised for drawing 
his conclusion from such a small number of cases, is that two people hardly ever share 
all words and ideas of how exactly the use them. It is not unusual to have a perfectly 
good conversation with someone, even though we do not know all the words they use. 
When we encounter a phrase that we do not understand, we are often able to infer the 
meaning via, as Davidson puts it, "wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary 
and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb 
for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely." 77, 78. 79 In these 
cases we do not employ conventions either. 
If the point of language is communication (which is a claim that Davidson accepts as 
true),80 and communication can occur without conventions, then it is plausible to 
believe that the use of linguistic conventions is not a necessary condition for 
language. Thus, if the point of language is to communicate, and we quite frequently 
manage to communicate by creatively interpreting individual idiolects with their 
unique word applications (what many may want to call linguistic errors or ignorance), 
then our traditional concept of a language needs to be modified to apply to individual 
idiolects, rather than to communally shared rules for word and phrase application. 
Hence, Davidson's widely discussed claim with which this section began: there is no 
such thing as a language in the sense of a system of shared convention-governed 
meanings. 81 
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Davidson has been accused of failing to distinguish between necessary and sufficient 
conditions for communication. Those who hold this view think that the most 
Davidson's argument shows is that linguistic conventions might not suffice for every 
case of linguistic communication, but that cannot be taken to mean that they're not 
t' .. 82 necessary or commUnICatIOn. 
This objection fails to recognise the significance of the argument, however. Davidson 
does not think that the situations described above are exceptions because their 
meanings have to be derived from an individual idiolect, as opposed to a language 
based on conventional meanings. He thinks, firstly, that meaning is derived from 
instances of successful communication, secondly, that there are many cases of 
successful communication without the use of conventions and, thirdly, that, if 
conventional language had to be removed completely (such as when communicating 
with someone with whom one shares no language), successful communication will 
still be almost guaranteed, provided that the interpreter is making use of an 
appropriate method of interpretation and in possession of adequate information about 
the speaker. Consequently, all meaning is derived from individual idiolects and where 
conventional language use happens to coincide with the meanings of an individual 
idiolect, it is nothing but a fortunate accident. Davidson is, thus, not guilty of 
confusing the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions. Conventions 
are neither necessary for successful communication because we would, in a case 
where no language is shared, be able to get along quite well without them. 
Davidson has also been accused of conflating linguistic meaning and speaker 
meaning. 83 In the case of Richard Sheridan's Mrs. Malaprop (which is the example 
Davidson used in his original argument), the speaker meaning of her statement might 
have been "Sure, if I apprehend any thing in this world it is the use of my vernacular 
tongue, and a nice arrangement of epithets." That is, after all, how a creative 
interpreter would have understood her and it is also how she would have wanted to be 
understood. But the linguistic meaning of her utterance still remains, "Sure, if I 
reprehend any thing in this world it is the use of my oracular tongue, and a nice 
derangement of epitaphs." This utterance makes no sense according to the rules of the 
language of English, which is what enables us to say that Mrs. Malaprop's use of 
English is incorrect. 
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Davidson does not conflate speaker- and linguistic meaning, though. He is quite 
aware of the distinction (and this is the point where he explicitly admits that we do 
use linguistic conventions when communicating).84 He just thinks that, since 
conventions are not necessary for communication while interpretation is, the 
distinction needs to be reworked to respect that meaning requires interpretation rather 
than the application of linguistic rules. As a result, what has traditionally been 
identified as philosophically unimportant and labelled speaker meaning, Davidson 
thinks is of great Philosophical importance since it is the source of meaning. And 
what has traditionally been considered to be of great Philosophical significance and 
called "linguistic meaning", Davidson relegates to the status of a philosophically 
uninteresting practice. 85 It is philosophically uninteresting because the only reason 
why we try to speak as others do, and why we are prepared to bring our speech in line 
with the standard use and closely obey linguistic conventions, is that we do not want 
to be seen as ignorant of the most common use of English. As Davidson says, "Using 
a word in a non-standard way out of ignorance may be a faux pas in the same way that 
using the wrong fork at a dinner party is, and it has as little to do with communication 
as using the wrong fork has to do with nourishing oneself, given that the word is 
understood and the fork works.,,86 
This places us in the position to correctly understand the original Davidsonian claim 
that there is no such thing as a convention-governed language. If the point of language 
is to communicate successfully, and successful communication is possible without the 
use of conventions, then the phenomenon that makes communication possible is 
actually the creative interpretation of individual idiolects rather than a shared 
language. This does, however, not imply that he denies that languages like English 
are, in some ordinary sense, spoken.87 As previously mentioned, he recognises that, 
within linguistic communities, we will speak pretty much as others do and that such 
conformity is encouraged. It does, after all, simplify communication greatly not to 
have to interpret every utterance from scratch. Phenomena like malapropisms are 
important, however, since the theoretical possibility of communication without shared 
practices demonstrate that such sharing cannot be an essential constituent in meaning 
and communication. Davidson is not trying to make a point about what it is that we, 
as a matter of fact, do. He is trying to make a philosophical (rather than an empirical) 
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point about the necessary conditions for communication. That is why he does not 
deny the existence of, say English, as a language. He has made it clear that, in 
practice, we employ shared linguistic rules. In his own words, 
I do not think we normally understand what others say by consciously 
ret1ecting on the question what they mean, by appealing to some theory of 
interpretation, or by summoning up what we take to be the relevant 
evidence. We do it, much of the time, effortlessly, even automatically. We 
can do this because we have learned to talk pretty much as others do, and 
this explains why we generally understand without effort much that they 
88 
say. 
Since Davidson admits, firstly, that we mostly speak like others do and, secondly, that 
this frequently allows us to use conventions without interpretation, he essentially 
concedes that, in practice, the process of radical interpretation is not always involved 
in knowing what someone means. In cases where we do use conventions to know 
what our interlocutors mean, radical interpretation without conventions has to be 
possible. 89 Davidson, thus, concludes that radical interpretation is something that we 
often do not need to do in practice, even though we potentially could. 
1.4. THE PROBLEM 
Now, if the meaning asymmetry between a speaker and her interpreters requires that 
those interpreters radically interpret her, then we want to say that a meaning 
asymmetry between a speaker and her interlocutors requires that her interlocutors 
radically interpret her. (1.1). Radical interpretation is, however, something that we 
often do not do in practice (1.2-1.3). This suggests that the meaning asymmetry is 
something that is often not present in practice. And if the meaning asymmetry is 
something that is often not present in practice, then we are left without an explanation 
for the attitude asymmetries between speakers and their interlocutors in their 
linguistic communities. 
In Section 2 I shall consider four possible strategies for accommodating the meaning 
asymmetry in practice, together with my reasons for thinking that they all fail to 
explain the attitude asymmetries described in Chapter 2. A successful strategy will 
have to be able to support two claims. It will have to show, Firstly, that the constraints 
of radical interpretation can continue into situations of communication where we do 
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not actually use interpretation and, secondly, that the theoretical constraints of radical 
interpretation can explain a meaning asymmetry, and thereby the attitude 
asymmetries, between a speaker and her interlocutors in her linguistic community. 
My contention in the remainder of this chapter is that, even if traditional 
interpretationists can show that radical interpretation and its constraints are operative 
during communication based on linguistic conventions (rather than on interpretation), 
the type of meaning asymmetry that it implies is not appropriate to explain the attitude 
asymmetries between speakers and their interlocutors with whom they share linguistic 
conventions. 
2. THE MEANING ASYMMETRY IN PRACTICE 
2.1. INTERLOCUTORS AS SPECTATORS 
Traditional interpretationists may argue that it is true that, firstly, our interlocutors do 
not interpret us when they use conventions to understand what we mean, and, 
secondly, that radical interpretation continues even in situations where conventions 
are used. 
For all the reasons mentioned previously, our interlocutors do not interpret us in 
situations where they use conventions to understand what we mean. But the use of 
conventions does not rule out interpretation (and thereby the meaning asymmetry) 
since it does not rule out the possibility that the speaker is radically interpretable. As 
Davidson's theory of conventions suggests, if an interlocutor decide to discard all 
linguistic conventions, the speaker will still be interpretable to him. Even if this feat is 
deemed impossible, it still does not weaken the idea that the speaker remains radically 
interpretable. If a genuine radical interpreter, who does not speak her language at all, 
were to observe a speaker, she would still be radically interpretable to him, whether 
she is functioning in a linguistic community or not. He will be in a position to fix 
what she means by radically interpreting her. Consequently, if the use of her words 
(and the possibility of being radically interpreted as applying them consistently) fixes 
their meaning, then the speaker knows what she means while her radical interpreter 
still has to interpret for meaning. That is, even in a situation where conventions are 
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used, the speaker knows, while her radical interpreter may not know, what her words 
mean, which is the meaning asymmetry. 
Traditional interpretationists can further claim that our interlocutors in our linguistic 
communities are not in a position to know what we mean, so whatever they know 
does not play any role in what we mean and, consequently, in what we know we 
mean. They are thereby relegated to spectators of the notion of meaning and the 
process of fixing it. Since our knowledge of what we mean is grounded by our radical 
interpreter's interpretation of us, our interlocutors knowledge of what we mean is 
likely to be mistaken because they do not have anything to do with fixing what we 
mean. Where they are correct about what we mean, they are simply lucky that their 
conventions coincide with the meaning that a radical interpreter finds in our personal 
idiolects. After all, the ultimate evidence for what someone means and believes is 
derived from the radical interpretation of her speech and behaviour, so the 
conventions that speech communities make use of are irrelevant to meaning and belief 
content. The meaning asymmetry between a speaker and her radical interpreter, thus, 
gives rise to a large meaning asymmetry between the speaker and her interlocutors, 
since her interlocutors are in a poor position to know what she means. 
To summarise this strategy: In a situation where linguistic conventions are used, 
radical interpreters can know what I mean through interpretation. The fact that I am 
radically interpretable shows that I know what I mean. My interlocutors cannot know 
what I mean without checking their conclusions with a radical interpreter (or with me, 
of course, assuming that I am radically interpretable).90 This means that I know what I 
mean while my fellow English speakers may not know what I mean. Therefore, in a 
situation where linguistic conventions are used, the meaning asymmetry can explain 
the presence of the attitude asymmetries. 
The attitude asymmetries explained by this version of the meaning asymmetry will 
look as follows: 
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The authority asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means because she is radically interpretable and 
the regular application of her sentences fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors do not know what she means because whatever knowledge 
their linguistic conventions give them about her does not settle what she 
means (unless there is a convergence between such claims and those of the 
radical interpreter). 
3. Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors do not know, what she 
believes. 
The evidence asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means without using her own behaviour and 
speech as evidence because the regular application of her sentences fixes their 
meamng. 
2. Her interlocutors have to use her behaviour and speech to know what she 
means since their conventions do not settle what she means (unless there is a 
convergence between such claims and those of the radical interpreter). 
3. Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors cannot know, what she 
believes without employing her behaviour and speech as evidence. 
The transparency asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows the meaning of the sentences that she holds true because 
their regular application fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors cannot know the meaning of the sentences that she holds true 
without using her behaviour and speech as evidence since their conventions do 
not settle what she means (unless there is a convergence between such claims 
and those of the radical interpreter). 
3. Thus, the speaker self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with what she holds 
true about the world while her interlocutors have to attribute beliefs to her in 
the service of an explanation of her behaviour and speech. 
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OBJECTIONS 
This strategy gives the best account of the meaning asymmetry and, thereby, of the 
attitude asymmetries in practice. It does, however, rely on the likelihood that the 
people with whom we share linguistic conventions are often mistaken about what we 
mean since they are not employing an appropriate method of radical interpretation to 
interpret us. This is, of course, true, but it cannot be employed to argue that the 
conclusions that our interlocutors draw about what we mean are of no significant 
theoretical use at all. Even if Davidson's suggestion is accepted that such conclusions 
cannot constitute our linguistic and propositional content in the way that an 
omniscient radical interpreter's can, the reality remains that they are, more often than 
not, right about what we mean, without any interpretation at all. 91 The project of 
sorting people into linguistic communities based on information obtained via radical 
interpretation dictates this. If a speaker frequently deviates from the linguistic 
conventions of her community, then Davidson's principle of charity requires that we 
assume that she is speaking a different language, which an appropriate method of 
radical interpretation will assign to her. In such cases her community will also treat 
her as someone who is speaking, either a completely different language, or a different 
English dialect (with some of its own conventions). Ifl share a language with others 
whose radically interpreted evidence places them in the same speech community as 
me, then my everyday speech is likely to be very similar to the speech from which the 
radical interpreter constructs his scheme about me. And people are able to 
unreflectively understand that, exactly because it is likely to be fairly similar to the 
raw evidence that they provide their radical interpreters with. And then it is not clear 
why, even ifnot perfectly, others would not be in a great position to know my 
language. If our linguistic community is correct about what we mean a lot of the time, 
then we cannot merely dismiss their conclusions about us as insignificant or irrelevant 
to the matter at hand. If our speech community can more often than not reach the 
same conclusion about what we mean through conventions while the radical 
interpreter has to interpret, our speech community more often than not appears to have 
an immediate route to our meaning which even the radical interpreter lacks. 
Traditional interpretationists may continue to claim that the frequency with which our 
interlocutors manage to get the meaning of our statements right is unimportant, since 
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their judgements are made to be correct by the judgements of a radical interpreter. 
Whatever conclusion they draw is reached through luck, rather than insight about the 
speaker's speech and behaviour. Hence, the fact that a radical interpreter can judge 
that she is, like everyone around her, speaking English does not imply that her 
interlocutors have a way of knowing what she means. 
This underestimates the strength of my argument, however. It is not simply the case 
that, since our interlocutors happen to be right about what we mean a lot of the time, 
they have to know what we mean. The judgements that our interlocutors make about 
what we mean is almost guaranteed to correspond with the judgements reached by an 
interpreter since we deliberately try to speak very much like the other people in our 
linguistic community do. It might be right that we speak very much like those in our 
linguistic community because we do not want to be seen as ignorant or unintelligent, 
but the fact remains that we deliberately alter our speech to correspond with theirs. 
The longer the time that someone spends in a specific speech community, the more 
likely it becomes that there will be very few differences between her speech and the 
speech of her interlocutors. We do not want others to think that we are inarticulate or 
ignorant of the common use of English and we are eager to make ourselves 
understood. So we calculatingly learn to speak like they do. If this is true, then it is 
difficult to know why traditional interpretationists claim that radical interpretation can 
ground a large meaning asymmetry between ourselves and our linguistic 
communities. 
To recap: in a situation where linguistic conventions are used, our radical interpreters 
will construct very similar individual idiolects for us since we often speak in the same 
way (even if it is by accident rather than convention). My interlocutors will recognise 
that I speak the same language as them since our personal idiolects are very similar. 
The similarity of our personal idiolects ensures that we will agree on many 
conventions to conform to in order to simplify communication. Linguistic 
conventions will often lead my interlocutors directly to conclusions that correspond 
with those my radical interpreter reaches via interpretation. So, a lot of the time, my 
interlocutors will be in as good a position as myself to know what I mean. Therefore, 
in situations where conventions are used, this first approach towards the meaning 
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asymmetry can explain the attitude asymmetries, but only at the expense of a 
plausible account of interpretation and conventions. 
2.2. INTERLOCUTORS AS WELL INFORMED CONVENTION USERS 
A second strategy that traditional interpretationists might use is to construct a 
situation very much like the one above, but to integrate my comments. Once again, it 
is true, firstly, that our interlocutors do not interpret us when they use conventions to 
understand what we mean, and, secondly, that radical interpretation continues even in 
situations where conventions are used. 
Here our interlocutors use conventions, instead of an appropriate method of radical 
interpretation, to understand us. Their conclusions can, again, not constitute our 
linguistic and propositional content in the way that an omniscient radical interpreter's 
can. They do, however, happen to be right about what we mean more often than not, 
without engaging in any interpretation at all. 92 As explained above, the project of 
sorting people into linguistic communities based on information obtained via radical 
interpretation implies this and the fact of deliberately trying to speak like others in our 
linguistic communities do strengthens it. Our interlocutors are, accordingly, in a very 
good position to know our language. 
This does not imply that there is no meaning asymmetry between speakers and their 
interlocutors, though. In this situation the speaker knows what she means since she is 
speaking a language that is interpretable to her radical interpreter. Her interlocutors 
are mostly able to know what she means because she is using the same conventions 
that they are. There thus appears not to be a meaning asymmetry, but this appearance 
is misleading since those conventions may at any time become incapable of 
explaining her speech. If she, for example, deliberately or accidentally stops using 
them or if she uses a convention or sentence that her interlocutors are not familiar 
with, they may at any point become wrong about what she means. In the radical case, 
the meaning asymmetry rests on the fact that the radical interpreter may be wrong 
about what she means since he has to continue interpreting her. Even if he is an 
omniscient interpreter of her, he has to continue interpreting her. And then his 
conclusions about what she means may at any point be wrong since his interpretive 
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scheme may at any point become inappropriate to make sense of her; that is, his past 
successful interpretations cannot guarantee that he will continue to be right in the 
future. The fact that he has to continue to collect evidence and interpret it in the light 
of everything else he knows about her, leaves room that his conclusions may be 
mistaken. Similarly, in practice, our interlocutors may at any point reach mistaken 
conclusions about what we mean since they rely on conventions that may at any point 
become inappropriate to make sense of us. 
Therefore, in situations where linguistic conventions are used, a speaker knows, while 
her interlocutors may not know, what she means. 
The attitude asymmetries explained by this version of the meaning asymmetry will 
look as follows: 
The authority asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means because she is radically interpretable and 
the regular application of her sentences fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors are mostly right, but may be wrong, about what she means 
since their conventions may at any point become unable to make sense of her. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors may not know, what she 
believes. 
The evidence asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means without using her own behaviour and 
speech as evidence since the regular application of her sentences fixes their 
meamng. 
2. Her interlocutors mostly do not have to, but at any point may have to, use her 
behaviour and speech as evidence to know what she means. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows what she believes without using her own behaviour 
and speech as evidence while her interlocutors may have to use such evidence 
to know what she believes. 
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The transparency asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows the meaning of the sentences that she holds true since their 
regular application fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors mostly do not have to, but at any point may have to, use her 
behaviour and speech as evidence to know the meaning of the sentences that 
she holds true. 
3. Thus, the speaker self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with what she holds 
true about the world while her interlocutors at any point may have to attribute 
beliefs to her in the service of an explanation of her speech and behaviour. 
OBJECTIONS 
The first strategy can justify plausible versions of the attitude asymmetries but 
contains some problematic assumptions about interpretation and conventions. This 
strategy, on the other hand, seems to justify the existence of a meaning asymmetry in 
practice without giving an inappropriate picture of interpretation and conventions, but 
the attitude asymmetries that it is able to explain are too weak. 
The authority asymmetry that it is able to explain is similar to the one described in 
chapter 2 and is thus as it should be. In case of the evidence asymmetry, however, 
saying that our interlocutors may have to (but mostly do not have to) use a speaker's 
evidence to know what she believes is just not strong enough. The original evidence 
asymmetry holds that we assume that our interlocutors usually employ such evidence 
in order to know what we believe. Similarly, in the case of the transparency 
asymmetry, it is not sufficient to say that our interlocutors may have to (but mostly do 
not have to) attribute beliefs to us in the service of an explanation of our speech and 
behaviour. The original transparency asymmetry holds that we assume that our 
interlocutors usually attribute beliefs in the service of an explanation of our speech 
and behaviour. 
This inability to explain the proper evidence and transparency asymmetries renders 
this strategy hopeless.93 
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2.3. INTERLOCUTORS AS INTERPRETERS 
Another possible traditional interpretationist strategy is that, while conversing with 
those in our linguistic communities, the meaning asymmetry (and consequently the 
attitude asymmetries) continue since our interlocutors always take an interpretive 
stance towards us. On this view, the meaning asymmetry is grounded, not by the 
possibility of being radically interpretable outside our linguistic communities, but by 
being interpretable within our linguistic communities.94 
This response does not contradict Davidson's view that we often understand what our 
interlocutors mean since "we have learned to speak pretty much like they do". But 
even in cases where we do use conventions, we are still using interpretation since we 
always have to check that the conventions that we use make accurate sense of what 
the speaker says and does. We never simply use conventions to understand a speaker. 
We use conventions together with an interpretation of whether the conventions in 
specific cases are appropriate. Thus, even cases where we use linguistic conventions 
involve interpretation in the form of checking that our conventions make sense of 
what a speaker says and does. And if there is an omniscient interpreter with whom the 
speaker shares linguistic conventions, then such an interpreter will function very 
similarly to a radical interpreter. The difference is that he will use conventions 
together with a judgement of which sentence the speaker holds true and what her 
behaviour and environment suggest she means. 
A possible justification for this idea is that the second strategy above assumes that I 
can know that I speak the same language as someone else. But traditional 
interpretationists may ask how I can know whether I share a language with the 
speaker or not? We cannot say that I can know this when I hear familiar sounds 
arranged in familiar ways. Hearing familiar sounds arranged in familiar ways, which 
has up to now been treated as an unacceptable appeal to phenomenology anyway, 
cannot give me the knowledge that I share a language with someone else. I will have 
to judge that those familiar sounds are applied to the same sort of things in the 
environment that I apply them to, otherwise I will know only that others make the 
same sort of sounds as I do. And knowing what a speaker applies her words to is 
something that can only be achieved through radical interpretation; that is, through the 
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employment of her behaviour, speech and environment in order to interpret the 
phrases that she seems to hold true. Thus, traditional interpretationists may claim that 
the use of conventions alone cannot give me the knowledge that I am speaking the 
same language as my interlocutors. I have to perform some interpretation to place 
them in the same speech community as myself. And I have to continue to interpret 
them if I want to know that they continue to speak the same language as I do. Thus, 
even when we do use conventions to understand what our interlocutors mean, we are 
still taking an interpretive stance towards them. We are not only ready to interpret at 
the smallest suspicion of unusual or unpredictable speech, but we also always judge 
whether to apply the conventions by recalling their other behaviour and speech.95 
If a speaker, for example, claims that it is raining, her interlocutor will use the 
conventions of the English language to assign meaning to her utterance, which (as I 
argued above) seems to give him a good chance of being right about what she means. 
But he assigns the meaning to her utterance, not by consulting a list of conventions 
only, but by recalling any of her other behaviour and speech that mayor may not 
contradict the conventional meaning, considering whether the conventional meaning 
is appropriate in their current conversation or environment, working out what else she 
could have meant if not, and so forth. The justification for the meaning asymmetry is, 
thus, the same as in the radical case. Here it is just an interlocutor that is judging her 
against the linguistic conventions that he is applying to her. 
The attitude asymmetries explained by this version of the meaning asymmetry will 
look as follows: 
The authority asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means since her interlocutors interpret her and 
the regular application of her sentences fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors may be wrong about what she means since their 
interpretations may at any point be wrong. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors may not know, what she 
believes. 
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The evidence asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means without using her own behaviour and 
speech as evidence since the regular application of her sentences fixes their 
meamng. 
2. Her interlocutors have to use her behaviour and speech as evidence to know 
what she means since they are her radical interpreters. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows what she believes without using her own speech and 
behaviour as evidence while her interlocutors have to employ such evidence to 
know what she believes. 
The transparency asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows the meaning of the sentences that she holds true since their 
regular application fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors may not know the meaning of the sentences that she holds 
true since they have to interpret for meaning. 
3. Thus, the speaker self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with what she holds 
true about the world while her interlocutors attribute beliefs to her in the 
service of an explanation of her behaviour and speech. 
OBJECTIONS 
Like the approach in Section 2.1, this strategy is able to explain the sort of attitude 
asymmetries that we want, but in this instance it cannot account for some of the 
observations made in Section 1.2. It may be true that we often keep in mind a 
speaker's behaviour in the context of her environment when she speaks. But this does 
not imply that we are actually interpreting. And there seem to be good reasons for 
claiming that actual interpretation of a speaker's speech against both conventions and 
all other information cannot be the usual course of events. 
Firstly, in the case of a new acquaintance, we have access only to what she says. We 
know nothing about her behaviour and speech in the context of the environmental 
events and objects that she is talking about. There is almost nothing to interpret 
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against our conventions, even if we do happen to adopt an interpretive stance towards 
her.96 In the radical case, the meaning asymmetry rests on the idea that, since a radical 
interpreter has to interpret the speaker, he may be wrong about what she means. In the 
case of new acquaintances, since her interlocutors attribute conventional meaning 
without access to evidence of what she says under which environmental conditions, 
the meaning asymmetry will have to be lost. 
Secondly, on the other extreme, in the case of a very close relation, we may be in 
possession of a lot of information about her, but we will also be aware of a lot more 
linguistic conventions that we share. Once again, there will be almost nothing to 
interpret. Even if we agree with such traditional interpretationists that we do use some 
interpretation to verify that a speaker is speaking the same language as us, there 
appears to be little to justify the claim that we go on interpreting a speaker to continue 
verifying that she is speaking the same language as us. This is precisely the type of 
objection that persuaded Davidson himself that we did not always use interpretation 
when understanding the speech of someone in our linguistic community. The more 
confident we become that we speak the same language with the same conventions, the 
less evidence about a speaker's behaviour and environment we use. That's exactly 
why Davidson is not able to claim that we use radical interpretation in practice. He 
has to talk about the more modest "creative interpretation". Instead of being able to 
claim that we use the behaviour of a speaker in the context of our environment as 
evidence for our interpretation, he has to talk about ""wit, luck, and wisdom from a 
private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, 
and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most 
likely.,,97The knowledge that we share a lot of conventions simplifies communication, 
since it allows us to use evidence only in cases where the speaker produces a phrase 
that we do not understand at all, or a surprising phrase (like a malapropism or 
spoonerism). And even in such cases the evidence does not concern the speaker's 
behaviour and speech in the context of the environmental objects/events that she is 
talking about, but instead likely deviations from conventions that we are certain she 
shares with us. It, thus, seems as if we use a lot less evidence in interactions with 
close relations/friends with whom we share a language with its conventions, and even 
this smaller amount of evidence is used only in cases where speakers produce 
surprising speech. 
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The two preceding paragraphs show that, if the interpretation of other evidence 
against our conventions is meant to ground the meaning asymmetry, then this strategy 
cannot explain the general form of the meaning asymmetry (and consequently the 
attitude asymmetries). It implies that, at least in situations with new acquaintances and 
close relations, the interpretation of gathered evidence against our conventions is not 
the usual course of events. If the meaning asymmetry is meant to spring from our 
interlocutors' interpretations of us, then at least in these situations we cannot assume 
that the speaker usually knows, while her interlocutors may not know, what she 
means (and believes). 
2.4. INTERLOCUTORS AS POTENTIAL INTERPRETERS 
The last strategy open to a traditional interpretationist is to use our interlocutors as 
potential, as opposed to actual, radical interpreters. All the responses above attempt to 
maintain that there is some actual meaning asymmetry between the speaker and her 
interlocutors based on some actual interpretation that they either do or should do. But 
why do we have to assume that her interlocutors actually have to interpret her? Just so 
long as she is radically interpretable to her interlocutors, even if they do not, in fact, 
interpret her, then the meaning asymmetry between her and her interlocutors can be 
retained. 
This parallels the argument for the meaning asymmetry in the radical case. The idea 
of a fully informed radical interpreter is meant to be an abstract one. It does not 
describe some actual individual. So, whether there is a fully informed radical 
interpreter interpreting or not, there is always a meaning asymmetry present. Any 
situation where someone speaks is a situation of radical interpretation since, to qualify 
as speaking a language and entertaining propositional content, a speaker has to be 
interpretable to a fully informed radical interpreter. Whether anyone is actually 
interpreting or not is not important. Whether someone will in principle be able to 
interpret is what grounds the meaning asymmetry. In other words, even in situations 
where no one is actually interpreting there is a meaning asymmetry since the fact that 
there is no actual interpretation does not suddenly render the speaker uninterpretable. 
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Analogously, during conversations between a speaker and her interlocutor there is no 
one that is interpreting since the communication will be based mainly on their shared 
linguistic conventions. But the fact that there is no one that is actually interpreting 
does not suddenly render the speaker uninterpretable. And if the speaker remains 
interpretable, then they are communicating in a situation of radical interpretation 
coupled with its meaning asymmetry 
The attitude asymmetries explained by this version of the meaning asymmetry will 
look as follows: 
The authority asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means since she is radically interpretable and the 
regular application of her sentences fixes their meaning. 
2. Her interlocutors may not know what she means since, if they had interpreted 
her, they may not have known what she meant. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors may not know, what she 
believes. 
The evidence asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows what she means without using her own speech and 
behaviour as evidence since the regular application of her sentences fixes their 
meamng. 
2. Her interlocutors have to use her speech and behaviour to know what she 
means since, if they had interpreted her, then they would have had to use it. 
3. Thus, the speaker knows what she believes without using her own speech and 
behaviour as evidence while her interlocutors have to use such evidence to 
know what she believes. 
The transparency asymmetry 
1. The speaker knows the meaning of the sentences that she holds true since their 
regular application fixes their meaning. 
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2. Her interlocutors have to use her behaviour and speech to know the meaning 
of the sentences that she holds true since, if they had interpreted her, they 
would have had to use it. 
3. Thus, the speaker self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with what she holds 
true about the world while her interlocutors attribute beliefs to her in the 
service of an explanation of her speech and behaviour. 
OBJECTIONS 
This strategy is of no use in explaining the attitude asymmetries between a speaker 
and her interlocutors since it is merely a restatement of Davidson's original arguments 
for radical interpretation and for the meaning asymmetry as a conceptual picture of 
the mental. Chapter 4 argues that the meaning asymmetry coupled with radical 
interpretation, when understood as a conceptual model of the mental, is able to 
explain why, in theory, the attitude asymmetries are always present. What this chapter 
is attempting to accomplish is to find a way in which this conceptual picture of the 
mental can be extended to explain what we, as a matter of fact, do in practice. 
The point in this case is precisely that her interlocutors are not mythical characters 
called radical interpreters who serve to illustrate the nature of the mental. They are 
people with whom we share a language with its conventions who mostly do not have 
to interpret us to know what we mean. Casting them in the role of potential radical 
interpreters, like this strategy does, still does not tell us what exactly is going on in a 
situation where we are conversing with our interlocutors. We already know that a 
radical interpreter has to find the speaker's speech interpretable for the meaning 
asymmetry to continue. But that will be a meaning asymmetry between a speaker and 
a radical interpreter. Throughout this chapter our strategies to translate the meaning 
asymmetry into practice have failed since we have been unable to find the role that 
our interlocutors play in interpretation and in the meaning asymmetry. We have 
discovered that they are not interpreters since they do not observe our speech and 
behaviour in the context of our environment to judge what we mean. And regarding 
them as potential (as opposed to actual) radical interpreters leaves the question 
unanswered as to what they actually are and how our actual relations with them can 
be explained. The strategy of rejecting the role of our interlocutors in favour of 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
turning back to the conceptual picture of the mental can be read as a reluctant 
admission that the conceptual picture cannot be translated into practice.98 
3. CONCLUSION 
A meaning asymmetry appropriate to the task of explaining the attitude asymmetries 
can, therefore, not be accommodated in situations where we use linguistic 
conventions, which is what we do almost all of the time. Even if we agree with 
traditional interpretationists that a meaning asymmetry is present in the radical case, 
and that the meaning asymmetry in the radical case can explain why the attitude 
asymmetries (understood as general assumptions) are always present, it is all of very 
little use if the meaning asymmetry cannot fit into what we actually do in our 
linguistic communities. Such traditional interpretationists follow Davidson by 
admitting that we use conventions in practice, but they simply do not take such cases 
of convention use seriously enough. They may be right that we can, in principle, stop 
using conventions and that successful communication will continue. As argued 
throughout, it does seem as if it is right that Davidson's system of radical 
interpretation can give a plausible account of the nature of the mental. But in practice 
we do use conventions and we will not stop using them, and it is at this level that the 
meaning asymmetry interpretation collapses. We need a theory that either explains the 
attitude asymmetries between ourselves and our interlocutors during interactions with 
them within our linguistic communities, or one that can at least be extended to explain 
them. The meaning asymmetry alone is clearly not intended to explain them directly, 
since it is embedded in a system of radical interpretation. It also seems impossible to 
extend it to accommodate conventions, since it cannot be separated from a system of 
radical interpretation. We, as a result, have a theoretically coherent picture of the 
mental that cannot be developed to be anything more than just that. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY TO THE RESCUE 
In this chapter, I propose to explain a strategy whereby Davidson's system of radical 
interpretation can accommodate the three attitude asymmetries. In section 1, I intend 
to explicate my solution by applying it to the asymmetries, by justifying each 
individual claim that gives rise to it and by explaining its advantages over the 
meaning asymmetry interpretation. In section 2, 3 and 4, I will defend it from some 
possible objections that can arise. The previous chapter left us with two dilemmas: 
first, how exactly can radical interpretation be made compatible with what we do 
within our linguistic communities and, second, how can we construct an explanation 
for the attitude asymmetries that applies both in the radical and non-radical cases, 
given that the two cases are so different. In this chapter both these problems will be 
solved and it will become clear both how radical interpretation relates to what we do 
in our linguistic communities and how its accommodation of the attitude asymmetries 
can be translated into practice. 
1. THE SENTENCE HELD TRUE ASYMMETRY 
1.1 THE SENTENCE HELD TRUE ASYMMETRY AS AN EXPLANATION OF 
THE ATTITUDE ASYMMETRIES 
Given that our interest is primarily in an explanation for the attitude asymmetries in 
practice, I will begin by applying my solution to interactions between speakers and 
their interlocutors within their linguistic communities. In sections 1.2 and 1.3, I will 
show how it is compatible with radical interpretation. 
Davidson's system of radical interpretation can accommodate all three of the attitude 
asymmetries once we understand that the speaker usually knows, while her 
interlocutors may not know, which sentences she holds true. Traditional 
interpretationists treat the held-true sentence symmetrically by assuming that the 
speaker and her interpreter both know which sentence she holds true, while he, unlike 
her, then has to interpret to know its meaning. I propose that the meaning asymmetry, 
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in fact, is a sentence held-true asymmetry and that we should treat both knowledge of 
the sentence that is held true and knowledge of its meaning asymmetrically. 
The justification for the sentence held true asymmetry is, accordingly, parasitic upon 
the meaning asymmetry and will be defended in detail below. For now, it will suffice 
to say that the fact that the speaker is interpretable as speaking a language means that 
she is applying her sentences consistently. The fact that she is applying her sentences 
consistently means that she knows what she means, for all the reasons given in 
chapter 4. The fact that she usually knows what she means means that she usually 
knows the truth conditions of her sentences (or what environmental conditions she 
usually applies her sentences in the presence of). Since she knows which truth 
conditions her sentences usually have, as soon as she is in a situation where such truth 
conditions obtain, she usually knows which sentence she holds true. 
It is important to note that I am not claiming that the speaker has to wait until those 
truth conditions obtain before she knows which sentence she holds true in them. The 
fact that she knows her language means that she always knows the truth conditions of 
her sentences and that she, as a result, knows which truth conditions have to obtain for 
her to hold a specific sentence true. Since I am, however, comparing and contrasting 
her position with that of her interpreter/interlocutor, it is helpful to apply the sentence 
held-true asymmetry by placing them in a situation where the truth conditions of one 
of her sentences obtain. My argument for the sentence held-true asymmetry does, 
however, hold even in situations where the truth conditions of that sentence do not 
obtain. 
If the fact of speaking a language can give the speaker the knowledge of which 
sentences she usually holds true in the presence of which conditions, then she does 
not have to wait until she speaks or behaves to know which sentences she holds true. 
On this strategy the speaker usually knows what she believes, usually does not need to 
use her own behaviour and speech to know what she believes and usually self-
attributes beliefs that are consistent with her view of the world because the fact of 
speaking a language gives her the knowledge of which sentences she holds true. In 
practice, her interlocutors may be wrong about what she believes since they may not 
know what she holds true. They have to use her behaviour and speech to know what 
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she believes since they have to wait for her to utter a sentence and display behaviour 
that indicates that she holds it true. Similarly, they have to attribute beliefs to her in 
the service of an explanation of her speech and behaviour since they have to wait for 
her to utter a sentence and display behaviour that indicates that she holds it true. Her 
radical interpreter, similarly, has to wait for her to utter the sentences that she holds 
true. The only difference between the radical and non-radical cases is that her radical 
interpreter has to interpret for meaning as well, unlike her interlocutor in the first 
statement of each of the following schematic outlines below). 
The attitude asymmetries explained by the sentence held-true asymmetry will look as 
follows 
The authority asymmetry in the non-radical case 
1. Both the speaker and her interlocutor usually know what she means by the 
sentences that she holds true. 
2. The speaker usually knows which sentences she holds true when encountering 
situations in which she holds them true since she is generally interpretable and 
thus knows the meaning of her sentences. 
3. Her interlocutors may not know which sentences she holds true when 
encountering situations in which she holds them true unless she has uttered 
them. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that a speaker holds 
true. 
5. The speaker usually knows, while her interlocutors may not know, what she 
believes. 
The evidence asymmetry in the non-radical case 
1. Both the speaker and her interlocutor usually know what she means by the 
sentences that she holds true. 
2. The speaker usually does not have to use her own behaviour as evidence to 
know which sentences she holds true when encountering situations in which 
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she holds them true since she is generally interpretable and thus knows the 
meaning of her sentences. 
3. Her interlocutors usually have to use her behaviour as evidence to know which 
sentences she holds true when encountering situations in which she holds them 
true since they have to either count on her to inform them or prompt her 
appropriately to utter them. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that a speaker holds 
true. 
S. The speaker usually knows what she believes without using her own speech 
and behaviour as evidence while her interlocutors have to use such evidence to 
know what she believes. 
The transparency asymmetry in the non-radical case 
1. Both the speaker and her interlocutor usually know what she means by the 
sentences that she holds true. 
2. The speaker usually does not have to use her own speech and behaviour as 
evidence to know which sentences she holds true when encountering situations 
in which she holds them true since she is generally interpretable and thus 
knows the meaning of her sentences. 
3. Her interlocutors usually have to use her speech and behaviour as evidence to 
know which sentences she holds true when encountering situations in which 
she holds them true since they have to either count on her to inform them or 
prompt her appropriately to utter them. 
4. A belief is attributed by giving a meaningful sentence that a speaker holds 
true. 
S. The speaker usually self-attributes beliefs that are consistent with what she 
holds true while her interlocutors attribute beliefs to her in the service of an 
explanation of her speech and behaviour. 
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1.2. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SENTENCE HELD TRUE 
ASYMMETRY 
I have defended some of the individual claims that contribute to this strategy 
previously, so I will repeat some of them only briefly. In this section, I will assume 
that we are potentially interpretable to a radical interpreter and justify the sentence 
held-true asymmetry accordingly. In section 1.3, I will explain how our use of 
linguistic conventions fits in with this picture. Moreover, in the chapters in which 
these arguments first appeared, I followed Davidson and talked about "the 
environmental conditions in which a speaker holds a sentence true", whereas in this 
chapter I talk about "the situations in which the speaker holds a sentence true" or 
"situations in which the truth conditions of her sentences obtain". The former applies 
more accurately to the simple perceptual beliefs that Davidson himself illustrated his 
system with, while the latter describes more accurately the complex beliefs (with their 
more complex truth conditions) that I will use in this chapter to illustrate my solution. 
(More about this distinction below.) The arguments below hold just as much for the 
latter as for the former, so for now I will continue to use simple perceptual beliefs to 
ill ustrate. 
Firstly, the fact that the speaker is interpretable as speaking a language means that she 
is applying her sentences consistently. If she is not interpretable to an omniscient 
radical interpreter under favourable circumstances, then she is clearly not applying her 
sentences consistently and thus not speaking a language. 
Secondly, the fact that the speaker applies her sentences consistently means that she 
usually knows what she means. As seen in chapter 4, if she applies her sentences 
consistently, she can use disquotation to state what she means. She can relate her 
sentences to each other both when applying them to her environment and when 
attributing meaning and belief to others. She is interpretable to others as knowing 
what she means since everything she does say, and can possibly say, will indicate 
both that she knows what she means, and exactly what she knows she means. 
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Thirdly, the fact that the speaker usually knows what she means means that she 
usually knows the truth conditions of her sentences or what environmental conditions 
she usually applies them in. 
The first justification for this third claim is the definition of meaning. If we agree with 
Davidson that the speaker knows what she means, and meaning just is the truth 
conditions of a sentence, then the speaker knows the truth conditions of her sentences. 
From her own perspective, the truth conditions of a sentence that she holds true are 
given by the sentence that she holds true in the presence of certain environmental 
conditions. The sentence that she holds true is that "It is raining", and its truth 
conditions are given by the sentence that she holds true under those environmental 
conditions which happens to be that "It is raining". She gives the truth conditions of 
the sentence that she holds true as, "My sentence 'It is raining' is true ifand only ifit 
is raining". The sentence on the left-hand-side ofthe biconditional is the sentence that 
she holds true, and the sentence on the right-hand-side is the one that she usually 
holds true in the same environmental conditions that she holds the sentence on the 
left-hand-side true in. Thus, if she knows the meaning of one of her sentences, then, 
by definition, she knows its truth conditions. If she knows its truth conditions, then, 
by definition, she knows which environmental conditions she usually applies it in. 
Otherwise her disquotation will not work. 
The second justification for this third claim relies on all the justifications thus far, 
since it requires the speaker to be interpretable as applying her sentences consistently 
and thereby as the speaker of a language. If she speaks a language, then she is able to 
be an interpreter of others. In the radical case, the speaker will give the meaning (or 
truth conditions) of another's sentence by using a sentence in her idiolect that she 
usually holds true in the same environmental conditions that she thinks he is holding 
his true in. She hears him say, "It is raining". She judges that he is holding that 
sentence true in the same environmental conditions that she would have held a 
sentence "It is raining" true in. From her perspective, she judges which environmental 
conditions he is holding a sentence true in, figures out which sentence in her language 
she holds true in those environmental conditions and then, via her perception of her 
environment and her knowledge of her own language, she produces the sentence that 
gives the meaning of his sentence. She, in other words, knows which sentences she 
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typically holds true under which environmental conditions, since that is the only way 
in which she can work out what he means (by mapping his language onto her own). 99 
In the non-radical case, she also knows which environmental conditions she holds 
which sentences true in, since she employs the same conventions as her interlocutor 
and she understands the sentences that he holds true. 
Fourthly, the previous point related to knowledge of meaning in specific cases, rather 
than to knowledge about what is usually the case. The fact that the speaker knows 
which environmental conditions she usually applies her sentences in the presence of 
means that, once she encounters such conditions, she usually knows which sentence 
she holds true. 
She is interpretable to others as knowing which sentence she holds true since 
everything she does say, and can possibly say, will indicate that she knows which 
sentence she holds true, and except for cases where she is uncertain about her 
environment, there is nothing that she can say that will indicate that she does not 
know which sentence she holds true. There is no evidence on the basis of which 
interpreters can withhold an attribution of the knowledge of which sentence she holds 
true once she encounters the environmental conditions that she usually uses it in the 
presence of. Furthermore, as seen above, when encountering environmental 
conditions in which her interpreter or interlocutor utters a sentence that he holds true, 
she knows which sentence she would have held true in those same conditions. She 
thus cannot encounter any specific set of environmental conditions without knowing 
exactly which sentence she would have held true in them. 
Moreover, if we want radical interpretation to be more than a collection of sounds that 
an interpreter manages to find meaningful, then we are required to assume that the 
speaker knows which sentence she holds true when encountering the environmental 
conditions that she usually applies it in. Davidson himself encourages us to think of 
speakers as speaking because they want to be understood, and as knowing that they 
have to apply their sentences consistently in order to be understood. Speakers thus 
apply their sentences consistently with the intention of providing clues about their 
meaning to their interpreters. A theory that allows for speakers to be in environmental 
circumstances without knowing which sentence they hold true will have difficulty 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
accounting for the sense in which language use is intentional. On such a theory the 
consistency of language application will be a matter of something in the environment 
causing speakers to produce a specific sequence of sounds. It will allow the speaker to 
become a spectator of the way in which the environment causes her body to move. 
Theories that want to make the speaker a participant in her own linguistic responses to 
her environment have to allow that she applies her sentences consistently to events 
that she thinks are apparent to her interpreters with the intention of being understood. 
And if the speaker is applying her sentences consistently (as judged by an omniscient 
radical interpreter), then it means that she is applying them consistently to events that 
she thinks are apparent to her interpreters with the intention of making herself 
interpretable. If she applies them to something she thinks is apparent to her 
interpreters, then she apparently knows which environmental conditions she is in. And 
if she intentionally applies her sentences consistently in those same environmental 
conditions, then she apparently knows which sentence she usually holds true in them 
and, consequently, which sentence she on particular occasions holds true in them. We, 
accordingly, need to attribute to her the knowledge of which sentence she holds true 
in the environmental conditions she finds herself in. 
Someone may object that the fact that such intentions and knowledge have to be 
attributed to her by an interpreter does not give us a good reason to conclude that she 
genuinely knows which environmental conditions she is in and which sentence she 
holds true. We want radical interpretation to be more than a collection of sounds that 
an interpreter manages to find meaningful, so we attribute things to the speaker that 
will prevent this from being the case. But this does not mean that the speaker 
genuinely speaks intentionally and that she knows which sentence she holds true in 
the environmental conditions that she is in. 
This is not the case, however, since we will attribute to her whatever the relevant 
information about her suggests she is doing. To return to the measurement analogy, 
we treat our attributions of thirty centimetres or twelve inches as picking out a 
property of the ruler. Length is not something that it does not genuinely have but that 
we attribute to it because we have something to gain from thinking of a ruler as 
something with length. Whether we attribute to it the number thirty or the number 
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twelve depends on whether we employ the centimetres or inches measurement 
scheme, like the precise nature of the environmental conditions in which the speaker 
holds a sentence true depends on whether I am employing my language or on whether 
John is using his language as interpretive scheme to make sense of what she says. But, 
since there is ample evidence that she knows which sentence she holds true once she 
encounters the environmental conditions that she usually applies it in, knowledge of 
which sentence she holds true is something that she genuinely has, even though the 
precise nature of the environmental conditions that she knows she holds a sentence 
true in will depend on the specific interpretive scheme used to interpret her. She utters 
the same sentence in the same environmental conditions almost all of the time, she 
can relate that sentence to other environmental conditions and the sentences that she 
holds true in those, she can describe or point out the environmental conditions in 
which she does not hold it true, she can (and is required to) use her understanding of 
which sentences she holds true in which environmental conditions to attribute 
meaning and belief content to others, etc. There is as much evidence to suggest that 
she knows which sentence she holds true when encountering a set of environmental 
conditions as there is to claim that she knows what she means by her sentences. A 
speaker, thus, knows which sentence she holds true when encountering the 
environmental conditions that she holds it true in. 
Lastly, the sentence held true asymmetry holds in both the radical and the practical 
cases. Both a radical interpreter and an interlocutor will be in some doubt about 
exactly which environmental conditions the speaker is going to respond to before she 
responds, and this is where the sentence held true asymmetry lies. The only difference 
between the radical and practical cases is that, in practice, we assume that our 
interlocutors know what our sentences mean, but since they may not know to which 
environmental conditions we are going to respond before we say or do something, 
they have to wait for us to tell them which sentences we hold true. 
First, in the radical case, our interpreters do not know what our sentences mean, 
which gives them the additional task of examining the environmental conditions in 
which we utter the sentence that we hold true in order to know what we mean by it. 
But they have to wait until we tell them which sentence we hold true before they can 
interpret its meaning. Even if such radical interpreters already have a lot of 
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infonnation about us and they know what we typically mean by which sentences, they 
still have to wait for us to utter the sentences that we hold true. They, thus, have to 
derive the sentences that we hold true from our behaviour while, for all the reasons 
given above, we can know which sentences we hold true even before we have actually 
spoken. 
Second, in the non-radical case, the conventions employed by a speaker's 
interlocutors are likely to tell them what she means. Since meaning just is the truth 
conditions of a sentence, it may be tempting to object that such interlocutors have a 
good way of knowing which sentences she holds true in which environmental 
conditions, and that they, accordingly, have to be in a good position to know which 
sentences she holds true when they encounter the environmental conditions in which 
she holds them true. 
The big mistake that such an objection will make is to assume that a speaker's 
interlocutors are in as good a position as herself to know when the conditions under 
which she holds a sentence true are present. It is true that their linguistic conventions 
give her interlocutors a good way of knowing which sentences she will hold true 
under which conditions, but it does not follow from this that they will know which 
conditions she is encountering before she utters the sentence that she holds true in 
them. The objection assumes that the truth conditions of a speaker"s sentence are 
given by a sentence mined from their linguistic conventions that her interlocutor 
would have used in their current environment only, while the truth conditions of her 
sentence are actually given by a sentence that he would have used in their current 
environment in addition to sentences that describe numerous past environmental 
. d . 100 perceptlOns an expenences. 
Through their conventions her interlocutor knows, for example, that she is likely to 
hold true the sentence "Dogs are delightful pets" when encountering situations in 
which he would have used that same sentence: a woman playing with, or cuddling, a 
dog, for example, following from a background of positive experiences with dogs of 
his own and of others. In theory he can, thus, describe the type of environmental 
conditions that she will hold the sentence true in, together with numerous past 
perceptions and experiences of her environment that need to be in place for her 
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current environmental conditions to prompt her to hold it true. He knows that she may 
not hold true that sentence when encountering a woman hugging or playing with her 
dog alone, since he knows that the idea of dogs being delightful pets is informed by 
numerous other environmental conditions that she may have encountered in the past. 
If she owns a cat for whom she feels affection or if a dog has bitten her in the past, the 
environmental conditions that he thinks will prompt her to utter one sentence may be 
so informed by past environmental events that she utters something completely 
different. Ifhe had been an omniscient radical interpreter, which no actual person can 
ever be, then he would have had this information and he would have known in the 
light of which past events to understand their current environment. But since our 
interlocutors do not have such information, they cannot understand which truth 
conditions we judge to obtain at any specific time, even though they know what type 
of environmental conditions and past experiences we typically hold which sentences 
true in. 
In practice we realise that truth conditions go far beyond simple perceptions of a 
speaker's current environment; hence, my reluctance in this chapter to talk about 
sentences that are held true in specific environmental conditions. We know that, even 
though we can describe the type of complex truth conditions that a speaker's sentence 
should have in order to mean what our conventions tell us it does, we can never tell in 
advance whether such complex truth conditions obtain. 
This is an impressive advantage of a sentence held-true asymmetry as an explanation 
for the attitude asymmetries. It can give a more nuanced account of the different 
categories of beliefs that we attribute. The attribution of straightforward perceptual 
beliefs such as "The sun is shining" clearly pose less of a problem for our 
interlocutors than beliefs that value events/people/experiences and those that require 
an assessment of environmental conditions that goes beyond simple perceptions. If the 
speaker's interlocutor encounters the environmental conditions in which he usually 
says, "This is a dog", he will effortlessly attribute to the speaker the belief that this is 
a dog. He is very likely to be right about what she believes, even without employing 
her behaviour or speech as evidence. If the speaker argues that she does not really 
believe this, we will usually think that she actually does believe it, whether she self-
attributes it or not, or we will find some attentional or perceptual irregularity to 
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explain either why she actually does believe it, or why she does not believe it, even 
though she should. In cases of pure perceptual beliefs, even though we treat each 
other as if the attitude asymmetries are still present, it is intuitively plausible that first-
person authority is fairly weak and that third-persons can make attributions without 
employing too much evidence. 
Beliefs regarding the owner, the behaviour, the breed and the appeal of the dog are 
more difficult to attribute correctly without first observing what the speaker says and 
does. The speaker may say, "The dog is agitated", when he is doing what her 
interlocutor takes to be running back and forth in the corridor. He can then attribute 
this belief to her upon hearing which sentence she holds true. When he sees the dog 
running back and forth in the corridor, he usually holds true the sentence, "The dog is 
exhilarated because he anticipates a walk". Their conventions give them the 
knowledge of the meaning of both these sentences, but since the contexts in which 
they interpret these specific environmental conditions differ, she knows, while he may 
not know, which sentence she holds true. 
Their shared linguistic conventions do, in other words, give him the knowledge that, 
by the sentence "The dog is agitated", she means that the dog is doing something to 
which he would have responded that "the dog is agitated" if he had certain 
background conditions in place. But whether she actually has such background 
conditions in place is something that there conventions cannot settle for him before 
she speaks. He, in other words, knows the type of truth conditions that her sentence 
"the dog is agitated" has to have, but since he lacks a lot of information about her past 
perceptions and experiences of her environment, he cannot know whether their 
current environmental conditions are conditions where those truth conditions obtain, 
unless she tells him. 
Thus, the speaker knows, while her interlocutors may not know, which sentences she 
holds true before she speaks since she knows, while they may not know, how her 
background affects her interpretation of her current environmental conditions. And 
since she knows, while he may not know, how her background informs her 
understanding of her current environmental conditions, she knows, while he may not 
know, which truth conditions obtain and, accordingly, which sentence she holds true. 
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1.3. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE SENTENCE HELD TRUE ASYMMETRY 
In the previous chapter, the strategy in 2.2 suggested itself as the best attempt at 
accommodating a meaning asymmetry in linguistic communities with their shared 
conventions. It suggests that the speaker knows what she means since she is speaking 
a language that is potentially interpretable to a radical interpreter. Her interlocutors 
are mostly able to know what she means because she is using the same conventions 
that they are. Those conventions, however, may at any time become incapable of 
explaining her speech, which will prompt her interlocutors to creatively interpret her. 
If she, for example, employs sentences that her interlocutor is not familiar with or she 
makes a surprising utterance like a mixed metaphor or a spoonerism, they may 
become wrong about what she means because they then, like a radical interpreter, 
have to interpret her. 101 
This strategy is preferable to the others in chapter 5 since it does not rely on 
problematic assumptions about interpretation and conventions like the strategies in 
sections 2.1 and 2.3 do, and it does not simply disregard the problem like the strategy 
in section 2.4 does. Its only shortcoming is that the evidence and transparency 
asymmetries that it manages to explain are not strong enough. It quite correctly 
accepts that linguistic conventions can often give us access to what people mean 
without using any interpretation, but then it does not have a way of preventing the 
further claim that, since our interlocutors have a route that often leads them to what 
we mean without the need for interpretation, they consequently have a route that often 
leads them to what we believe without the need for interpretation. Then there is 
simply no way of holding onto sufficiently robust evidence and transparency 
asymmetries since both these asymmetries require our interlocutors' general use of 
behavioural and verbal evidence. 
This is why I propose that the attitude asymmetries are explained by a sentence held 
true asymmetry instead of by a meaning asymmetry. Proponents of the meaning 
asymmetry as an explanation for the attitude asymmetries will have to admit that a 
speaker's interlocutors will only use evidence to know what she means in cases where 
they misunderstand each other or where they communicate poorly. And then they lose 
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the general form of the evidence and transparency asymmetries. My strategy of 
admitting of such a meaning asymmetry in practice (for the reasons given in 2.2 in 
chapter 5), but of explaining the attitude asymmetries via a held-true asymmetry 
improves on this since the speaker's interlocutors always have to wait until she speaks 
or behaves to know to which environmental conditions she is responding. They will 
probably be right about which environmental conditions she identifies, but they have 
to wait for her response to judge whether they are right. Since they are likely to know 
what she means without having to make use of any evidence, once she has responded 
to her environment, her interlocutors will know which sentence she holds true and 
what she means by it. They will thus know what she believes. Their knowledge of 
their environment alone is, however, not sufficient to provide them with the 
knowledge of which sentences she holds true because they cannot know exactly 
which part of their shared environment she is going to respond to. Her actual response 
to her environment is the crucial step without which they cannot know anything about 
her beliefs. And since her response takes the form of speech and non-verbal 
behaviour, a held-true asymmetry can show why her interlocutors employ her speech 
and behaviour to attribute beliefs to her. 
This strategy is also preferable to strategies like the one in section 2.4 in chapter 5 
since it does not rely exclusively on the theoretical "radical case" and simply 
disregard what we as a matter of fact do in practice. It is, of course, vital that it is 
compatible with the radical case, which I can easily show it to be. 
When a speaker speaks, her interlocutors use their shared linguistic conventions to 
know what she means. But whether they are right about what she means can only be 
established by an omniscient radical interpreter that is using an appropriate method of 
interpretation. Since such a radical interpreter will employ information of what 
sentence she holds true under which environmental conditions to know what she 
means, whatever environmental conditions she responds to, and whatever sentence 
she holds true in those environmental conditions, are issues that a radical interpreter 
has to settle as well. During communication between the speaker and her interlocutor, 
in other words, she knows which sentences she holds true since she knows what she 
means and thereby to which environmental conditions she is responding. But whether 
she is correct about what she means, and whether she is correct about which 
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environmental conditions she is responding to, are questions that have to be settled by 
a radical interpreter. This strategy can, thus, explain what it is that we do in practice. 
But it remains true to Davidson's criteria for something to qualify as being mental 
since it is consistent with the conceptual possibility of being interpretable to an 
omniscient radical interpreter. If an environmental condition, a sentence that is held 
true or a speaker's meaning is not in principle interpretable to an omniscient radical 
interpreter, then it just cannot be an environmental condition, a sentence that is held 
true or a speaker's meaning and we or our interlocutors are in error when self-
attributing or attributing it. 
The relationship between a case of radical interpretation and a case of communication 
that involves the use of shared linguistic conventions is thus that the former provides 
criteria for testing the latter. A system of radical interpretation is a test that we should 
use to confirm that something is genuinely mental. If, for example, there is something 
that we suspect might be a speaker's (authoritative) knowledge of one of her beliefs, 
we should put it through the test of radical interpretation and the held true asymmetry. 
If it can be thus explained, then it can be knowledge of her belief since it can qualify 
as something mental. If it cannot, then it cannot be knowledge of her belief since it 
cannot qualify as something mental. That is, if we know that, in principle, an 
omniscient radical interpreter would have been able to interpret the speaker as 
someone who is applying her sentences consistently, would have attributed to her a 
sentence that she holds true under environmental conditions that are accessible to him, 
would have attributed to her the knowledge of which sentence she holds true when 
encountering which environmental conditions, and so forth, then the event that we 
suspect to be knowledge of her belief really is that. If, on the other hand, we know 
that, in principle, an omniscient radical interpreter would not have been able to, for 
example, identify the environmental conditions that she is responding to, then the 
event that we suspect might be knowledge of her belief cannot be that, since 
something can qualify as the meaning of an utterance only if it can be attributed based 
on publicly available observations of behaviour and environment. Radical 
interpretation, thus, informs us about the nature of mental events by setting the limits 
on how they are to be attributed, and it gives us a way of testing whether our 
attributions (and self-attributions) based on linguistic conventions conform to the 
rigorous standards of objectivity that the mental requires. 
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A possible objection is that this strategy portrays what we do in practice as a pseudo 
linguistic and mentalistic performance. We think that we understand what others 
mean, we can have a guess at what they believe and we think that a speaker usually 
knows what she believes, but it is quite possible that we are wrong most of the time, 
or even all of the time. There is, in practice, no way of verifying the conclusions that 
we draw about the meaning and beliefs of anyone, not even of ourselves. Only an 
omniscient radical interpreter, which is not someone that can ever exist, can ever truly 
know anything about what we mean and believe. 
This problem is not as grave as it may seem, however. Firstly, as argued in the 
previous chapter, in a situation where linguistic conventions are used, the radical 
interpreters of English speakers will construct very similar individual idiolects for 
them since they often speak in the same way. Linguistic conventions will, thus, 
mostly lead our interlocutors directly to conclusions that correspond with those our 
radical interpreters reach via interpretation. What we do in practice is, therefore, 
unlikely to lead us to conclusions that are wrong most or all of the time. 
Secondly, we should keep in mind that Davidson's commitment to the holistic nature 
of meaning and belief entails that our strategies for making sense of others should 
rationalise, not particular isolated bits of their behaviour and speech, but should 
unearth and explain overall patterns of their behaviour and speech. Our linguistic 
conventions effectively constitute a whole language. '02 Our use of conventions, and 
our wish to obey such conventions as closely as possible, thereby allow us to detect 
the patterns in the speech of others. Moreover, we are willing temporarily to abandon 
our linguistic conventions when a speaker's speech can be rendered more coherent by 
creatively interpreting her. We also try to attribute a coherent set of beliefs evidenced 
by the numerous questions that we tend to ask when our use of linguistic conventions 
and our understanding of our shared environment suggest that the speaker holds 
incompatible beliefs. In practice we clearly attempt to make sense of overall patterns 
of a speaker"s speech and behaviour, even though we do use different procedures than 
a radical interpreter would. And since the methods that we do use is more often than 
not able to make systematic sense of a large amount of the overall speech and 
behaviour of those with whom we communicate, we are clearly doing a lot right. 
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These two points, of course, do not guarantee that, in practice, we are always right 
about what a speaker means and believes. But the fact that our interlocutors' 
understanding of us will mostly coincide with our radical interpreters' interpretation 
of us (since we all do speak in roughly the same way), together with our strategies for 
trying to attribute coherent sets of meanings and beliefs, do suggest that our practices 
place us on approximately the same course as a radical interpreter's interpretations 
would. Our practices should, as a result, not be understood as having little to do with 
what people mean and believe. 
Lastly, in chapter 2, I specified that one requirement is that we are looking for a 
unified account of the three attitude asymmetries. We do not want an account that can 
quite accidentally allow for all three in a haphazard way. We want a theory that 
allows for a systematic explanation of the three asymmetries. Traditional 
interpretationists cannot provide us with such a unified account. Even though they can 
show that all three asymmetries, in principle, can be accounted for by the meaning 
asymmetry, it cannot be extended to explain what actually happens between speakers 
and their interlocutors. They, thus, will have to rely on something different to explain 
the attitude asymmetries that we assume exist between speakers and those with whom 
they share linguistic conventions. A truly unified account is not one that differs 
depending on whether it is meant to explain the attitude asymmetries in principle or 
the attitude asymmetries as they actually occur between speakers and their 
interlocutors. 
My strategy, on the contrary, utilises a sentence held true asymmetry to account for 
the attitude asymmetries. It can explain both what we in fact do in practice and what 
we would, in principle, have to do to confirm that our practices give an accurate 
picture of the mental. That is, since it makes use of a principle that can be extended to 
interactions within our linguistic communities, it can explain both the attitude 
asymmetries between us and our interlocutors and the criteria for something to qualify 
as an attitude asymmetry. 
Traditional interpretationists' mistake is to place the explanatory power in the 
meaning asymmetry while, even in the radical case, it should be in the sentence held 
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true asymmetry. They are right that there is a meaning asymmetry between a speaker 
and her radical interpreter and, as seen in section 2.2 in chapter 5, that there is a 
meaning asymmetry between a speaker and those with whom she shares linguistic 
conventions. But since the meaning asymmetry in practice does not require that our 
interlocutors always use evidence to interpret us, it just cannot sustain all three the 
attitude asymmetries and should therefore not be used to explain them. 
lA. DAVIDSON CLARIFIED OR CORRECTED 
Up to now I have deliberately steered clear of placing Davidson's own reconciliation 
strategy within one of these two interpretations of it. As mentioned in the schematic 
outline of the project at the end of chapter 3, he aimed his reconciliation at accounting 
for the attitude asymmetries in a situation of radical interpretation only, which is 
probably why he did not deem it necessary to spell out his approach in more detail. 
He could have prevented opening himself up to a meaning asymmetry interpretation if 
he had applied his reconciliation strategy more broadly to explain the type of 
situations that we want theories of self-knowledge to explain. 
As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, Davidson did admit to the existence of a sentence 
held-true asymmetry. He just did not think that it alone could explain the attitude 
asymmetries since, without the interpretation of meaning, the sentence held-true 
asymmetry is just as mysterious as the attitude asymmetries. 103 The first-person's 
knowledge of what she means can be built into the fact that she is speaking a 
language, which, according to both of us, is the only publicly accessible information 
that immediate and authoritative knowledge of meaning can be derived from. 
Davidson, like me, thus treated the meaning asymmetry as primary. 
The difference between us is that nothing in Davidson's writings indicates that he 
deemed a sentence held-true asymmetry to be important, while I think that the fact 
that the sentence held-true asymmetry has to be derived from the meaning asymmetry 
does not render it unimportant. 
It is not clear from Davidson's writings whether he understood that his reasons for 
defending a speaker's knowledge of what she means could also serve to defend a 
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speaker's knowledge of which sentences she held true. It is, accordingly, difficult to 
know whether my strategy clarifies or improves on Davidson's. My critics might 
claim that, for all the reasons I have given, Davidson meant the sentence held-true 
asymmetry all along. In his 1984 paper, "first-person authority", he certainly 
minimized the importance of a sentence held-true asymmetry for the reasons given 
above, and in his 1993 responses to critics who challenged the ability of the meaning 
asymmetry to explain the attitude asymmetries, he never mentioned the possibility of 
a sentence held-true asymmetry that is necessarily entailed by it. But in his 1991 
paper, "the three varieties of knowledge", he argued, as I did in chapter 3 and above, 
that a speaker of a language can be an interpreter of others only if she knows the 
content of her own language and beliefs. This suggests that he was aware of the idea 
of a speaker's knowledge of which sentences she holds true in which environmental 
conditions. But he advanced this argument in the epistemological context of arguing 
that no one form of knowledge can be reduced to any other, as opposed to in an 
argument for self-knowledge or first-person authority. Whether he was aware that this 
reasoning could enhance his argument for first-person authority by implying a 
sentence held-true asymmetry remains a mystery. 
Thus, since there is nothing in his writings that suggests that he did mean the sentence 
held-true asymmetry all along, and since there is nothing that indicates that he did not, 
I cannot take a definite stand on whether my account clarifies what he was trying to 
say right from the start, or whether it develops what he did say. 
2. OBJECTIONS TO A SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY IN THE 
RADICAL CASE 
I have just offered an alternative way of explaining all three the attitude asymmetries 
in both the radical and non-radical cases based on the notion of a sentence held-true 
asymmetry. In order to both clarify and defend this claim, I will consider a number of 
possible objections to it. I will divide them into three groups. In the first section I will 
consider objections to the claim that the sentence held-true asymmetry can explain the 
asymmetries in the radical case. In the next I will consider objections that focus on the 
non-radical case. In the third section, I will consider objections to it that arise from 
situations in which the attitude asymmetries are not present. 
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2.1. THE SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY AND THE DANGER OF 
CIRCULARITY 
Some theorists may want to argue that the above account is circular since each stage 
requires another stage in a circle to explain it. There is no way into the circle to justify 
non-circularly one of its stages. According to this objection, my approach proceeds as 
follows: 
The speaker knows what she believes because, when encountering a set of 
environmental conditions, she knows which sentence she typically holds true in it. 
She knows which sentence she holds true in it because she knows which 
environmental conditions she typically holds which sentences true in. She knows 
which environmental conditions she typically holds which sentences true in because 
she knows what she means by the sentences that she holds true. She knows what she 
means by the sentences that she holds true because she knows which sentences she 
typically holds true in which environmental conditions. She knows which sentences 
she typically holds true in which environmental conditions because, when 
encountering a specific set of environmental conditions, she knows which sentence 
she typically holds true in it. 
Firstly, this objection separates my argument into three stages: the speaker knowing 
the meaning of the sentences that she holds true, the speaker knowing the 
environmental conditions in which she typically holds sentences true in and the 
identification of which sentence she holds true when she encounters a specific set of 
environmental conditions. I, and I am sure Davidson will concur, propose that these 
are not three separate stages that are meant to explain one another, but three different 
ways of expressing the same point. As explained earlier, meaning just is the truth 
conditions of a sentence. Its truth conditions are given by the sentence that she holds 
true in the presence of certain environmental conditions. If she applies her sentences 
consistently and the sentence on the right-hand-side of her biconditional is, 
accordingly, the sentence that she typically holds true in the same environmental 
conditions than the sentence on the left, then she knows which environmental 
conditions she typically holds which sentences true in and, when encountering a 
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specific set of environmental conditions, she knows which sentence she holds true in 
it. Again, if she knows the meaning of one of her sentences, then, by definition, she 
knows its truth conditions. If she knows its truth conditions, then, by definition, she 
knows which environmental conditions she usually holds it true in. The three points 
are not meant to explain each other; they are one and the same thing. 
Furthermore, I do not leave the account without some outside anchor since we can 
only say that a speaker speaks a language if she is interpretable. Whether she is right 
about what she means by the sentences that she holds true is, as in Davidson's original 
system, still up to her interpreter. The way into the circle is thus still via the 
interpretation of meaning, but since everyone agrees that the speaker does not have to 
interpret her own speech to know what she means, the circle from her perspective 
does not need such an opening. She knows what she means, knows which sentences 
she typically holds true in which environmental conditions and knows which sentence 
she holds true when encountering a specific set of environmental conditions only if 
she is interpretable. It is exactly the same type of transcendental argument from 
interpretability that Davidson employed to explain his reconciliation strategy and that 
I defended in chapter 4. 
2.2. FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY AND PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE 
INFORMA TION 
Here is another objection to my strategy. In the radical case a sentence held-true 
asymmetry, even if we agree that it can explain the evidence and transparency 
asymmetries, just cannot be large enough to justify the authority asymmetry. 
Information of which sentences a speaker holds true is non-intentional information 
that is, by definition, publicly observable and accessible to all. There is no 
justification for claiming that one person's access to publicly observable information 
is superior to that of another. The fact that it is publicly accessible makes everybody 
access it with the same likelihood of being right. A speaker's omniscient radical 
interpreter is just as likely to know which sentences she holds true as she is because, if 
he is an omniscient radical interpreter, he knows all the sentences that she holds true, 
both those that she has actually uttered and those that she would have uttered had she 
been appropriately prompted under favourable circumstances. The information that 
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her consistent use of her language gives her about which sentences she holds true 
cannot give her any knowledge beyond what such omniscient interpreters can learn 
from the information of which sentences she has actually uttered and of which 
sentences she would have uttered if prompted appropriately. Even if we agree that the 
speaker's knowledge does not actually stem from her own behaviour, if she cannot 
know anything about which sentences she holds true that an omniscient interpreter 
cannot know, then we cannot say that she knows, while her omniscient radical 
interpreters may not know, which sentences she holds true. 
This objection simply re-states the original problem regarding the authority that a 
speaker has over her beliefs and over the meaning of her sentences. There is no 
element of the meaning of a speaker's sentences that cannot be known by an 
omniscient radical interpreter and, consequently, there is no element of the content of 
a speaker's beliefs that cannot be known by such an interpreter. Davidson and I, 
nonetheless, claim that a speaker is in a position of authority with regard to the 
meaning of her sentences and the contents of her beliefs since an interpreter always 
has to continue interpreting her to know what she means. And the accuracy of past 
interpretations of what she means and believes cannot guarantee the accuracy of 
future interpretations of what she means and believes. 
The same holds for the sentences that she holds true. If he is an omniscient radical 
interpreter at time Tl, he will know all the sentences that she holds true at time Tl. 
But even though he is an omniscient radical interpreter at time T 1, he has to continue 
observing her speech, non-verbal behaviour and environment to enable him to remain 
an omniscient radical interpreter into time T2. And ifhe has to continue to observe 
her and prompt her appropriately under favourable circumstances to know which 
sentences she holds true, he may fail to notice some sentences that she does hold true. 
And then she knows, while he may not know, which sentences she holds true, not 
because the sentences that she holds true are facts that only she has access to, but 
because he has, for some reason or another, failed to notice facts that he could have 
accessed. 
The objection conceives of the notion of an omniscient radical interpreter as someone 
who knows all the sentences that a speaker has ever uttered and would have uttered 
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and will still utter in the whole of her life if prompted appropriately under ideal 
circumstances. But this removes such an interpreter from the context of radical 
interpretation. He has to actually prompt her and observe her to obtain the information 
that allows him to become an omniscient interpreter. And during this process of 
prompting and observing he may prompt her in a manner that is inappropriate to elicit 
the right type of information, prompt her in circumstances that are not favourable for 
acquiring honest or correct responses or he may fail to notice some of the sentences 
that she holds true. And then she knows, while he does not know, which sentences she 
holds true. We can make no sense of the idea of an interpreter that is born with, that 
the speaker psychically supplies with, or that otherwise acquires information of all the 
sentences that a speaker holds true. Such mechanisms will make it impossible for him 
to interpret such information because, in order to make sense of what she says, he 
needs to know what she holds true under environmental conditions that he needs to 
perceive for himself. Knowing what she holds true under environmental conditions 
that are apparent to him is the only way in which he can map her language onto his 
own. The concept of an omniscient radical interpreter, thus, poses no threat to the 
sentence held-true asymmetry because, so long as we understand that an omniscient 
radical interpreter has to continue prompting and observing a speaker to know which 
sentences she holds true, the possibility remains that she knows, while he does not 
know, which sentences she holds true when encountering the environmental 
conditions in which she holds them true. 
3. OBJECTIONS TO A SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY IN THE 
NON-RADICAL CASE 
3.1. THE SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE OF UNUTTERED SENTENCES 
One can put forward the following objection to a sentence held-true asymmetry in 
both the radical and non-radical cases. A sentence held-true asymmetry unwarrantedly 
relies on the speaker's continuous use of a language to give her the knowledge of 
which sentences she holds true. It is acceptable to use her past use of a language to 
claim that she knows that she holds true sentences that she has actually uttered. But, 
since we cannot assume that she will continue to speak a language, I cannot claim that 
she knows that she holds true sentences that she has never uttered. If the speaker has, 
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for example, uttered the sentence "It is raining" in the presence of something her 
interpreters or interlocutors judged to be rain, then it is reasonable to claim that, when 
next she encounters rain, she knows that she holds true the sentence "It is raining". If 
she has never uttered the sentence, "Wolverine has metal claws that shoot out from 
the back of his hands" while watching what her interpreters or interlocutors take to be 
an X-men movie, I cannot claim that she knows that she holds this sentence true when 
encountering the X-men movie, since she has never been interpreted as holding true 
this sentence consistently in these type of environmental conditions. If she has never 
uttered it, then she has never been judged to use the sentence consistently, and then I 
cannot claim that her consistent sentence application gives her the knowledge of 
which sentence she holds true when encountering that specific set of environmental 
conditions. 
This objection assumes that every single of the speaker's sentences has to be actually 
interpreted for us to know that she is still speaking a language and that she is thereby 
still applying most of her sentences consistently. It, thus, assumes that the meanings 
of different sentences are attributed one by one on their use since each sentence has a 
meaning that is isolated from whatever other sentences in a language mean. This 
objection, in other words, overlooks the holistic character of meaning and belief 
content. Part of what Davidson's theory of meaning tries to do is to spell out the 
meanings of sentences holistically through the relationships among sentences within 
the structure of the language as a whole. That is why the only way of getting to the 
meanings of a speaker's sentences is to map it onto another language so that their 
meanings can be holistically established by relating them to sentences, and the 
relationships between those sentences, in that other language. So, even if the speaker 
has never uttered the sentence, "Wolverine has metal claws that shoot out from the 
back of his hands" while watching what her interpreters or interlocutors take to be an 
X-men movie, she is likely to have uttered numerous sentences about metal claws, 
shooting and backs of hands quite consistently in the presence of what such 
interpreters or interlocutors took to be metal claws, shootings and backs of hands. 
There is, thus, more than a sufficient amount of information to claim that, even if she 
has never been judged to apply a specific sentence consistently, due to its links with 
other sentences in her language, and due to her knowledge of such related sentences 
in her language, she knows which sentence she holds true when encountering 
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environmental conditions that are similar to the ones she usually holds the related 
sentences true in. 
We do not need an interpreter or interlocutor to judge that a speaker is applying every 
one of her sentences consistently before we can rightly label her a speaker of a 
language. If she is mostly interpretable, even if there are occasional lapses in 
interpretability, she is speaking a language and she still generally knows what she 
means and which sentences she holds true. If she remains generally interpretable 
when she does speak, we can thus say that she knows which sentences she holds true 
in which environmental conditions, even in cases where she has not actually uttered 
them. 
3.2. THE ACTIONS OF SPEAKERS AND THEIR INTERLOCUTORS 
The next possible complaint is that my account still relies on the idea of a radical 
interpreter. In section 2.4 in chapter 5, I objected to the notion of an interlocutor as a 
potential radical interpreter by arguing that such a strategy still does not explain what 
exactly the role of interlocutors really is. I argued that treating them as potential 
radical interpreters cannot explain the attitude asymmetries between them and those 
with whom they communicate since it does not explain what they actually do in 
practice. Now, however, I claim that it is acceptable to use a similar strategy by 
defining the role of the speaker in a way that does not capture what she actually does 
in practice. This account needs a radical interpreter to ensure that the speaker 
continues to speak a language, since we need the fact that she is speaking a language 
to base her knowledge of which sentences she holds true on. An omniscient radical 
interpreter, as we have seen, has access both to what the speaker actually says, and to 
what the speaker will say ifhe prompts her appropriately under favourable 
circumstances. But in practice the speaker is not prompted by an omniscient radical 
interpreter and she does not utter sentences that she would have uttered if 
appropriately prompted. And without uttering sentences that she will have uttered 
when appropriately prompted by an omniscient radical interpreter, we cannot say that 
she continues to be interpretable (and speak a language). We can only say that she 
continues to be interpretable if judged so by such an omniscient radical interpreter. If 
we cannot judge that she is speaking a language and applying her sentences 
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consistently from whatever it is that she as a matter of fact does in practice, then we 
do not have a way of claiming that the consistent use of her sentences gives her the 
knowledge of which sentence she holds true when encountering the situation in which 
she holds it true. 
As mentioned earlier, my account does not require the interpretation of a radical 
interpreter, and it does not need the speaker to do anything that she actually does not 
do. In practice, the speaker's interlocutors are sufficiently well qualified to judge 
whether she is still interpretable or not. 
Firstly, as argued both in chapter 6 and above, if the speaker and her interlocutors are 
both members of the English speech community, they both recognise themselves as 
such since they speak very similarly and they use conventions based on their already 
similar idiolects to further simplify communication, then their radical interpreters will 
construct very similar interpretive schemes for them; interpretive schemes that will 
lead to approximately the same conclusions about meaning than their conventions do. 
Secondly, even though we mostly understand others without examining their speech 
and behaviour in the context of their environment, the interpretive constraints that we 
bear in mind when making sense of those with whom we communicate are similar to 
those that a radical interpreter will have to obey. The conventions that her 
interlocutors use are, like the interpretive scheme of a radical interpreter, aimed at 
explaining patterns in her speech, as opposed to making sense of discrete bits of 
speech and behaviour in isolation. Moreover, on particular occasions where their 
conventions cannot make sense of what she says, her interlocutor still seems to follow 
the right type of constraints to make accurate sense of her. He will rely on some of 
their other shared conventions (that are likely to be accurate), likely deviations from 
such conventions, their shared environment and her behaviour, all employed with the 
dual aim of attributing to her perceptual beliefs that correspond with theirs and a 
coherent set of meanings and belief contents. 
Thirdly, our interlocutors are in a good position to notice if we stop applying our 
sentences consistently and even then, their use of interpretation can still lead them to 
an accurate judgment of our interpretability. The conventions that our interlocutors 
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use to make sense of us make holistic sense of us. The meaning of one sentence with, 
for example, the phrase "It is raining" in it is systematically connected with the 
meaning of sentences like "It is raining hard" or "It is not raining". "It is raining 
hard", in tum, is systematically connected with sentences like "The powerful blow 
knocked the boxer down" while "It is not raining" systematically resembles "John is 
not a teacher" which is linked with "teaching is a noble profession" and so forth. All 
our sentences rely for their meaning on numerous other sentences, and our shared 
conventions prompt us to speak and understand in a way that respects such 
connections. If a speaker stops applying her sentences consistently, it is consequently 
likely to become apparent to her interlocutors almost immediately. 
The random application of just a few of her sentences will render their conventions of 
little use in making sense of her since such conventions are geared towards attributing 
such interconnected meanings. This will compel them to abandon their shared 
conventions in the search for a system that can assign meaning to her speech that is 
systematically connected. And since they are likely to fall back on what Davidson 
calls radical interpretation, they will be reasonably likely to stumble onto an 
interpretive scheme that can make sense of her, in case she actually is applying her 
sentences consistently. If their project of radical interpretation still fails to make sense 
of her, then there is a reasonably good chance that she actually has become 
uninterpretable. Only an omniscient radical interpreter can, of course, make an 
accurate judgment of whether she really is interpretable or not, but since the 
conventions that her interlocutors use are likely to detect it if she does become 
uninterpretable, and since they can then resort to the best interpretive scheme that they 
can find, they are likely to be fairly good judges of her interpretability. 
My explanation, thus, does not need the speaker to do anything other than what she in 
fact does in practice. What she does, and what her interlocutors do, will, much more 
often than not, tell us whether she is applying her sentences consistently or not (and 
thereby whether she is speaking a language or not). This account, thus, can explain 
why the speaker knows, while her interlocutors may not know, which sentences she 
holds true without having to assume that they act in a way that they actually do not. 
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4. OBJECTIONS TO THE SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE ATTITUDE ASYMMETRIES 
The following objections involve situations in which the speaker is uncertain about 
what she believes or where she has to employ her own behaviour and speech as 
evidence to know what she believes and self-attribute a belief in the service of an 
explanation of her own behaviour. According to the sentence held-true asymmetry, it 
will have to be because she is uncertain about which conditions she is in and, 
accordingly, uncertain about which sentence she holds true. When a speaker's 
interlocutor, thus, is right about what she believes while she is wrong or uncertain, it 
will have to be because he correctly identifies the current conditions as conditions that 
she holds it true in while she is wrong or uncertain. To illustrate how the sentence 
held-true asymmetry will explain situations in which we realise that the attitude 
asymmetries are absent, let us return to the same example employed in chapters 2 and 
4. A speaker says that she believes that her husband is not a murderer while someone 
with whom she communicates maintains that she actually believes that her husband is 
a murderer, since a lot of her behaviour indicates that she fears him. As in chapter 4, I 
shall give a schematic outline of the authority asymmetry only, since it will be evident 
how it explains the other two. 
The authority asymmetry 
1. Both the speaker and her interlocutor know the meaning (or truth conditions) 
of both her sentences "My husband is a murderer" and "My husband is not a 
murderer'". 
2. The speaker utters the sentence "My husband is not a murderer" under 
conditions that would usually have prompted her to say, "My husband is a 
murderer"'. 
3. Since the speaker is applying the sentence inconsistently, she has misidentified 
the conditions under which she is uttering it and has thus lost her position of 
authority over her language and belief contents. 
4. Both the speaker and her interlocutor have to employ her speech and 
behaviour as evidence to know what environmental conditions she finds 
herself in. 
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5. Her interlocutor is, thus, just as likely as herself to know which sentence she 
holds true because he is just as likely as her to know which conditions she 
finds herself in. 
Here meaning is the objective element that fixes whether she is uttering the right or 
wrong sentence as the one that she holds true in her current environmental conditions. 
This is true in both the radical and non-radical cases. In the radical case, her radical 
interpreter has access to his perception of their environment, her speech and 
behaviour and whatever he has already attributed to her. He knows that she usually 
holds true the sentence "My husband is not a murderer" in environmental conditions 
that he holds true the sentence "My 'spouse' is not a murderer". Now he realises that 
she is uttering the sentence "My husband is not a murderer" in environmental 
conditions that he would have held true the sentence "My 'spouse' is a murderer". He 
will attempt to re-interpret her and assign a new meaning to that sentence, but that 
will cause too many other parts of her speech not to be interpretable, since it will then 
become impossible to map many of her other sentences onto his language. He will, 
thus, use the coherence constraint and simply assume that, on this specific occasion, 
she is getting the meaning of the sentence that she is uttering wrong. In other words, 
she is uttering it as a sentence that she holds true in conditions that she does not 
usually hold it true in. And the only reasonable explanation for this is that she has 
misidentified the conditions in which she is speaking. In the non-radical case, her 
interlocutor, via their shared linguistic conventions, knows which sentences she 
typically holds true under which conditions, namely, the same conditions that he does 
hold, or would have held, them true in. If she utters the sentence "My husband is not a 
murderer" under conditions that he is certain are different from the ones she should be 
applying them in, he is unlikely to try to re-interpret her language, since he assumes 
that she is using the same linguistic conventions that he is when she speaks. He will 
immediately assume that she is mistaken about which sentence she holds true, and the 
only reasonable explanation for this is that she has misidentified the environmental 
conditions in which she is speaking. 
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4.1. A MEANING ORA SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY 
Now traditional interpretationists may argue that, since I cannot show how the 
sentence held-true asymmetry deals with situations where we realise that an attitude 
asymmetry is not present without using meaning as the mechanism whereby the 
sentence held-true asymmetry explains such situations, then I am simply returning to 
the meaning asymmetry to explain such situations. Then my strategy is not a uniiied 
explanation of the attitude asymmetries since it uses the sentence held-true asymmetry 
to explain the general forms of the attitude asymmetries and the meaning asymmetry 
to explain situations in which we realise that they are absent. 
I, however, am not doing this. My claim is that the speaker's misidentification of the 
conditions in which she applies a sentence introduces an inconsistency in her 
language use and makes her get the meaning of her sentence in the current situation 
wrong. But the reason for this, as it has been throughout this chapter, is that she is 
uncertain about the conditions in her environment or the background conditions in the 
context of which she understands her current environmental conditions. I am, thus, 
still focusing on how we understand our environment and which sentence we, 
accordingly, hold true. If, as I have done, one starts with the speaker's identification 
of (or her interlocutors' inability to identify) the conditions that are currently in place, 
and move to the sentence that she holds true in those conditions, then one is in a 
position to accommodate what it is that we do in practice. But it, quite correctly, 
continues to rely firmly on Davidson's approach to meaning, firstly, since meaning is 
the only way of talking about what we hold true in our environment, secondly, since 
meaning is the only objective way of fixing what we do hold true and, thirdly, since 
the attribution of meaning is the only way of establishing that the speaker is speaking 
a language and thereby of guarantying her knowledge of what she means, her 
knowledge of which sentences she holds true under which conditions and her 
knowledge of which conditions she is currently encountering. The presence of 
meaning is one of the strengths of my account, not one of its weaknesses, since it 
shows how a sentence held-true asymmetry can be established objectively. 
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4.2. THE SENTENCE HELD-TRUE ASYMMETRY AND THE ABSENCE OF 
THE AUTHORITY ASYMMETRY 
My critics may object that a sentence held-true asymmetry cannot give a satisfactory 
account of situations where we assume that the authority asymmetry is absent. A 
sentence held-true asymmetry may explain the absence of the evidence and 
transparency asymmetries, since it can explain why a speaker may have to use her 
speech and behaviour as evidence to self-attribute a belief. But it cannot explain the 
absence of the authority asymmetry. If the account holds that the speaker is in a better 
position to identify the truth conditions that hold at any specific time since they are 
strongly informed by past perceptions, then it implies that it is highly improbable that 
her interlocutors are right, while she is wrong, about which conditions she is 
responding to. 
My critics may even ask how the speaker can ever be wrong about the conditions that 
she is speaking in. Since her interlocutors, given the same background conditions as 
hers, would have used the same sentence as the one she now uses, it appears as if 
whatever she utters as a sentence that she holds true is right. It~ for example, her 
interlocutor trusted and loved his spouse, if he was committed to his spouse, if he 
dreaded the end of his marriage, ifhe was ashamed of being married to a murderer, 
and so forth, then he would have uttered the same sentence as she utters as the one he 
held true. There is, thus, no reason for thinking that the speaker has uttered the wrong 
sentence as the one that she holds true, considering that the background conditions in 
the context of which she understands her current environment effectively validate 
whatever she says as something that she holds true. 
Firstly, from her interlocutor's perspective, understanding her reasons for holding true 
a sentence is different from actually endorsing it as something that he would have 
held true, given the same background conditions. He will understand that he may have 
held true the same sentence if he had been in exactly the same position as her, but he 
will know that, given the presence of some powerful emotions and the obvious nature 
of their current environment, he would have been wrong to do so. He, thus, will 
conclude that she is, likewise, wrong about what she holds true as a result of the way 
in which some powerful emotions have caused her to misidentify her current 
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environmental conditions (and thereby misidentify her current situation as one that 
fulfils the truth conditions that this sentence usually has). Afterwards, the speaker is 
also likely to acknowledge that she did not identifY the nature of her current 
environmental conditions in the same way she usually would have identified them in 
the absence of such powerful emotions, (and that she thereby misidentified her current 
conditions as the truth conditions of that sentence). 
In situations like the Tex-bar case in chapter 2, where the speaker does not realise that 
she believes that a Tex-bar tastes better than other chocolate bars, there are obviously 
no strong emotions that interfere with her ability to identify the conditions in which 
she speaks. But, as suggested in chapter 2, this is not the type of case in which her 
interlocutor will confidently claim that he is definitely right about what she believes. 
He will suggest to her that she might believe that Tex-bars taste better than other 
chocolate bars, since the last fifteen chocolate bars that she bought included ten Tex-
bars. But then he will wait for her to tell him whether that behaviour genuinely 
indicates that she believes what he thinks she does. In this situation she is uttering the 
sentence, "No one chocolate bar tastes better than the others" in a situation where he, 
firstly, thinks that most of her other behaviour indicates that she holds true the 
sentence, "Tex-bars taste better than other chocolate bars" and, secondly, thinks that 
such behaviour in his own case would have indicated a preference for Tex-bars. They 
will consequently enter into a discussion about her past and present experiences of 
Tex-bar eating and buying since she clearly seems unsure about what she holds true. 
But even in this discussion he will still regard her as an authority on what she holds 
true, since he regards her as an authority on what exactly conditions she is speaking 
In. 
It, lastly, should be noted that my account does not imply that her interlocutors are 
mostly wrong about the conditions to which she is responding. It only implies that 
they may be wrong since they do not have all the information about her past 
perceptions that the speaker has. They, in other words, can use their mutual 
environment, their knowledge about her history and their linguistic conventions to 
guess which sentence she holds true, but they have to wait until she speaks and 
behaves to know what she believes, since they have to wait until she speaks and 
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behaves to know to which aspect of their environment she is responding and how her 
past perceptions have int1uenced the nature of the conditions that she is identifying. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The traditional interpretationists, who argue that Davidson proposed a meaning 
asymmetry alone to account for the attitude asymmetries, wind up with an implausible 
explanation of those asymmetries because the meaning asymmetry cannot be 
translated into practice. They, however, completely overlook the fact that their 
reasons for defending a speaker's knowledge of what she means can also serve to 
defend a speaker's knowledge of which sentences she holds true. In sections 1.1 and 
1.2 I showed how the fact that all language speakers know what they mean, which is 
what Davidson uses to defend his original strategy, can sustain a sentence held true 
asymmetry. A sentence held-true asymmetry can explain the attitude asymmetries in 
both the radical and the non-radical cases, and nun of the objections considered in 
sections 2, 3 and 4 can cast doubt on its ability to do so. 
In sections 1.2 and 1.3, it also became apparent how Davidson's system of radical 
interpretation relates to what we in fact do when communicating with those in our 
linguistic communities. It effectively provides theoretical criteria for establishing the 
nature of the mental by ensuring that meaning and belief contents are the type of 
things that are socially constituted. It provides criteria for testing the accuracy of the 
attributions that we make within our linguistic communities by ensuring that nothing 
that cannot potentially be attributed based on publicly accessible evidence can qualify 
as something genuinely mental. 
We, therefore, now know why we treat a speaker as if she is usually right about what 
she believes, as if she does not usually have to use her own behaviour and speech as 
evidence to know what she believes and why she does not usually self-attribute 
beliefs in the service of an explanation of her behaviour and speech. The relationship 
between the radical and the non-radical cases also show us when we are, and when we 
are not, correct when doing so. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I intend to evaluate the strength of my conclusion by relating it, firstly, 
back to the methodology in chapter 2, secondly, to the generic interpretationist 
account sketched in chapter 1 and, thirdly, to other states of mind. 
In chapter 2, I argued that the best approach for describing the asymmetries that 
theories of beliefs should aim to account for, was to describe some of our common 
everyday epistemic and conversational practices. My reluctance to derive them from 
theories of self-knowledge stemmed from my concern that it would be difficult to 
convince a theorist of the desirability of accounting for asymmetries derived from 
theories of self-knowledge that she did not subscribe to. I, as a result, motivated that 
theories of beliefs, and in this case particularly interpretationism, were more desirable 
if they could account for our different treatments ot: as opposed to some actual 
differences between, the first- and third-person perspectives of beliefs. 
My critics may, however, think that this approach is too weak since it may allow 
theories that cannot truly account for the first-person's perspective of beliefs to qualify 
as desirable, simply because they can accommodate our practices. Such critics may 
remain unconvinced by my methodology in chapter 2, and may continue to claim that 
the philosophically interesting question is not whether our theories can accommodate 
our practices, but whether our theories can accommodate what genuinely is the case. 
They may object that being able to accommodate our practices is a minimum 
requirement, but that theories that can accommodate what genuinely is the case are 
more desirable than those that can only accommodate our practices. In chapter 4, I 
quoted Sarah Sawyer, who expressed the concern as follows: ·'According to 
Davidson, if we do not assume a subject knows her thoughts, then we cannot begin 
the process of radical interpretation. This explains why the presumption is needed, but 
it is not clear that this in itself provides a justification for it. .. 104 
I do not want to take issue with how we can possibly know what is genuinely the 
case, which is precisely the type of question that I was attempting to avoid when I 
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proposed that we should derive the asymmetries from our practices. But now that we 
have reached the conclusion of my investigation into the role of the first-person 
perspective of beliefs in Donald Davidson's version of interpretationism, I want to 
suggest that it shows that radical interpretationism can accommodate a stronger 
version of the asymmetry thesis than the one described in chapter 2. 
Sawyer's objection, that is quite common, stems from understanding the 
transcendental argument from interpretability in isolation from, firstly, Davidson's 
other interpretationist commitments and, secondly, from the other two arguments for 
Davidson's reconciliation strategy. 
Firstly, the other interpretationist commitments. Interpretationism, as we have seen, 
maintains that beliefs are properties that people have, in the same way as length is a 
property that a ruler has. But a belief that P, since its content has to be constituted 
socially, cannot be a belief that P ifit is not so describable by someone with whom we 
communicate. Similarly, a length of thirty centimetres, since its numerical value needs 
to be determined in relation to other numerical values, cannot be a length of thirty 
centimetres without being so describable by someone who is making use of a specific 
type of measurement scheme. A belief is not something that a person does not really 
have, and that we only attribute to her in order to make sense of her. It is something 
that she really has, but its precise description depends on which interpretive scheme is 
interpreting her; like length is something that the ruler has, but its precise description 
depends on which measurement scheme is used to measure it. This can be contrasted 
with instrumentalism, according to which we credit our interlocutors with whatever 
will assist us in making sense of them. Beliefs, on this theory, are not inner states or, 
in fact, properties that our interlocutors in any sense have. They are useful tools that 
we use to keep track of what they say and do, and their reality stretches no further 
than that. 
For the same reasons as above, Davidson can maintain that a speaker's knowledge of 
her beliefs is not just something that we attribute to her in order to render her 
interpretable, but is, in fact, something that she really has (only if it is describable as 
such by an omniscient radical interpreter, of course). He will have to go about this in 
the following way: the speaker, since everything she can and does say indicates that 
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she knows what she means, does know what she means (see chapter 4). The speaker, 
since everything she can and does say indicates that she knows which sentences she 
holds true, does know which sentences she holds true (see chapter 6). The speaker, 
since everything she can and does say indicates that she knows what she means 
without using her behaviour as evidence, does know what she means without using 
her behaviour as evidence (see chapter 4). The speaker, since everything she can and 
does say indicates that she knows which sentences she holds true without using her 
behaviour as evidence, does know which sentences she holds true without using her 
behaviour as evidence (see chapter 6). It is not just something that we have to assume 
in order to be able to interpret her, like beliefs are not just things that we have to 
presume she has in order to interpret her. It is something that she really has but that 
needs to be interpretable, like beliefs are things that she really has but that need to be 
interpretable. In other words, all the arguments in this thesis suggest, not only that we 
have to treat her as if she has knowledge of her meaning and beliefs in order to 
successfully interpret her, but that we have to treat her as if she has knowledge of her 
meaning and beliefs because all the evidence that we have suggests that she has such 
knowledge. 
Secondly, the contribution that the other two arguments in Davidson's reconciliation 
strategy make. The argument from disquotation actually allows the speaker to state 
the truth conditions, not only because she is interpretable as such, but because she is 
an interpreter of others. If she did not know which sentences she held true in which 
environmental conditions, then she would not have been able to map the languages of 
others onto her own. The facts that she can state the truth conditions of her sentences 
and that she has to know her own language in order to interpret others (together with 
interpretability, of course), show how interpretationism can account easily for the 
view that the speaker as a matter of fact knows what she means, and that she knows 
this without evidence. If we take seriously the connection between meaning and 
belief, and we take seriously the fact that authoritative and immediate knowledge of 
meaning necessarily implies authoritative and immediate knowledge of which 
sentences we hold true, then Davidson's radical interpretationism can explain the 
view that a speaker, as a matter of fact, has authoritative and immediate knowledge of 
her beliefs that are transparent to the world. Davidson's interpretationism can, as a 
result, satisfy both philosophers that subscribe to my methodology in chapter 2, and 
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those that insist that authority, immediacy and transparency are more than just 
practices. 
The second question I want to address is the significance of my conclusion for other 
interpretationist accounts. In chapter 1, I described some claims that all 
interpretationists endorse. Beliefs qua beliefs are not inner states. I.e., claims about 
what a subject believes are not claims about her internal physical (or any other) states. 
They are properties or statuses that individuals have in virtue of being interpretable as 
such by others. A belief that P is a property that we have to be able to attribute to a 
person, like a length of thirty centimetres or twelve inches are properties that we have 
to be able to attribute to a ruler. Beliefs just are properties that rationalise other 
propositional attitudes, behaviour and speech. There is no element of beliefs that fall 
outside a project of interpretation that rationalises our attitudes, behaviour and speech. 
For something to qualify as a belief, it, thus, has to be attributable by a third-person in 
a context of this type of rationalisation or interpretation. What a fully informed 
interpreter, who employs a proper system of interpretation, cannot find out about a 
beliet~ is, thus, not a belief at all. 
Since all interpretationist models define beliefs as rationalising our behaviour and 
speech, they can all potentially account for a meaning asymmetry via a transcendental 
argument from interpretability. The speaker is interpretable as knowing what she 
means because she is applying her sentences consistently. But by now we know that 
the meaning asymmetry alone is not capable of accounting for the asymmetry thesis. 
The three primary claims that enable Davidson's radical interpretation to account for 
it is, firstly, his insistence on starting with a sentence that the speaker holds true, 
secondly, his definition of the meaning of a sentence as the truth conditions of that 
sentence and, thirdly, his view that all speakers are interpreters of others. If meaning 
just is the truth conditions of a sentence, then knowing the meaning of our sentences 
implies that we know which sentence we hold true when which truth conditions 
obtain. Further, if we have to know the truth conditions of our sentences before we 
can map the languages of others onto our own, then our knowledge of which sentence 
we hold true before we utter it is secured. My conclusion, thus, can be generalised 
only to those interpretationist systems that subscribe to these three claims. 
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The questions related to the first-person perspective that remains for Davidson's 
radical interpretationism is whether my conclusion can be generalised to propositional 
attitudes other than beliefs and, ultimately, to sensations. 
Philosophers usually treat beliefs as the most important of the propositional attitudes, 
since several others require or rely on them. We, for example, cannot hope for sunny 
weather without being able to believe that it is sunny, since the belief that it is sunny 
is the success condition of the hope. The same holds for desires, intentions, fears, and 
so forth. But the central place that Davidson gives truth in his system, by starting with 
a sentence that the speaker holds true, casts doubt on its ability to be extended to these 
other attitudes. If one, however, believes that a desire for P can be reduced to a 
collection of beliefs like the belief that not-P, the belief that P is good to have, the 
belief that being without P is disappointing, and so forth, then his system is safe from 
these doubts. The extension of my conclusion to other propositional attitudes, thus, 
depends upon what one takes such other attitudes to be. 
Sensations pose a more substantial problem. If our immediate and authoritative 
knowledge of our beliefs rely on our immediate and authoritative knowledge of which 
sentences we hold true, then so should our knowledge of our sensations. Since 
sensations do not seem to involve the holding true of meaningful sentences as much 
as propositional attitudes do, Davidson himself specified that he wished his account to 
be extended only to propositional attitudes. This is, thus, not a concern only for my 
conclusion, but for interpretationism as a whole. If we want a unified account of the 
first-person's perspective on everything that is mental, interpretationists will have to 
show how their account can be extended to sensations. If they think that sensations 
are sufficiently different from propositional attitudes to warrant a different 
explanation for them, then interpretationists will still have to show what type of 
different explanation for them interpretationism can incorporate. 
I, therefore, want to conclude that Davidson's system of radical interpretationism is 
capable of accounting for the differences between the first- and third-person's stances 
towards beliefs, but I also want to advise that a lot of work still needs to be done to 
vindicate it as a plausible theory of mind. 
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NOTES 
G. Ryle, The Concept 0/ Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).2 Richard Moran, 
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
200 I ).' Few contemporary philosophers defend strict or absolute infallibility and omniscience, but 
several more modest versions of infallibility and omniscience are still supported. For a well-known 
version oflimited infallibility, see F. Jackson, "Is There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility 
Thesis?," Australasian Journal 0/ Philosophy 51 (1973). For contemporary versions of omniscience, 
see R. Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981). and even C. 
Peacocke, A Study o/Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). If infallibility and omniscience are 
theoretical versions of the first-person authority claim, then the fact that there are different versions of 
infallibility and omniscience should make my point even clearer. (fwe are not prepared to become 
involved in a lot of theorising, we should not use theory to determine the exact nature ofthe differences 
between first- and third-person beliefs. 
4 There is, of course, another strategy that can lead us to the asymmetries, namely, our 
phenomenological experiences of beliefs and believing. But this is by far the weakest approach. The 
best we can do is to rely on our verbal reports of our feelings about beliefs, but then a whole series of 
unanswerable questions will arise: does language accurately express feelings about thoughts and beliefs 
or are they more intricately connected? Do people who use the same words to refer to a feeling about a 
belief mean the same feeling by their words? How can disputes be resolved? And so forth. Verbal 
reports cannot help in an investigation of phenomenological experiences and those experiences 
themselves cannot be revealed in any other way. 
5 This difference in treatment can be read to correspond to the traditional theoretical notions of 
directness and/or immediacy. The evidence asymmetry differs from these claims in two ways. First, I 
am not claiming that first-person beliefs are more direct than third-person ones. I am merely claiming 
that they are treated as if they are not self-attributed by employing behavioural evidence. Second, 
where the immediacy claim proposes that first-person beliefs are not self-attributed on the basis of any 
evidence at all, ( am refraining from taking a stand on whether self-attributions rely on evidence. ( am 
just claiming that they are not treated as if they make use of behavioural evidence specifically. 
(, I am not necessarily unaware of the truth of the beliefs that ( ascribe to others, and I am likely 
to understand that the beliefs of others are states that contain their grasp of the world. Still, my interest 
in their grasp of the world is primarily in the explanatory power it gives me. 
7 It is very much part of our ordinary discourse to remark, "even though Ben believes that 
coffee is healthier than tea, tea is, in fact, healthier." It is a way in which a speaker lets everyone know 
that Ben believes something that the speaker thinks is false. But if Ben had to report, "I believe that 
coffee is healthier than tea, but coffee contains more harmful ingredients than tea", we would either ask 
him to explain his belief, or we would simply label him irrational or deeply confused. 
8 On a theoretical level, the fact that we are treated as if we are authoritative with regard to our 
beliefs is usually taken to mean that we, in fact, possess such authority. In other words, we are not only 
treated as if we are more likely to be correct about our own beliefs during interaction with others; we 
are actually more likely to be correct about them. Why else would we treat people as default authorities 
over their own attitudes if they did not demonstrate such authority to others on a regular basis? Crispin 
Wright once criticised the practice of explaining away our authority over our propositional attitudes as 
either a linguistic convention like Wittgenstein did or as courtesy like Richard Rorty did. He believes 
strongly that such theories fail to justify or explain the practice of treating persons as default 
authorities. As he once noted, ''They are no more than a mere invitation to choose to treat as primitive 
something which we have run into trouble trying to explain". See C. Wright, "The Wittgensteinian 
Legacy," in Knowing our Own Mind~, ed. C. Wright, B. Smith, and C Macdonald (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998).,45 Whether we are just treated as authorities, or whether we are, in fact, such authorities, 
is once again a theoretical debate which I do not need to settle here. Our practices indicate that we treat 
others as such authorities, and the question of whether they truly are such authorities just does not arise 
on the practical level. 
9 Which, of course, demonstrates a relationship between the transparency and authority 
asymmetries. 
10 This idea was first advanced by Wittgenstein, and later defended by Gareth Evans. See L. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). and 
G. Evans, The Varieties o/Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
II This picture of the existence of stable beliefs that are ready to be discovered is not opposed 
by interpretationists only. See, for example, Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self~ 
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Knmi'ledge. Moran conceives of beliefs as states that are partly shaped by our awareness and 
understanding of them. On this picture there is also little room for the question of how we come to 
know what the beliefs are that we already hold. After all, ifthe belief is altered by our awareness and 
interpretation of it, it is more shaped than discovered. 
12 The significance of univocality and the importance of accounting for the asymmetries are 
stressed by most theorists who have written on the subject. See, for example, R. Brandom, "Expressing 
and Attributing Beliefs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 4 (1994). Richard 
Moran, "Interpretation Theory and the First Person," Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175 (1994). P. F. 
Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959)., 11013 This inference does not necessarily 
have to be a conscious one. 
14 This is the point where I will be accused of over-simplifying the theory theory's explanation 
of how we access our own beliefs, and the criticism will probably be justified. Most theory theorists 
deliberately attempt to steer clear of this picture because of its apparent implausibility. Most of them 
hold onto the claim that we access our own beliefs through some theory-mediated inference, but they 
all have different ideas of what the theory contains. Peter Carruthers, for example, believes that the 
theory whereby we attribute beliefs to others allows us, not only access to their behaviour, but also 
access to the environment in which they behave. Accordingly, the theory whereby we access our own 
beliefs has to give us this type of access to our environment and, since it gives us access to a third-
person's speech, it has to allow us access to our own inner speech (or thoughts). Shaun Nichols and 
Stephen Stich, on the other hand, believe that this Carruthers-type of account does not rely on a theory 
anymore, and should, thus, be abandoned in favour of their theory that proposes a self-monitoring 
mechanism for detecting the contents of our belief box. They are aware of having to account for 
situations where the attitude asymmetries seem not to be present, which leads them to propose different 
mechanisms for detecting and reasoning about our beliefs. When we are wrong about our beliefs, we 
are not usually wrong about what we believe, but rather about how our beliefs cause our behaviour. So, 
when we are wrong about our beliefs, it is because we are using our theory of mind, instead of the self-
monitoring mechanism. This certainly seems to be the kind of haphazard explanation that I referred to 
in section 4. For Carruthers' account, see P. Carruthers, "Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence 
of Theory Theory," in Theories of Theories of Mind, ed. P. Carruthers and P. Smith (Cambridge, MA.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) .. For Nichols and Stich's account, see S. Nichols and S. Stich, 
"Reading One's Own Mind," in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and 
Understanding Other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) .. For their reasons for thinking 
that we usually get wrong the reasoning from our beliefs, as opposed to the beliefs themselves, see R. 
Nisbett and T. Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes," 
P:,ychological Review 84 (1977). and R. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and 
Shortcomings of Social Judgment (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980) .. 
15 Even though there are many who believe that this is not what he was trying to say. 
16 W. Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl, Scriven, M. (Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1956).17 
For Davidson's debate with Jerry Fodor, a contemporary theory theorist, see D. Davidson, 
"Psychology As Philosophy," in Essays on Actions and Events (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001). and J. Fodor, "The Persistence of the Attitudes," in Psychosemantics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1987).18 This does not, as many may be lead to believe, mean that Davidson is an anti-realist or 
instrumentalist about beliefs. He thinks that there is a token (as opposed to a type/law-like) identity 
between beliefs so attributed and physical brain processes. Davidson talks about beliefs as mental 
events, since they are attributed under a specific description, but this makes them no less real than the 
attribution of properties like thirty centimetres or twelve inches to a ruler. Beliefs are physical brain 
states, in the same way as length is a property ofa ruler, but the actual attribution of "a belief that the 
sun is shining" or of "thirty centimetres" depends upon the person's description of what he is observing 
from his own perspective. 
19 D. Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985)., 15820 D. Davidson. "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," In 
Subjective. Intersubjective, Objective,. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 200 I )., 148 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein is commonly understood as putting forward a similar, though in some 
respects different, argument against the possibility ofa private language. Wittgenstein's argument can 
be summarised as follows: if the meaning of a word did involve elements that were not publicly 
determinable, then it would imply a private language: a language whose meanings, or elements that 
make up parts of meanings, are necessarily available to only its originator: a language that is in 
principle indecipherable to others because the objects/events that give the words their meaning, or to 
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which the words refer, are necessarily available only to the speaker. There cannot be such a private 
language, though, because, for such a language to exist, the speaker would have to be able to correlate 
words with objects that are necessarily private. Davidson once noted that, "The point of meaning is 
synonymy - sameness of meaning, whether of different sentences for the same speaker or different 
speakers, or of the same sentence from speaker to speaker." The speaker can say that what he means by 
tree is the private mental picture he is now entertaining, and tomorrow he can say that he is entertaining 
the same mental picture that his word tree refers to. Thus, semantic content is bestowed on his private 
language by his private objects. But how can it ever be established that the mental pictures that are 
supposed to define "tree" are the same from one day to the next? As Wittgenstein will say, then ... 
"whatever is going to seem right to him is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 
'right"'. This is because, in order to make a factual statement, such as "the mental picture I am now 
having is the same one I was having yesterday when I named it 'tree''', it has to be possible for the 
speaker to be wrong. Otherwise it cannot be a statement of fact. And this is the crux of Wittgenstein 's 
argument against a private language. For a word to mean something, a correlation between the word 
and the object has to be established that allows for consistency in use. In a private language, however, 
such an initial correlation cannot be established, exactly because no method for future recognition of 
the object exists. If there is no second person to agree, or disagree with, about the nature of the object 
that defines the word, then no future consistency of meaning can be secured because then whatever 
seems right to the private linguist will be right. He, thus, cannot establish correlations between his 
words and objects that allow for future consistency in use because no strategy for future consistency 
will allow such a linguist to make factual statements about his private objects. Therefore, a language 
that is in principle private is impossible not only because it would be unintelligible to others, but 
because a private linguist would not be able to establish meanings for its words which will render such 
a language unintelligible to its creator as well. There is probably little in this argument that Davidson 
would disagree with. If there are differences between his overall project and that of Wittgenstein 's, it is 
in the detail of how exactly language is essentially social. For his argument against the possibility ofa 
private language, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections 244-271. For a contemporary 
statement of the reading of Wittgenstein that Davidson claims to disagree with about the way in which 
language is essentially social, see S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1982).and D. Davidson, "The Second Person," in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 200 I ).22 When Wittgenstein first proposed this argument against the 
possibility of a private language, one widespread objection employed private codes or diaries to show 
that a private language must be possible. The argument against private language does not, however, 
include situations in which people construct secret codes to represent environmental objects or events. 
Children, for example, often construct their own secret languages by making up words that refer to 
objects or events in their environment. My brother created fairly exotic words by substituting A for E, 
B for G, C for Z, D for T, etc., but he still applied the words he created to objects and events around 
him. So, in principle his secret code was not a private language because, by matching his utterances 
with the objects in his environment, others would have been able to figure out the meaning of the 
words in his language. Then there would have been no element of the meaning of his words that would 
have been available only to himself because, with some effort, cooperation and sufficient information, 
observers would have been able to decipher it. 
23 It should also be noted that the argument against the possibility of a private language holds, 
not only for what my words mean, but also for what I mean by my words. After all, what I mean by my 
words requires semantic content just as much as the meaning of words does. For, if what I mean by my 
words is not derived from some publicly available source, then what I mean by my words will have to 
be derived from an essentially private language also, such as from an exclusively first-person 
accessible picture in my mind. But, as mentioned above, there are good reasons for thinking that such a 
private language cannot exist. So, what I mean by my words will also have to be publicly determinable. 
24 D. Davidson, "Reality Without Reference," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985)., 22025 "Correct" obviously in the sense of whether it captures 
the truth conditions of the speaker's phrase accurately, as will be judged by an omniscient interpreter. 
26 The first question is a version of the classic problem of universal scepticism of whether our 
experiences genuinely connect us with an external world and the second the question of how we can 
know whether we are right about the nature of the world. 
27 D. Davidson. "Knowing One's Own Mind," Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 60, no. 3 (1987)., 445 
28 This is an argument that Davidson advanced against w.v.o. Quine's concept of stimulus 
meaning. For Davidson's argument, see D. Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," in Perspectives 
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on Quine, ed. R. Barrett, Gibson, R. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). For Quine's response, see W.V.O. 
Quine, "Three Indeterminacies," in Perspectives on Quine, ed. R. Barrett and R. Gibson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990).29 D. Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," in Subjective. Intersubjective, 
Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).,12930 Davidson, "The Second Person.", 11931 D. 
Davidson. "Radical Interpretation," In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985), 135 
32 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation.", 136 
.D Davidson, "Radical Interpretation.", 138 and D. Davidson, "Belief and the Basis of Meaning," 
in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985)., 154 
34 Interpretationists differ with regard to the amount of evidence that is essential to establish a 
speaker's interpretability. As seen here, Davidson includes not only a speaker's current behaviour and 
speech, but a huge amount of information about her past behaviour, speech and environmental factors. 
35 Davidson, "Knowing One's Own Mind," 441 
36 D. Davidson, "First-Person Authority," Dialectica 39 (1984)., 10337 Ibid., 11038 
Ibid., 110 
39 [Davidson, "Knowing One's Own Mind," 456 and D. Davidson, "Reply to Thele," in 
Reflecting Davidson (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).,25040 In Davidson's own words, "It would 
once more make the account circular to explain the basic asymmetry by assuming an asymmetry in the 
assurance you and I have that I hold the sentence I have just uttered to be a true sentence. There must 
be such an asymmetry, of course, but it cannot be allowed to contribute to the desired explanation." See 
Davidson, "First-Person Authority.", 10941 Ibid., 11142 That is, the speaker is not interpretable 
because she accidentally happens to apply her words consistently. She is interpretable because she 
applies her words consistently with the intention of providing clues about the meaning of her words to 
her interpreters. It is true that the intention has to be attributed by an interpreter. But that does not mean 
that the interpreter is attributing something that isn't actually present just because it will make better 
sense of what the speaker does. That is instrumentalism, not interpretation ism. He is interpreting 
something that is already there and that is accessible to him. 
43 For Davidson's view on intentions in communication, see Davidson, "The Second Person.,,44 
Davidson, "First-Person Authority.", 11045 One potential problem often raised to 
Davidson's use of Tarskian truth definitions is that the biconditional "if and only if' guarantees only 
that the phrase on the left will have the same truth value as that on the right, and that this makes it 
possible to use any phrase on the right so long as its truth value is identical to that on the left. Since 
Davidson insists that a theory of meaning, and therefore the construction of the biconditionals, has to 
conform to what people as a matter of fact do when they make sense of others, this is not a problem. In 
practice, we do not simply use any phrase on the right of the biconditional. We judge under what 
environmental conditions speakers use the phrase on the left. The way in which the biconditional is 
allowed to be constructed has to be empirically verifiable by what language speakers actually do. 
Furthermore, simply using any phrase on the right of the biconditional with an identical truth value to 
the phrase on the left is likely to fail to make sense of the speaker in other contexts. That is precisely 
the role that Davidson wants correspondence and coherence to play in his system of interpretation. 
46 This is part of Davidson's idea of triangulation. For a full defence, see D. Davidson, "Three 
Varieties of Knowledge," in Subjective, Intersubjective. Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 200 I )., 
originally published in 1991. 
47 [B. Thele, "The Explanation of First-Person Authority," in Reflecting Davidson, ed. R. 
Stoecker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).,239 
48 K. Ludwig, "First-Person Knowledge and Authority," in Language, Mind and Epistemology, 
ed. G. Preyer, F. Siebelt, and A. Ulfig (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)., 18649 D. 
Beisecker, "Interpretation and First-Person Authority: Davidson on Selj~Knowledge" (cited April 06 
2006): available from http://www.unlv.edu/faculty/beisecker/Research/FPA-SWPR.pdf.'° The terms 
immediate and authoritative are heavily theory-laden, but in this context [ am using them to apply to 
the evidence and authority asymmetries as set out in chapter 2. 
51 [Thele, "The Explanation of First-Person Authority," 243 
52 B. Smith, "On Knowing One's Own Language," in Knol'ving Glir Olt:n Minds, ed. C. Wright, 
B. Smith, and C. MacDonald (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)., 4 [7 
53 Ludwig, "First-Person Knowledge and Authority.", 391, seems to miss the point that it is a 
deflationary approach to knowing what one means when he criticises Davidson for putting forward an 
explanation of self-knowledge that "gets the order of the explanation backwards". Ludwig thinks that 
Davidson proposes that the fact that one is interpretable gives one the knowledge of what one means. 
He wants it to be the other way around, namely, that knowing what one means makes one interpretable. 
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Davidson, however, does not have to struggle with the order ofthe explanation, because he isn't 
proposing that the one causes the other. 
54 Smith, "On Knowing One's Own Language," 418 
55 Thele, "The Explanation of First-Person Authority," 243-244 
56 I deliberately refrained from employing an omniscient radical interpreter to make the same 
point, since I suspect that it is theorists' reluctance to accept it that leads them to objections such as 
these. This is precisely what Davidson used his concept of an omniscient interpreter for, though. If an 
interpreter had all the non-semantic information about the speaker, then such information, after 
interpreted for meaning, would have revealed the speaker's agnosticism. 
57 Another difficulty for Thele's objection is that, if the speaker does not know whether two 
words mean the same or not, then what could possibly be responsible for the fact that she applies them 
interchangeably to refer to the same sort of event, and especially the fact that she does so consistently. 
Thele, because he is responsible for the more unlikely claim, will have to accept the burden of 
accounting for this phenomenon. 
58 Smith, "On Knowing One's Own Language.", 417 Thele, "The Explanation of First-Person 
Authority.", 24559 Ludwig, "First-Person Knowledge and Authority.", 390 Thele, "The Explanation of 
First-Person Authority.", 245 60 Ibid.,24561 Davidson, "First-Person Authority.", III 
62 S. Sawyer, "An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge ", 1999 (cited April 062006); 
A vailable from http://www.philosophy.ku.edu/faculty/Sawyer/Ext_Int.html. 
63 E. Picardi, "First-Person Authority and Radical Interpretation," in Reflecting Davidson, ed. R. 
Stoecker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).,202, for example, expresses the typical objection as 
follows: "I cannot be meaning to refer to anything to which I explicitly do not mean to refer". Firstly, 
Davidson will reject this way of stating the problem, since he rejects reference as the basis of meaning. 
Secondly, even if two interpreters assign different truth conditions to a speaker's utterance, it does not 
imply that the speaker "refers" to something she explicitly does not mean to "refer". She means 
whatever truth conditions her biconditional states, and there is a possibility that an interpreter can make 
sense of her by attributing whatever truth conditions he judges her utterance to state in his language. 
6-1 For Davidson's view on intentions in communication, see Davidson, "The Second Person.,,65 
Davidson, "Reality Without Reference.,,66 The interpreter maps her language onto his own 
and judges that, by the sentence "My husband is not a murderer", she means what he, in his own 
language, means when he says "My husband is a murderer". 
67 Think in the sense of being so interpretable to an omniscient radical interpreter, of course. 
68 Barry Smith and Kirk Ludwig have both proposed something like the following: the meaning 
asymmetry can explain the attitude asymmetries only if there is a meaning asymmetry between a 
speaker and her interlocutors. Intuition tells us that there is no meaning asymmetry between her and her 
interlocutors. Therefore, in practice there is no meaning asymmetry. Those who put forward this 
objection usually claim that those with whom a speaker communicates just hear the meaning of her 
words automatically and unretlectively along with her speech. When she speaks, her interlocutors do 
not hear her words and then interpret to check whether they have their meaning right, or that they have 
their meaning at all. They know the meaning of her sentences straight away, and they will only hesitate 
and carefully interpret when there are severe difficulties communicating. See Ludwig, "First-Person 
Knowledge and Authority." Smith, "On Knowing One's Own Language.". This objection seems to 
appeal to personal reports about the experience of hearing meaning in the speech of others. Up to now I 
have opted to steer clear of personal reports about believing which is an approach I choose to stand by 
in the case of meaning as well. Most of us can probably relate to the above observations as an accurate 
retlection of what we experience when someone speaks. It is, however, once again the type of report 
that it is difficult to learn something from, since the reports are likely to vary according to different 
individuals' lcvcls of self-examination, language proficiency and theories about meaning and 
communication. Moreover, even ifit is possible to reach agreement about our experience of hearing 
meaning along with speech, the objection will still have to assume that it is necessarily the case that the 
meaning asymmetry will be apparent in our experience if it is present. Such awkward questions about 
phenomenology and its connection with reports about personal experience can be easily avoided by 
focussing on arguments for and against the presence ofradical interpretation in practice. If the meaning 
asymmetry requires a situation of radical interpretation (which I intend to show below), then reasons 
for and against the occurrence of radical interpretation in practice can settle the matter of the presence 
of the meaning asymmetry without entangling us in the tricky web of phenomenology. 
69 Claim 3 can be understood in two ways: first, as a claim about what we as a matter offact do 
in practice and, second, as a denial of the claim that the theoretical assumptions of the radical case must 
constrain any conception of the mental, including the practical case. The first may, as a result of 
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convention, be something Davidson would subscribe to; the second definitely not. [n this paragraph I 
obviously meant the first. 
70 Together with being able to state the truth conditions accurately through disquotation and 
being an interpreter of others. 
71 The terms "immediate" and "authoritative" are heavily theory-laden, but I am employing 
them to apply to the evidence and authority asymmetries as set out in chapter 2 respectively. 
72 D. Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives 
on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. E. LePore (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1986).,44673 
Davidson accuses Michael Dummett and Andreas Kemmer[ing, among others, of omitting the 
qualifying phrase "what philosophers and linguists have supposed" from their analysis of his statement. 
Dummett once remarked that, "Whatever force Davidson's arguments may have, they cannot 
sustain the bald conclusion, but cry out for some account of an indispensable concept', 
namely, the concept of a language M. Dummett, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some 
Comments on Davidson and Hacking," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. E. Lepore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).,465-466 For 
Davidson's response, see D. Davidson, "The Social Aspect of Language," in The Philosophy of 
Michael Dummett, ed. B. McGuinness (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994)., 2-3 A[so see D. Davidson, 
"Rep[y to Andreas Kemmer[ing's the Philosophical Significance of a Shared Language," in 
Reflecting Davidson, ed. R. Stoecker (Berlin: WaIter de Gruyter, 1993)., 118 74 Some 
philosophers think that Davidson is mistaken about the exact nature of linguistic conventions. For one 
example, see P. Rysiew, "Conventiona[ Wisdom,"Analysis 60, no. I (2000).75 In his 1775 comedy, 
The Rivals, Richard Sheridan (1751-1816) introduced a humorous character called Mrs. Malaprop. The 
self-educated Mrs. Malaprop constantly substituted similar-sounding words for the words that she 
actually intended to use, which often resulted in the most ridiculous sentences. Examples include: "I 
hope you will represent her to the captain as an object not altogether illegible." (eligible) " ... she might 
reprehend the true meaning of what she is saying." (comprehend) " ... if ever you betray what you are 
entrusted with ... you forfeit my malevolence forever. .. " (benevo[ence) and the classic sentence which 
Davidson himself used to illustrate his point, "Sure, if I reprehend any thing in this world it is the use of 
my oracular tongue, and a nice derangement of epitaphs." (apprehend, vernacular, arrangement, 
epithets) 
76 It must be noted that one such slip does not change the meaning of, say epitaph, in Mrs. 
Malaprop's personal idiolect. Subsequent conversations with her will settle whether the word "epitaph" 
means "epitaph" or "epithet" in her idiolect, depending on what she applies it to consistently. This 
point was also made by Alexander George. He mistakenly attributed the opposite view to Davidson, 
though. See A. George, "Whose Language [s It Anyway? Some Notes on [diolects,"Philosophical 
Quarterly 40, no. 160 (1990). Whether the meaning of "epitaph" changes in her personal idiolect or 
not, the interpreter still has to use creative interpretation to figure out what she means when she uses it. 
77 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. ",44678 Davidson explains this process 
as follows: During interpretation the interpreter transforms a "prior theory" into a "passing theory. 
The hearer's prior theory is how he is prepared to interpret an utterance of the speaker beforehand, 
while his passing theory is how he actually ends up interpreting it. The speaker's prior theory is what 
she thinks the interpreter's theory is, while her passing theory is the theory she wants the interpreter to 
use. What the interpreter and the speaker should share is the passing theory. That is, he has to interpret 
her in the way that she intends to be interpreted. The prior theory cannot be learned in advance since 
we don't have the same prior theory for different people. Moreover, we have different prior theories for 
one person, depending on the situation in which we are interpreting her. The passing theory can also 
not be learned in advance (as the case of Mrs. Malaprop illustrates. It has to be created on the fly. 
[bid. 79 Uwe Wirth offers an explanation mined from Charles Peirce. The surprising fact, C, is 
observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that 
A is true. U. Wirth, "Abductive Reasoning in Peirce's and Davidson's Account of 
Interpretation,"Transactions q(the Charles S. Peirce Society 35, no. I (1999). For another view on how 
this might work, see, S. Yarbrough, "Passing Theories Through Topical Heuristics: Donald Davidson, 
Aristotle, and the Conditions of Discursive Competence,"Philosophy and Rhetoric 37, no. I (2004).80 
Davidson, "The Social Aspect of Language.", 1081 See D. Davidson, "Communication and 
Convention," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). D. Davidson, 
"A N ice Derangement of Epitaphs." and D. Davidson, "The Social Aspect of Language." amongst 
others. 
82 See J. Bennett, "Critical Notice: Davidson's Inquiries Into Truth and [nterpretation, "Mind 94 
(1985).,603 83 D. Bar-On and M. Risjord, "Is There Such a Thing As a Language?,"Canadian 
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Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992)., 185-186 and A. Kemmerling, "The Philosophical Significance of a 
Shared Language," in Reflecting Davidson, ed. R. Stoecker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).84 
Davidson made clear that he was aware of this distinction. See Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs.", 434 and Davidson, "Reply to Andreas Kemmerling's the Philosophical Significance of a 
Shared Language.", 11985 Ifone wants to analyse Davidson's argument, one should, thus, focus on his 
idea that speaker meaning is the source of meaning. 
86 Davidson, "The Social Aspect of Language.", 987 Davidson, "Reply to Andreas 
Kemmerling's the Philosophical Significance ofa Shared Language.", 117 and Davidson, "The Social 
Aspect of Language.", 11 88 Ibid., I 089 Again, something cannot be called the meaning 
of an utterance or the knowledge of the meaning of an utterance if it is not in principle interpretable. 
90 My interlocutors, of course, do not actually have to check with me or with my radical 
interpreter. The correctness is determined by what I or my radical interpreter would say ifthe 
interlocutor were to check. 
91 The notion of "right" appealed to here is obviously that of being similar or identical to what a 
radical interpreter would have attributed. 
n The notion of "right" appealed to here is obviously that of being similar or identical to what a 
radical interpreter would have attributed. 
93 Firstly, if traditional interpretationists can offer an argument in support of the view that our 
practices are mistaken and that they should be modified, then this strategy can work. In the absence of 
such an argument, I will assume that this strategy is not satisfactory. Secondly, my modification of the 
evidence asymmetry in chapter 2 cannot help, since the strategy will then have to show why we usually 
employ a speaker's behaviour as evidence to know what belief to attribute to her. It is, however, the use 
of evidence which it cannot account for. 
94 By "outside our linguistic communities" I simply mean those with whom we share no 
language. Those inside our linguistic communities, I take to be those with whom we do share a 
language and conventions of how to use that language. 
95 This does not contradict anything that Davidson says. In this type of scenario, it is possible 
for their to be a radical interpreter who is using no conventions at all to interpret the speaker. 
96 Theorists may claim that this is no different from the radical case, where our radical 
interpreters also have to start with almost no evidence, but prompt us for evidence. The case remains, 
however, that our interlocutors seem to know what we mean without ever having to prompt us for 
verbal or behavioural cues in the presence of environmental events/objects. Radical interpreters have to 
prompt, our interlocutors do not have to. And radical interpreters, since they are conceptual rather than 
actual, have access to information about what we would be disposed to do in certain situations, our 
interlocutors do not. 
97 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. ",44698 A fifth strategy that a critic 
offered to me is the following: (A) in both the radical and the non-radical case, there is the potential of 
radical interpretation. (B) The potential of radical interpretation in both cases lead to a meaning 
asymmetry which can explain the attitude asymmetries. (C) In the non-radical case, we use conventions 
instead of radical interpretation to understand what a speaker means. However, since, even in the non-
radical case, we know that (A) and (b) pertain, we treat our actual conclusions as secondary to those 
that we would have reached through radical interpretation. According to this strategy, however, we still 
do not use evidence to know what our interlocutors mean, even if we know that we potentially could or 
should have. And then this strategy does not amount to much more than the one discussed in 2.2. The 
speaker knows what she means since she is radically interpretable as applying her words consistently. 
We may not know what she means since our conventions may fail to make sense of her. She, thus, 
knows what she believes while we may not. But the evidence and transparency asymmetries require 
that we use evidence to interpret for meaning, which this strategy cannot make room for. And ifit does 
make room for it, then it will become the strategy in 2.3, and require us to use evidence which just is 
not available. 
99 This is a point that Davidson himself makes with his use of the notion of triangulation. A 
speaker cannot have knowledge of the minds of others without having knowledge of the world and of 
her own mind. Knowledge of the world is required to know the minds of others since she has to judge 
which environmental conditions he is holding his sentences true in. Knowledge of her own mind is 
required to know the minds of others since she has to assign meaning to his utterances by judging 
which sentences she holds true in the environmental conditions that she thinks he holds his sentence 
true in. Davidson, however, treats triangulation like a postscript to his system of radical interpretation; 
possibly because it is something that only dawned on him much later. Taking the point seriously that a 
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speaker has to know which sentences she holds true in which environmental conditions can solve many 
of the problems that his meaning asymmetry was criticised for. 
100 This also holds in a radical case where an interpreter has been interpreting a speaker for long 
enough to know approximately which sentences she holds true under which environmental conditions. 
Her past perceptions of her environment play just as much of a role in the truth conditions of her 
sentences in the radical case than it does in the non-radical case. 
101 This is similar to the radical case, in which the meaning asymmetry rests on the fact that the 
radical interpreter may be wrong about what she means since he has to continue interpreting her, even 
ifhe is a fully informed interpreter of her. And then his conclusions about what she means may at any 
point be wrong since his interpretive scheme may at any point become inappropriate to make sense of 
her. 
102 Not a language in the sense of having to map speakers' sentences onto it, though. In the 
radical case, the interpreter interprets the speaker by observing her speech and behaviour in the context 
of her environment. He hears a sentence that he assumes she holds true, he prompts her to indicate 
which environmental event she is applying it to (by pointing, for example), he assumes that her 
sentence means the same as the sentence that he would have held true when applying it in the presence 
of that environmental event. In the non-radical case, the speaker utters a sentence which meaning her 
interlocutor knows without having to consult environment or further behaviour since she uses the same 
conventions when speaking that he uses when understanding her. There is, thus, no mapping of one 
language onto another because ofthe assumption that the two are the same. 
103 Davidson, "First-Person Authority.", 111 104 S. Sawyer, "An Externalist Account of 
Introspective Knowledge ", 1999 (cited April 062006); Available from 
http://www.philosophy.ku.edu/faculty/Sawyer/Ext_lnt.html. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
References: 
Bar-On, D., and M. Risjord. "Is There Such a Thing As a Language?" Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 163-90. 
Beisecker, D. Interpretation and First-Person Authority: Davidson on Self-
Knowledge, [cited April 06 2006] . Available from 
http://www.unlv.eduifaculty/beiseckeriResearchlFPA-SWPR.pdf. 
159 
Bennett, J. "Critical Notice: Davidson's Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation." Mind 
94 (1985): 601-26. 
Brandom, R. "Expressing and Attributing Beliefs." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54, no. 4 (1994): 905-12. 
Carruthers, P. "Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory Theory." In 
Theories o.fTheories o.f Mind, edited by P. Carruthers and P. Smith, 22-38. 
Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Chisholm, R. The First Person. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. 
Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs." In Truth and Interpretation: 
Per5pectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by E. LePore. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1986. 
---"A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." In Subjective. 
Intersubjective. Objective, 137-54. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
---"Belief and the Basis of Meaning." In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 
141-55. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
---"Communication and Convention." In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 
265-80. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
---"First-Person Authority." Dialectica 39 (1984): 101-11. 
---"Knowing One's Own Mind." Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 60, no. 3 (1987): 440-59. 
---"Meaning, Truth and Evidence." In Perspectives on Quine, edited by R. 
Barrett, Gibson, R., 68-79. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
---"Psychology As Philosophy." In Essays on Actions and Events, 229-41. 
London: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
---"Radical Interpretation." In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 125-39. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
---"Reality Without Reference." In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 215-
26. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
160 
---"Reply to Andreas Kemmerling's the Philosophical Significance of a Shared 
Language." In Reflecting Davidson, edited by R. Stoecker. Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1993. 
---"Reply to Thele." In Reflecting Davidson, 248-51. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1993. 
---liThe Emergence of Thought. II In Subjective. Intersubjective. Objective, 123-
35. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
---liThe Second Person. II In Subjective, Intersubjective. Objective, 107-23. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
---liThe Social Aspect of Language. II In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, 
edited by B. McGuinness. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994. 
---"Thought and Talk. II In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 155-71. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
---"Three Varieties of Knowledge. II In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 
205-21. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
Dummett, M. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and 
Hacking. II In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
Donald Davidson, edited by E. Lepore, 459-76. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986. 
Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Fodor, J. liThe Persistence of the Attitudes." In Psychosemantics, 1-27. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1987. 
George, A. "Whose Language Is It Anyway? Some Notes on Idiolects. II Philosophical 
Quarterly 40, no. 160 (1990): 275-98. 
Jackson, F. "ls There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility Thesis?" 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1973): 51-62. 
Kemmerling, A. liThe Philosophical Significance of a Shared Language. II In 
Reflecting Davidson, edited by R. Stoecker. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 
Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. 
Ludwig, K. "First-Person Knowledge and Authority. II In Language. Mind and 
Epistemology, edited by G. Preyer, F. Siebelt and A. Ulfig, 366-98. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. 
Moran, Richard. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Se(f-Knowledge. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
___ " Interpretation Theory and the First Person." Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 
175 (1994): 154-73. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
161 
Nichols, S., and S. Stich. "Reading One's Own Mind." In Mindreading: An Integrated 
Account of Pretence, Se([-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds, 150-
200. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Nisbett, R., and L. Ross. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social 
Judgment. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980. 
Nisbett, R., and T. Wilson. "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on 
Mental Processes." Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-59. 
Peacocke, C. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. 
Picardi, E. "First-Person Authority and Radical Interpretation." In Reflecting 
Davidson, edited by R. Stoecker, 196-209. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 
Quine, W.V.O. "Three Indeterminacies." In Per,~pectives on Quine, edited by R. 
Barrett and R. Gibson, 1-16. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949. 
Rysiew, P. "Conventional Wisdom." Analysis 60, no. 1 (2000): 74-83. 
Sawyer, S. An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge, 1999 [cited April 06 
2006]. Available from 
http://www.philosophy .ku.edu/faculty/Sawyer/Ext_ Int.html. 
Sellars, W. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." In Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, edited by H. Feigl, Scriven, M. Minneapolis: 
University of Minesota Press, 1956. 
Smith, B. "On Knowing One's Own Language." In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited 
by C. Wright, B. Smith and C. MacDonald. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
Strawson, P. F. Individuals. London: Methuen, 1959. 
Thele, B. "The Explanation of First-Person Authority." In Reflecting Davidson, edited 
by R. Stoecker, 213-47. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 
Wirth, U. "Abductive Reasoning in Peirce's and Davidson's Account of 
Interpretation." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35, no. 1 (1999): 
115-27. 
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. 
Wright, C. "The Wittgensteinian Legacy." In Knowing our Own Minds, edited by C. 
Wright, B. Smith and C Macdonald. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
Yarbrough, S. "Passing Theories Through Topical Heuristics: Donald Davidson, 
Aristotle, and the Conditions of Discursive Competence." Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 37, no. 1 (2004): 72-91. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
p
 To
wn
